How important is Democracy for the absence of war between states? (original) (raw)
Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?
The Review of Economic Studies, 2011
We build a game-theoretic model where aggression can be triggered by domestic political concerns as well as the fear of being attacked. In the model, leaders of full and limited democracies risk losing power if they do not stand up to threats from abroad. In addition, the leader of a fully democratic country loses the support of the median voter if he attacks a non-hostile country. The result is a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace. Using Polity data, we classify countries as full democracies, limited democracies, and dictatorships. For the period 1816-2000, Correlates of War data suggest that limited democracies are more aggressive than other regime types, including dictatorships, and not only during periods when the political regime is changing. In particular, a dyad of limited democracies is more likely to be involved in a militarized dispute than any other dyad (including "mixed" dyads, where the two countries have di¤erent regime types). Thus, while full democratization might advance the cause of peace, limited democratization might advance the cause of war. We also …nd that as the environment becomes more hostile, fully democratic countries become more aggressive faster than other regime types.
Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory
1998
A study was conducted to examine the effects of nation-states' political institutions on state relations. War-fighting and selection-effects explanation were compared to explain why democracies were more likely to win wars. An analysis of all interstate wars between 1816 and 1982 revealed that democracies that initiate wars often win them. Results also suggest that domestic political structure is one factor that should not be omitted from the study of international relations.
Another Skirmish in the Battle over Democracies and War
International Security, 2009
In previous articles and in our 2002 book Democracies at War, we argued that democracies are particularly likely to win their wars. Democratic political institutions provide incentives for elected leaders to launch only short, winnable, low-cost wars, so they may avoid domestic political threats to their hold on power. Democracies tend to win the wars they initiate because democratic leaders generally "select" themselves into winnable wars, and they are more likely to win when they are targeted because their armies ªght with better initiative and leadership. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1987, we found strong empirical support for our theory. 1 Other scholarship has produced ªndings supportive of our theory. Elsewhere, two different formal game-theoretic models produced the hypothesis that democracies are especially likely to win the wars they initiate. 2 The empirical results generated to test these and related hypotheses have withstood challenges to data selection and research design. 3 Using data sets and research designs different from ours, other scholars have uncovered empirical patterns consistent with our theory that democracies are especially likely to win the crises they initiate, 4 that wars and crises are shorter when democracies and democratic initiators are involved, and that democracies become increasingly likely to initiate wars as their likelihood of victory increases. 5 H.E. Goemans's recent
The Validity of the Democratic Peace Theory
The democratic peace theory, which originates from Kant’s theory of ‘Perpetual Peace’, states that democracies do not go to war with each other. However, it differs from Kant’s theory in the fact that the democratic peace theory sets forth the notion that democracies don’t go to war with other democracies but do go to war with states which have other forms of government (Layne 8). There are several reasons as to why this is considered a robust theory, including institutional constraints, democratic norms and cultures, implementation of one of the key postulates of liberal states, the satisfaction of liberal states with absolute gains and their economic interdependence as well as conditions of empire, hegemony and equilibrium. Perhaps the most powerful reason to believe the theory is it’s justification by empirical data and statistics. However, in this essay, I will state my reasons for disagreeing with the democratic peace theory, some of which are the vague definition of a democracy, the small sample size of empirical data, rise of democracies in a period conflict, the distinction between correlation and causation along with case studies which show that the reason two states don’t go to war may have nothing to do with the fact that they are democracies. Finally, I conclude the paper by putting forth a theory as to why democratic superpowers would back the DPT and prosper from it.
A Critique of the Democratic Peace Theory
The question whether democracy causes peace has been the focus of much investigation in recent years. It has been observed that no democratic state has ever gone to war with another, and the expectation naturally arises that as more states become democratic, the occasions for armed conflict will be reduced, leading to a more peaceful international system. The hope that a structural or institutional means of eliminating war might be found is not new. Adherents of the democratic peace theory point to Kant's essay of 1795 on "Perpetual Peace" as the origin of the idea. Democratic peace proponents today seek to explain the observed statistical correlation between democracy and peace by reference to inherent features of democratic governance such as the constraints placed on decision-makers by the separation of powers and their need to respect the will of the people, or-more vaguely-by reference to the cultural characteristics of democracies. But the recurrence of war has been a perpetual feature of human history, and the standard of proof must be high on those who would claim that the spread of democracy will result in a significant and sustained reduction of wars in the future. It is my contention in this essay that the empirical support for the democratic peace theory is based on too narrow a group, and that the analytical explanations for the theory are weak, and hence that there is insufficient warrant at this time for excessive confidence in the proposition that the spread of democracy will lead to a more peaceful world.
Democratisation and Inter‐State War: Why Reform does not Encourage Conflict1
Politics, 2004
The 'democratic peace theory' argues that democratic states do not initiate war against one another and that democratic institutions discourage that initiation of international conflict. In general, this theory has mostly been applied to existing liberal democracies. However, the peaceful nature of the process of democratisation is far less evident. Some scholars argue that the instability of democratic transitions increases the likelihood that democratising states will initiate international conflict, making the democratic peace theory less valuable in its explanatory power. This article, however, argues that democratising states, as opposed to authoritarian states exhibiting a brief period of liberalisation, are inherently less prone to periods of international conflict.
FROM WAR TO PEACE: WHEN DEMOCRACY PREVAILS
Why are some war-torn countries able to make the transition to democracy? This paper intends to bring to light central dilemmas originating from the efforts of building peace and democracy in fragile states after war. We will focus on understanding the tensions and contradictions in post-conflict democratization, the challenges facing interim governments and the role of the international community. We will first analyze the set of structural and common dilemmas of peace-building and democratization in the aftermath of civil war, such as temporal, systemic, horizontal, and vertical dilemmas. The paper highly contributes theoretically to the body of knowledge by proposing a spiral of interrelated additional 8 dilemmas: security, safety, moral, sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. Secondly, the different dilemmas will be addressed in relation to elections. Thirdly, constitutionalism is a sine qua non mechanism for establishing the new " social contract " based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the processes of democratization and peace-building are promoted by international actors who also face their own range of varying and even mutually contradictory dilemmas. In conclusion, from war to peace, democracy might prevail initially with a minimalist approach. But only if certain choices of
Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited
Oxford University Press eBooks, 2012
This chapter analyzes the influence of democratic institutions-specifically, the effects of (i) electoral uncertainty when individuals within a nation have different preferences over public peaceful investment and (ii) greater checks and balances that lead to a more effective mobilization of resources for both public peaceful investment and arming-on a nation's incentive to arm and willingness to initiate war. The analysis is based on a model where nations contest some given resource and where they cannot commit to their future allocations to arming; yet, the victor in a conflict today gains an advantage in future conflict and thus realizes a savings in future arming. These assumptions imply that, despite the short-term incentives to settle peacefully, one or both nations might choose to initiate war. In such a setting, electoral uncertainty tends to make a democracy more peaceful relative to an autocracy, whereas greater checks and balances tend to make a democracy less peaceful. Thus, while two democracies might be more peaceful than two autocracies when paired against each other in a contest over a given resource, this is not necessarily the case. Even under conditions where democracies are most likely to be peaceful with one another, democracies are at least as likely to be in war with autocracies as autocracies are likely to be in war each other.
The Role of Democracy in International Relationship
The role of Democracy should not be ignored in the area of the international relationships. Indeed the value of democracy and its movements have mass impact on the international order in many cases. In this paper, I would like to discuss two points in explaining the roles of democracy: (1) the relationship between democracy and development and (2) the democratic system most commonly chosen as the best alternative one to fix any governance systems.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2008
There is a gap between much of the theorizing about the democratic peace, with its focus on democracies' internalization of costs of war, and the empirical evidence, which finds that democracies are pacifistic only towards each other. Drawing on the insights of Machiavelli and the classical thinkers on whom he relied, we offer a theory of democratic deterrence that can explain this empirical pattern. Because democracies mobilize the resources of their populations more fully than do most nondemocracies, a democracy's net expected per capita gains from aggression may be sufficient to motivate warlike behavior even with public participation in decisions about whether or not to fight. By our account democracies are disinclined to fight other democracies at least in part because other well mobilized regimes make less attractive targets.
The article examines democratic peace theory. Considerable research has examined how the regime type and the level of democracy relate with the probability of war. In addressing this issue, the article rests on the premise that democratization can be seen in two forms: a) as an internal process towards democracy b) as an external effort to promote or establish democratic regimes. Contributing to the debate regarding democratic peace theory, it is argued that democratization fails to deter states from pursuing their interests through war. However, and with regard to new forms of 'wars' like "terrorism", democratization can provide both the much needed space for cooperation and the creation of pluralistic societies that will accordingly help to confront some of the sources of rage.
The Reciprocal Relationship Between Military Conflict and Democracy
Defence and Peace Economics, 2013
Does democracy cause peace, or is democracy a consequence of peace? The burgeoning democratic peace literature has provided strong empirical evidence for the claim that democracies are a cause of peace. However, several skeptics of the democratic peace have suggested that the statistical findings are spurious. We test these competing claims using a simultaneous equation model. Using a unique data-set
The Justification of Democracy Peace Theory in the 21st Century
Social Science Review
Dependent on liberal ideologies , the democratic peace theory assumes that democracies rarely wage war on one another than non- democracies. But critics argue that merely being democratic in nature may not be the main reason for peace between democracies. Throughout the 21st century, we have witnessed the “War on Terrorism” after 9/11, the rise of multipolarity, several buffer zones underpinning major powers’ divisive politics and reflection of national leaders’ decisions on regional cooperatives and international institutions, etc., which have had varying effects on international politics. Therefore, this study begs a question that whether the implications of democratic peace theory are justified in the 21st century or not. Answering this question required a thorough review of the arguments put forward by democratic peace theorists and detractors. This article examines the justification of democratic peace theory by focusing on the remarkable political phenomena in the 21st century...
World Politics, 1992
A theoretical tradition as old as Immanuel Kant's essay on perpetual peace asserts that democratic states are unlikely to fight each other. When democratic states were few and far between, the Kantian perspective had little practical import, and power politics reigned. But if the Kantian perspective is correct, recent trends in replacing authoritarian regimes with democratic values and institutions in many parts of Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 1 may have profound implications not only for governmental practices within states but also for worldwide peace between states. It may be possible in part to supersede the "realist" principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice to the exclusion of "liberal" or "idealist" principles since at least the seventeenth century. Scholars of contemporary international relations are nearing consensus that democratically governed states rarely go to war with each other or even fight each other at low levels of lethal violence. This does not mean that there is anything like consensus on why the phenomenon occurs. Nor does it mean that democracies are more peaceful in general;