Prospects of a deflationary theory of self-knowledge (original) (raw)
Related papers
Oxford Handbook Online, 2016
A fundamental puzzle about self-knowledge is this: our spontaneous, unreflective self-attributions of beliefs and other mental states—avowals, as they are often called—appear to be at once epistemically groundless and also epistemically privileged. On the one hand, it seems that our avowals simply do not rely on—nor do they require—justification or evidence. On the other hand, our avowals seem to represent a substantive epistemic achievement: they appear to represent beliefs that are especially apt to constitute genuine knowledge of our own present states of mind. Several authors have recently tried to explain away avowals' groundlessness by appeal to the so-called transparency of present-tense self-attributions—a feature that is best illustrated by considering present-tense self-attributions of beliefs. As observed by Gareth Evans, if asked whether I believe, e.g., that it's raining, I will typically not 'look inward' and attend to my own state of mind, but instead I will look outside, to the world—to see whether it's raining or not. Two recent and divergent construals of transparency agree that it shows avowals of beliefs (and perhaps other mental states) to be only apparently groundless. After a critical discussion of these two construals (Section 2), we present an alternative reading of transparency that explains—rather than explains away—the apparent groundlessness of avowals (Section 3). We then explore (in Section 4) a way of coupling this alternative reading with a plausible account of how it is that our ordinary avowals can represent genuine knowledge of our own present states of mind.
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief
Self-Knowledge, Hatzimoysis, ed. Oxford University Press, 2011
In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access to dispositional beliefs, which are arguably more central examples of belief than occurrent judgments. First, one’s dispositional beliefs as to whether p may diverge from the occurrent judgments generated by the method of transparency. Second, even in cases where these are reliably linked — e.g., in which one’s judgment that p derives from one’s dispositional belief that p — using the judgment to self-attribute the dispositional belief requires an ‘inward’ gaze.
On The Epistemic Rationality and Significance of Self-Fulfilling Beliefs
Synthese, 2021
Some propositions are not likely to be true overall, but are likely to be true if you believe them. Appealing to the platitude that belief aims at truth, it has become increasingly popular to defend the view that such propositions are epistemically rational to believe. However, I argue that this view runs into trouble when we consider the connection between what's epistemically rational to believe and what's practically rational to do. I conclude by discussing how rejecting the view bears on three other epistemological issues. First, we're able to uncover a flaw in a common argument for permissivism. Second, we can generate a problem for prominent versions of epistemic consequentialism. Finally, we can better understand the connection between epistemic rationality and truth: epistemic rationality is a guide to true propositions rather than true beliefs.
2007
Certain situations seem to call for acknowledging the possibility that one's own beliefs are biased or distorted. On the other hand, certain sorts of epistemic self-doubts (such as 'I believe it's raining, but it's not') seem paradoxical. And some have put forth epistemic principles requiring rational agents to regard their own credences as so-called 'expert functions'.
If You Believe You Believe, You Believe. A Constitutive Account of Knowledge of One’s Own Beliefs
2017
Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore's paradox. It shows that if one believes that one believes that p then one believes that p – even though one can believe that p without believing that one believes that p.
Embedded Mental Action in Self-Attribution of Belief (PENULTIMATE DRAFT)
You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure " the transparency method for belief. " How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one mental action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude's being known transparently.
International Journal for Philosophical Studies, 2008
This paper argues that the cases of radical uncertainty about who one is that John Perry and David Lewis discuss do not show the need for a special first person kind of belief. I argue that the kind of uncertainty imagined is in fact incoherent.
SELF-ASCRIPTIONS OF BELIEF AND TRANSPARENCY DRAFT 2010
Review of philosophy nd psychology , 2010
Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self- knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is 12 defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P (draft version)