From The Caspian To The Baltic: To The Question Of History Of The Marines In Tsar Peter's Forces = С Каспия на Балтику: к вопросу об истории петровской морской пехоты (original) (raw)

К истории военно-морского флота в сасанидском Иране / About the History of Sasanian Naval Forces [in Russian]

Вестник Нижегородского университета им. Н. И. Лобачевского. 2017. № 4. С. 34–44., 2017

В историографии сложилось устойчивое восприятие Сасанидской державы как государства, чьи вооружённые силы были представлены исключительно сухопутными родами войск. Однако материал источников позволяет констатировать наличие в сасанидском Иране на протяжении всей его истории военно-морского флота, выполнявшего функцию боевого (военно-транспортного) обеспечения действий сухопутной армии. Главными причинами создания Сасанидами собственных военно-морских сил являлись необходимость обеспечения внешней безопасности Персидского государства путём установления контроля над морскими коммуникациями в зоне Персидского залива и стремление персидских властей к усилению военно-политического и торгово-экономического влияния сасанидского Ирана в северной части бассейна Индийского океана. Наиболее активная фаза действий персидского флота приходится на годы правления Хосрова Ануширвана (531–579). Последние упоминания об участии сасанидских военных кораблей в боевых действиях относятся к периоду персидско-византийской войны 602–628 гг. Основной зоной действий сасанидского флота являлись Персидский залив, Красное и Аравийское моря; попытки персов создать флот на Чёрном (540-е гг.) и Средиземном (620-е гг.) морях были пресечены Византией. После гибели Сасанидской державы персидские корабли вошли в состав вооружённых сил Арабского халифата и некоторое время продолжали участвовать в боевых действиях на стороне арабов. Своими морскими победами арабы в определённой мере были обязаны опыту, позаимствованному ими у персидских мореплавателей. *** It has been a widely-held ingrained perception in modern historiography that Sasanian Iran was a power whose armed forces were represented exclusively by land forces. However, the material of primary sources allows us to confirm the existence in Sassanid Iran throughout its history of the navy, which performed the function of combat (logistic) support for the land army. The main reasons for creating the navy were the need to ensure the external security of the Persian state by establishing control over the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf region and the desire of the Persian authorities to strengthen their military and political as well as trade and economic influence of Sassanid Iran in the northern part of the Indian Ocean basin. The most dynamic phase of the Persian navy’s activities occurred during the reign of Khosrow Anushirwan (531–579) when the Persians conquered Yemen by means of their fleet and even tried to establish a naval force in the Black Sea. The last event in which the Sasanian navy took part was the Byzantine-Persian war of 602–628. In this conflict, the Persians initially were able to achieve some progress in the Mediterranean Sea but eventually they were completely defeated by the more skillful Byzantine navy. The main areas of the Persian navy’s activities were the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. The Sasanids’ attempts to establish their fleet in the Black Sea (540’s) and in the Mediterranean Sea (620’s) were foiled by Byzantium. After the fall of the Sasanian Empire, Persian ships became part of the armed forces of the Arab Caliphate and for some time continued to participate in military operations on the side of the Arabs. Victories of the Arabian fleet over the Byzantines were, to some extent, due to the naval experience which the Arab seafarers got from their Persian teachers.

К истории военно-морского флота в сасанидском Иране / The History of Sasanian Navy Revisited [in Russian]

Abstract: В историографии сложилось устойчивое восприятие Сасанидской державы как государства, чьи вооружённые силы были представлены исключительно сухопутными родами войск. Однако материал источников позволяет констатировать наличие в сасанидском Иране на протяжении всей его истории военно-морского флота, выполнявшего функцию боевого (военно-транспортного) обеспечения действий сухопутной армии. Главными причинами создания Сасанидами собственных военно-морских сил являлись необходимость обеспечения внешней безопасности Персидского государства путём установления контроля над морскими коммуникациями в зоне Персидского залива и стремление персидских властей к усилению военно-политического и торгово-экономического влияния сасанидского Ирана в северной части бассейна Индийского океана. Наиболее активная фаза действий персидского флота приходится на годы правления Хосрова Ануширвана (531–579). Последние упоминания об участии сасанидских военных кораблей в боевых действиях относятся к периоду персидско-византийской войны 602–628 гг. Основной зоной действий сасанидского флота являлись Персидский залив, Красное и Аравийское моря; попытки персов создать флот на Чёрном (540 е гг.) и Средиземном (620 е гг.) морях были пресечены Византией. После гибели Сасанидской державы персидские корабли вошли в состав вооружённых сил Арабского халифата и некоторое время продолжали участвовать в боевых действиях на стороне арабов. Своими морскими победами арабы в определённой мере были обязаны опыту, позаимствованному ими у персидских мореплавателей. *** In the modern historiography, it has developed a stable perception of Sasanian Iran as a power whose armed forces were presented solely by land forces. However, the material of primary sources allows us to ascertain the existence of Sasanian navy which realized the function of logistic support of the land army. The main reasons for the foundation of the Sasanian navy consisted in necessity to ensure the external security of the Persian state by establishing control of the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf region, and in aspiration of the Sasanid authorities to increase the military and political as well as trade and economic influence of Sasanian Iran in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. The most dynamic phase of the Persian Navy's activities falls on the reign of Khosrow Anushirwan (531–579). During his rule, the Persians conquered Yemen by mean of the fleet and even tried to establish navy in the Black Sea. The last militay event in which the Sasanian navy took part was the Byzantine-Persian war of 602–628. In this conflict, the Persians initially were able to achieve some progress in the Mediterranean Sea but as a result, they were completely defeated by the more skillful Byzantine navy. The main areas of the Persian Navy's activities were the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Sea. The Sasanids’ attempts to establish fleet in the Black Sea (540’s) and Mediterranean Sea (620’s) were put an end by Byzantium. After the fall of Sasanian Empire, Persian ships became the part of the Arabian Navy and for some time continued to participate in wars on the side of the Arabs. Victories of the Arabian fleet over the Byzantines were, to some extent, due to the naval experience which the Arab seafarers got from their Persian teachers.

Белоусов А.С. Военно-морской флот во время русско-турецкой войны 1735-1739 гг.: историографический аспект (Belousov A.S. The Russian Navy during the Russian-Turkish war of 1735-1739: historiographic aspect)

2019

Belousov A.S. The Russian Navy during the russian-turkish war of 1735-1739: historiographic aspect // Klio. 2019. № 3 (147), pp. 37-43. Белоусов А.С. Военно-морской флот во время русско-турецкой войны 1735-1739 гг.: историографический аспект // Клио. 2019. № 3 (147). С. 37-43. The paper discusses the Russian and foreign historiography of the Russian-Turkish war of 1735-1739 and the naval studies in it, which plague the history of the Don and Dnieper flotillas. The analysis of the published works demonstrates the beginning of interest in this military conflict at the end of the 18th century by foreign historians, and then Russian. The historiographic base of the war of 1735-1739 was formed at the end of XIX - beginning of XX centuries. The historians of the Navy reproduced the existing model of research and concentrated on the publication of sources at this time. In Soviet times, the study of the war almost stopped. The naval context of the war has ceased to be in the field of view of Soviet historical science. New impetus to the development of historiography is identified at the beginning of the XXI century. Russian and foreign historians publish many works and significantly expand the list of problems. There is a widespread presence of the naval theme, emphasizing the fact that most researchers limit themselves to describing the history of the construction of flotillas without a comprehensive analysis of their shipbuilding programs, staff and combat use. In addition, many modern military historians do not use the experience of previous historiography and base their work on a lapidary list of sources. The analysis of the historiography of the Russian-Turkish war of 1735-1739 demonstrates that Russian and foreign researchers ignore each other’s sources and literature.

"Imperial Habit": Russia's Attempt to Gain a Foothold on the Eastern Coast of the Caspian Sea in the Era of Peter the Great

The article displays one of the directions of Russia's foreign policy during the reign of Peter the Great, namely, an attempt to gain a foothold on the Eastern coast of the Caspian Sea for further advancement through the Central Asian states to India in order to establish direct trade relations. The paper analyzes the goals and objectives set up by Peter the Great to Prince A. Bekovich-Cherkassky to initiate a new trade route to India from the Caspian Sea basin. Russia's steps aimed at creating a foothold on the Eastern coast of the Caspian Sea are being considered. The adopted scientific ideas about the number of strongholds in the Caspian region founded by Russia in 1716 are analyzed. The Russian-Turkmen relations are described during the period of Russia's activity in the Caspian region and after the failure of the Khiva expedition of 1717. The fate of Russian fortress-cities in the eastern Caspian region is traced. The assessment of the actions of Prince A. Bekovich-Cherkassky on the implementation of Russia's policy in the Caspian region is given in the context of Peter the Great's plans.

The Perioikoi in the Tactical Organization of the Spartan Army and the “Citizen Morai” Issue | Периэки в структуре спартанского войска и вопрос о «гражданских морах»

The Perioikoi in the Tactical Organization of the Spartan Army and the “Citizen Morai” Issue, 2015

The paper deals with the question about the degree to which the perioikoi were integrated into the structure of the Spartan army. The author draws attention to a number of inconsistencies and contradictions of sources containing some information on the Lacedaemonian army’s tactical organization at its different stages. The author mainly focuses on the textual analysis of the passage of De Republica Lacaedemoniorum in which Xenophon speaks about regular tactical units of Spartan troops (Rep. Lac. XI.4). The author overturns the arguments for the hypothesis that the integration of periokoi and spartiatai in the form of common fighting units took place only after the defeat in the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC.

Avakov P. Azov v strategicheskikh planakh tsaria Petra I, 1695–1696 gg.: Reviziia istoriograficheskoi traditsii // Cahiers du Monde russe. 2020. № 61/1–2. Janvier – juin. P. 177–204

Azov in Tsar Peter I’s strategic plans between 1695 and 1696: A revision of historiographical tradition The article analyzes the causes and goals of Peter I’s Azov campaigns. The author concludes that the generally accepted interpretation of this issue in historiography is hypothetical in nature and based on an a priori equivalence of the campaigns’ goals and results. The purpose of the campaigns was to deliver a tangible blow to the Ottoman Empire: getting access to the sea was the result of the capture of Azov. It is shown that J. Rousset de Missy, a Dutch publicist of the first half of the eighteenth century, stands at the origins of the historiographic tradition that connects the idea of owning Azov with the ambition to develop maritime trade in Russia. The universal constructions of the philosopher K. Marx played an important role in consolidating this scheme in Soviet historical science. The idea of organizing the Azov campaigns, based on the previous experience of military-political relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century, probably belongs to the tsar himself. The opinion that the author of this idea was the Ukrainian Hetman I.S. Mazepa has been declared insolvent. The author presents new information and arguments confirming that the planning of the Azov campaign began no earlier than the end of 1694. В статье анализируются причины и цели Азовских походов Петра I. Автор приходит к выводу, что общепринятая в историографии трактовка этого вопроса носит гипотетический характер и основана на априорном тождестве целей Азовских походов и их результатов. Целью походов было нанесение ощутимого удара по Османской империи, а получение выхода в море стало следствием взятия Азова. Показано, что у истоков историографической традиции, связывающей идею обладания Азовом со стремлением развивать в России морскую торговлю, стоит голландский публицист первой половины XVIII в. Ж. Руссе де Мисси. Для закрепления этой схемы в советской исторической науке важную роль сыграли универсальные построения философа К. Маркса. Идея организации Азовских походов, основанная на предшествующем опыте военно-политических отношений России с Османской империей в XVII в., вероятно, принадлежит самому царю. Мнение о том, что автором этой идеи был украинский гетман И.С. Мазепа, признано несостоятельным. Приведены новые сведения и аргументы, подтверждающие вывод о начале планирования похода к Азову не ранее конца 1694 г.

«Мозг» флота России. От Цусимы до Первой мировой войны ("Brain" of Russian Navy: From Tsushima to World War I)

Монография посвящена истории развития структуры центрального военно-морского управления в России в 1905-1914 гг. На основе архивных материалов, воспоминаний, публицистических сочинений рассматриваются взаимоотношения различных лиц и групп внутри руководства морского ведомства, проекты реорганизации Морского министерства. Сегодня отечественный военно-морской флот переживает новый период реорганизации. Только опираясь на исторический опыт и богатые традиции русского и советского флота, можно определить перспективы дальнейшего развития военно-морских сил нашей страны.

Персей, «македонский щит» и кавсия / Perseus, the "Macedonian Shield" and Kausia

Античный мир и археология. Вып. 21. Саратов, 2023. С. 70–82 / Ancient World and Archaeology 21, 2023, 70–82

The reverse of the denarii minted in Rome in 63 or 62 BC, with one of the moneyers at the time being L. Aemilius Lepidus Paullus, shows the conqueror of Macedonia L. Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, as well as Perseus, the captured last king of the Antigonid dynasty, his children and a trophy. Some of these coins have the trophy depicting a shield of the so-called «Macedonian type» with its typical geometric and astral design. In 2012 a well preserved sample of this denarius from the so-called «Mayflower Collection» was sold at an auction. On that particular coin Perseus is illustrated wearing a kausia, a headdress probably of Macedonian origin, which became widespread in the Hellenistic world. The captive king’s facial features bear resemblance to the portraits of Perseus on the tetradrachms minted during his reign. Both the «Macedonian shield» and the kausia were seen as symbols of Macedonia and other Hellenistic kingdoms, still recognizable a century after Alexander the Great’s homeland had lost its independence.