Gröbner bases for public key cryptography (original) (raw)
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Lattice Polly Cracker cryptosystems
Journal of Symbolic Computation, 2011
Using Gröbner bases for the construction of public key cryptosystems has been often attempted, but has always failed. We review the reason for these failures, and show that only ideals generated by binomials may give a successful cryptosystem. As a consequence, we concentrate on binomial ideals that correspond to Euclidean lattices. We show how to build a cryptosystem based on lattice ideals and their Gröbner bases, and, after breaking a simple variant, we construct a more elaborate one. In this variant the trapdoor information consists in a ''small'' change of coordinates that allows one to recover a ''fat'' Gröbner basis. While finding a change of coordinates giving a fat Gröbner basis is a relatively easy problem, finding a small one seems to be a hard optimization problem. This paper develops the details and proofs related to computer algebra, the cryptographic details related to security, the comparison with other lattice cryptosystems and discusses the implementation.
Applicable Algebra in Engineering, Communication and Computing, 2006
In the first sections we extend and generalize Gröbner basis theory to submodules of free right modules over monoid rings. Over free monoids, we adapt the known theory for right ideals and prove versions of Macaulay's basis theorem, the Buchberger criterion, and the Buchberger algorithm. Over monoids presented by a finitely generated convergent string rewriting system we generalize Madlener's Gröbner basis theory based on prefix reduction from right ideals to right modules. After showing how these Gröbner basis theories relate to classical group-theoretic problems, we use them as a basis for a new class of cryptosystems that are generalizations of the cryptosystems described in [2] and [8]. Well known cryptosystems such as RSA, El-Gamal, Polly Cracker, Polly Two and a braid group cryptosystem are shown to be special cases. We also discuss issues related to the security of these Gröbner basis cryptosystems.
A Lattice Based Public Key Cryptosystem Using Polynomial Representations
2003
In Crypto 97, a public key cryptosystem based on the closest vector problem was suggested by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi [4]. In this paper, we propose a public key cryptosystem applying representations of polynomials to the GGH encryption scheme. Its key size is much smaller than the GGH system so that it is a quite practical and efficient lattice based cryptosystem.
New Practical Algebraic Public-Key Cryptosystem and Some Related Algebraic and Computational Aspects
Applied Mathematics, 2013
The most popular present-day public-key cryptosystems are RSA and ElGamal cryptosystems. Some practical algebraic generalization of the ElGamal cryptosystem is considered-basic modular matrix cryptosystem (BMMC) over the modular matrix ring. An example of computation for an artificially small number n is presented. Some possible attacks on the cryptosystem and mathematical problems, the solution of which are necessary for implementing these attacks, are studied. For a small number n, computational time for compromising some present-day public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, ElGamal, and Rabin, is compared with the corresponding time for the ВММС. Finally, some open mathematical and computational problems are formulated.
2015
GGH class of public-key cryptosystems relies on computational problems based on the closest vector problem (CVP) in lattices for their security. The subject of lattice based cryptography is very active and there have recently been new ideas that revolutionised the field. We present EEH, a GGH-Like public key cryptosystem based on the Eisenstein integers Z[ζ 3 ] where ζ 3 is a primitive cube root of unity. EEH applies representations of polynomials to the GGH encryption scheme and we discuss its key size and parameters selection. We also provide theoretical and experimental data to compare the security and efficiency of EEH to GGH with comparable parameter sets and show that EEH is an improvement over GGH in terms of security and efficiency.
ILTRU: An NTRU-Like Public Key Cryptosystem Over Ideal Lattices
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2015
In this paper we present a new NTRU-Like public key cryptosystem with security provably based on the worst case hardness of the approximate both Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) and Closest Vector Problem (CVP) in some structured lattices, called ideal lattices. We show how to modify the ETRU cryptosystem, an NTRU-Like public key cryptosystem based on the Eisenstein integers 3 [ ] where 3 is a primitive cube root of unity, to make it provably secure, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic fields. The security then proves for our main system from the already proven hardness of the R-LWE and R-SIS problems. KeywordsLattice-based cryptography; Ideal lattices; ETRU; Provable security; Dedekind domain.
Lattice Based Tools in Cryptanalysis for Public Key Cryptography
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications, 2012
Lattice reduction is a powerful concept for solving diverse problems involving point lattices. Lattice reduction has been successfully utilizing in Number Theory, Linear algebra and Cryptology. Not only the existence of lattice based cryptosystems of hard in nature, but also has vulnerabilities by lattice reduction techniques. In this survey paper, we are focusing on point lattices and then describing an introduction to the theoretical and practical aspects of lattice reduction. Finally, we describe the applications of lattice reduction in Number theory, Linear algebra.
Algebraic cryptography: new constructions and their security against provable break
St. Petersburg Mathematical Journal, 2009
Cryptography based on noncommutative algebra still suffers from lack of schemes and lack of interest. In this work, we show new constructions of cryptosystems based on group invariants and suggest methods to make such cryptosystems secure in practice. We do not know any proof of security in its cryptographic sense or even a reduction of it to a sensible statement about regular complexity classes. In this paper we introduce a new notion of cryptographic security, a provable break, and prove that cryptosystems based on matrix group invariants and also a variation of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key agreement protocol for modular groups are secure against provable worst-case break unless NP ⊆ RP.
2020
Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a trend that has a deserved NIST status, and which aims to be resistant to quantum computers attacks like Shor and Grover algorithms. In this paper, we propose a method for designing post-quantum provable IND-CPA/IND-CCA2 public key cryptosystems based on polynomials over a non-commutative algebraic extension ring. The key ideas of our proposal is that (a) for a given non-commutative ring of rank-3 tensors, we can define polynomials and take them as the underlying work structure (b) we replace all numeric field arithmetic with GF(2 8) field operations. By doing so, it is easy to implement Rpropped Diffie-Helman-like key exchange protocol and consequently ElGamal-like cryptosystems. Here R stands for Rijndael as we work over the AES field. This approach yields secure post-quantum protocols since the resulting multiplicative monoid is immune against quantum algorithms and resist classical linearization attacks like Tsaban's Algebraic Span or Roman'kov. The protocols have been proved to be semantically secure. Finally, we present numerical examples of the proposed R-Propped protocols.