Addressing Aberrations in the Exegesis and Jurisprudence of Islam Responding to Islamism (A) (original) (raw)

The flaws in traditional methodology arise first and foremost from the rejection of reason as a foundation for providing knowledge of revelation. The turn from reason to tradition was catastrophic. It paved the way for a related catastrophic event, the turn from revelation to tradition. In this way, the authority of tradition surpassed both reason and revelation. The knowledge of revelation was subordinated to man-made reports without binding authority. The repression of revelation by tradition was followed by the subordination of revelation even to the pronouncements of the fuqaha, who emerged in the process of the re-arrangement of the roots of the law the chief authorities. The ijma or agreement of the ulema, according to the traditional perception, transcends everything. The result of the repression of reason to tradition was that unwarranted perceptions penetrated traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. It was accepted that reason is not equipped to understand revelation without the assistance of tradition. This transpired even though reason was used in the authentication of traditions in the first place. Further, it was assumed that tradition is revelation. This was tantamount to a fabrication of revelation. Treating tradition as revelation, according to man-made reports the rank of equality with the words of God is tantamount to textual polytheism. The text of revelation acquired “partners” in the form of the hadith anthologies. More than a hundred books of hadiths were accorded the rank of revelation, “similar” or even “equal” to revelation. This perception became widespread in defiance of the teaching of revelation which says that the Quran is unique and unlike anything else. It also amounted to associating with Allah what He gave no authority for (Quran, 7:33). In different words, the assertion that tradition is revelation was tantamount to a rejection of the uniqueness of the Quran. The effect of placing tradition on par with revelation was that tradition transcended revelation. Tradition surpassed revelation in three ways: first, reflecting the subordination of revelation to tradition, it was asserted that tradition “judges” revelation, Second, it was alleged that tradition may even “abrogate” revelation. The majority of the ulema from as early as 660 AD accepted that even a solitary hadith could abrogate a verse of the Book of Allah. Thus, it was claimed that rulings derived from tradition have the power to replace rulings in revelation. This applies in particular to rulings of apostasy, adultery and blasphemy. The rulings of men were permitted to overrule the rulings of Allah. This was a lapse into what we termed, “juristic polytheism.” Permitting the rulings of men to abrogate and replace the rulings of Allah corrupted significant parts of the sharia. This requires attention. It requires addressing aberrations that tainted traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. The repression of rationality emerged in the encounters between the followers of tradition and the rationalists. The traditionists besmirched reason to defeat the rationalists. The belittling of reasoning took place even though a few ulema argue that the protection of reason is among the purposes of the sharia. According to a hadith, the prophet referred to the use of ‘reason-based tafsir’ as disbelief (kufr). Muslims are expected to refrain from using reason in religion. Faith requires the sacrifice of reason on the altar of tradition. Traditionists treat abstaining from the use of reason in religion as an expression of piety. The treatment of reason in Islam reveals a checkered past. Anti-rationalism was propagated especially by the Sufis, who perceive persons who think as their enemies and the enemies of Islam. Traditionists allege that there is a “tension” between reason and revelation. The perception that equates reasoning with unbelief facilitated the proliferation of violence and accelerated the fall of the umma. For a civilization that does not value reason is doomed. It is by using reason that we access the knowledge of revelation. To this day we hear religious teachers advising their protégés against the perils of reasoning. The rejection of the relationship between causes and effects did a great disservice to Islam. For the rejection of the relationship between causes and effects entails a rejection of a large part of the teaching of revelation. Islam teaches that there is a relationship between the way we act and what we earn from it. If we are faithful and perform praiseworthy acts, we are rewarded with paradise. If we reject faith and perpetrate evil, we are rewarded with the fire. The rejection of reason also resulted in the backwardness of Muslims in the sciences and technology, which left them at the mercy of their enemies. Evidence of flawed reasoning is also encountered in the teaching of the purposes of the sharia. This teaching failed to emphasize justice as a purpose of the sharia. How to explain this glaring faux pas? For in the Book of Allah, justice is close to piety. In their backlash against the rationalists, who championed reason and justice, traditionists disregarded both. There are no books in Bukhari on justice, ethics and reason, essential parts of the teaching of revelation. Further evidence of flawed reasoning is found in the treatment of tradition as revelation, the perception that tradition judges revelation, and in the recourse to the teaching of abrogation. The rejection of reason facilitated the entry of a range of unwarranted perceptions and practices within exegesis and jurisprudence. These encompassed the perceptions that revelation is “ambiguous,” “deficient,” and “self-contradictory.” It was asserted that tradition explains revelation better than reason. Was any attention was paid to the fact that the explanation of revelation by tradition requires the use of reason, too? The subordination of reason to tradition was reflected in the perception that tradition was to be followed even against reason. The subordination of revelation to tradition was expressed in the perception that “tradition judges revelation” and that “revelation requires tradition more than tradition requires revelation.” Are these statements in keeping with the teaching of tauhid? The subjugation of reason and revelation to tradition tainted the knowledge of Islam. Folklore was expected to “explain” revelation, without the use of reason. The retreat from reason produced a paralysis in the Muslim mind. Inconsistent perceptions became embedded in exegesis as well as in jurisprudence. An example is the perception that traditions are “equal” to revelation and subordinate to revelation, at the same time. Another example is the replacement of parts of revelation by traditions. This resulted from the alleged abrogation of particular revealed verses by traditions. The teaching of abrogation enabled extensive tampering with the knowledge of revelation, deforming its teaching. The alleged abrogation of the peace verses by the ayah as-sayf transformed the teaching of peace into political Islam. It transformed Islam as the religion of peace into Islam as a religion of war seeking territorial expansion and global rule.