A Holistic View on Knowledge and Values (original) (raw)
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Rationality and Normativity: A Defence of the Metaphysical Foundation of Social and Ethical Values
AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities, 2019
This paper evaluated the role of metaphysics as the critical determinant of both ethical and social values. It is concerned with the philosophical problem of determining the principle underlying the different value opinions, social interactions, perceptions and judgements. The objective of the paper derives from the main concern of modern theory of value which is to find out the nature and significance of value in society. Consequently, the problem of the relations between value and existence; and value and social realities become of great significance on metaphysical grounds. The method of the study is essentially textual analysis. As a branch of philosophy, metaphysics conducts the most general investigation possible into the nature of reality, what is existence (being), and what (fundamentally distinct) types of thing exist. Some people have the idea that the subject matter of metaphysics is pure speculation with little practical relevance to mankind and society. Against this backdrop, this paper sought to establish the importance of metaphysics in the broader spectrum of human existence. In conclusion, the thesis of this paper is that metaphysics can provide a foundation for ethical and social values and that without metaphysics no rational justification may be given to these values.
Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue
Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology, 2021
This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous example of the 'road to Larissa,' and goes on to explain work on doxastic responsibility, on intellectual “virtue”/“vice,” and on epistemic value monism vs. pluralism. Section 1; Epistemic Value and the Value Problem; Section 2: The Ethics of Belief; Section 3: Virtue & Vice Epistemologies; Section 4: Epistemic Paternalism.
Epistemic Presuppositions and their Consequences
Metaphilosophy, 2003
Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach -among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue-centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue-centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding.
The Problem of Epistemic Value: From Knowledge to Understanding (2014)
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Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures, 2016
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Epistemological Origins of Ethics
Lewin's chapter focuses on the need for a constructivist ethics. His position calls for an analysis of ways in which knowledge and relationships are associated. This response is concerned with the following themes: first, connections between ways of knowing and ways of relating in constructivist writings; second, some constructivist issues in Lewin's chapter; and third, I describe a series of constructivist intervention studies designed to apply constructivist educational strategies for ethical reasons. A number of constructivist theorists have drawn attention to the ethical and social implications of their epistemology. For Kelly (1955) ways of knowing were ultimately ways of relating. This follows from the anticipatory and dynamic nature of knowing. Kelly saw behaviour as governed, not simply from what people anticipate in the short term—but by where the choices will lead in the longer term. What we know about people bears on the ways in which werelate to them. The constructions that we make determine the nature of our interdependencies. Maturana (1988, 1991) has been clear about the ethical implications of two types of explaining and Foerster (1991) has shown how thoughts about one's relationship to experience have ethical implications. Which is the primary cause, the world or my experience of it? Foerster adopted the position that his experience is the primary cause and the world the consequence. This ties him inseparably and inevitably to his responsibility. Finally, Glasersfeld has noted that constructivism leads to greater tolerance in social interactions. This tolerance arises when one realizes that neither problems nor solutions are ontological entities but arise out of ways of constructing. A world arises out of a way of seeing, a way of experiencing. That is not to say that we find all ways or all worlds equally likable (e.g. Glasersfeld, 1991, 1995). I would like to draw attention to three features of constructivism before turning to some specifics of Philip Lewin's contribution. First, constructivism emphasizes the role we have in organizing our experience, the way in which we make our understandings. Glasersfeld (1995), by his use of the word 'radical' in the phrase 'radical constructivism', signalled a break with a tradition that has been dominant for about two thousand years. Further, by showing the connections that the constructivist epistemological position has with cybernetics, he displayed both it's plausibility and power. To those whose implicit epistemology reflects the traditional view, one of the most unsettling of the implications is that different ways of understanding, different answers, may not be wrong. Instead, they may reflect an alternative way of looking at experience. Second, constructivism invites an openness to consider the ideas of other people and an openness to reconsider one's own ideas. Such openness requires
The Routledge Companion to Ethics, edited by John Skorupski, 2010
Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-77), and Leibniz (1646-1716) are commonly , and rightly, considered to belong to a single school of thought in metaphysics and epistemology. Although they arrive at different conclusions, they share a set of concerns and methodological principles. Each is interested in proving the existence of God and describing God's relation to the world; in giving an account of the human being; and in describing the nature and limits of knowledge. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz differ among themselves about what the most basic principles of reason are and how they are rightly applied. However , it is also generally true that each approaches these subjects as ones that can be understood better by means of human reason rather than by uncritical trust in the senses. For these purposes, then, the label "rationalist" can be a useful and tolerably accurate one. That label is probably not as useful in ethics. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz do hold some ethical views in common. Moreover, some of their most interesting differences do arise from their positions in metaphysical and epistemological debates. These philosophers' aims and influences in ethics also vary in many respects, however, and it would be misleading to underemphasize this point here. Descartes's moral theory shows the influence of Stoicism, and recasts ancient views about the passions and their control in light of his own account of the human being, human physiology, and psychology. The views that Descartes expresses are tempered by a reverence for ecclesiastical and civil authority together with a well-justified concern that his enemies would be very likely to find in a complete ethical theory, and, in particular, in a detailed normative ethics, effective means of damaging his reputation and security. As a result, even his most complete moral work, The Passions of the Soul, leaves one with the sense that some important consequences of the theory are left unwritten. Spinoza addresses Descartes and the Stoics in his own account of the passions and their control in the Ethics. However, Spinoza also clearly addresses a number of authors, notably Hobbes, Maimonides, and Aristotle. The themes of Spinoza's moral theory include Cartesian themes, but only as an important part of the whole view. Spinoza, moreover, states his view in a bold, uncompromising, and thorough treatise: his moral theory is much better developed than the views of either Descartes or Leibniz. Leibniz, although his remarks on ethics show careful attention to Spinoza and Descartes, addresses other traditions as well, especially the tradition of natural law theory. Leibniz does give accounts of virtue, happiness, and perfection that, while quite short and unsystematic, clearly respond to concerns of the sort that also moved Descartes and Spinoza. His most distinctive and important ethical ideas, however, the notions of charity and of the moral community of minds, which he calls the City of God, address a moral concern – how we should act toward others – that is only a passing concern for Spinoza and that Descartes entrusts to higher authorities. There is, then, a common set of themes addressed in these theories. The authors’ various concerns and perspectives suggest, however, that these similarities amount to an interesting development of the tradition of virtue ethics rather than to a single, readily defined school of rationalist ethical thought.
Ethics and values Final Project
In the professional healthcare industry, crucial decisions are made all the time. In fact, it can be said that decisions made in the healthcare industry are important because the outcome will literally affect the life of another person. As such, understanding how a person makes decisions, professionally and personally, is an important insight. The topic of this paper will tackle how our personal belief systems evolved, and how they assist in providing a better understanding of concepts such as ethics, values, and interprofessionalism. Aside from understanding the aforementioned, the paper will also present how they shape our analysis, interpretation and communication of ethical and legal issues that we may encounter in our personal and daily lives.