The Swedish Riksdag as Scrutiniser of the Principle of Subsidiarity (original) (raw)
Related papers
2017
The principle of subsidiarity in the European Union confines the policy-making and law-making competences of Union authorities to situations where the designated policy aims cannot be more effectively achieved at lower (i.e. national, regional or local) levels of governance. There are two institutionalised avenues envisaged to safeguard the EU institutions’ compliance with this principle. Besides the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in ruling on all legal questions arising from the application and interpretation of the Treaties, another important instrument is entrusted to the Member States’ parliaments. This consists of the political scrutiny of the proposed EU laws with regard to compliance with subsidiarity. This paper intends to juxtapose these institutionalised avenues through an analysis of the principle of subsidiarity as it appears throughout the case law of the Court of Justice and within the subsidiarity monitoring procedure performed by the national parliaments. The a...
2022
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the EU national parliaments have had the right to control the principle of subsidiarity through the Early Warning System (EWS). This study, commissioned by the European Parliament's Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the JURI Committee, examines how the EWS has worked over the past 12 years. It also looks into the interaction of the European Commission, local and regional entities, the Committee of the Regions and the Court of Justice of the EU with national parliaments to this end.
National Parliaments’ Scrutiny of the Principle of Subsidiarity: Reasoned Opinions 2014–2019
European Constitutional Law Review, 2020
Principle of subsidiarity – Early Warning Mechanism – Protocol No. 2 on Proportionality and Subsidiarity – The scope of the principle of subsidiarity – The role of national parliaments in the EU – National parliaments’ reasoned opinions – Principle of proportionality – Principle of conferral – National sovereignty in the EU – National identity in the EU – Justification of draft legislation acts
Role of the European Union in Applying the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2013
The principle of subsidiarity has always been the subject of many studies for the fact that the center of gravity moves gradually from the criteria of attribution to those relating to the exercise of powers. The principle of subsidiarity involves only European Union's competitive or collaborative competences when the action cannot be accomplished in member states level. While the principle of proportionality is a principle which obliges EU institutions to control the exercise of powers so that the measures taken do not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives that the institution or the institution must comply.The European Union institutions operate through political mechanisms (ex ante) and law mechanisms (ex post) control of the two principles.Legal control represents the fact that the Court of Justice has been cautioned in its control activities. The political control, in this paper, serves to present an overview of what led the recent treaties. In particular, we will analyze a new mechanism of preventive control, which aims to strengthen the control of the principles by the state parliaments (early warning system) on the basis of subsidiarity, which is a direct instrument to influence the legislative process. States are informed of any initiative of the Commission, who is forced to reconsider his proposal if one third of national parliaments consider incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity.
A CRITICAL LOOK OVER THE USE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY IN EU
2023
The principle of subsidiarity in the European Union (EU) is a fundamental aspect of its governance structure, aimed at ensuring decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens they affect. However, its application has been subject to criticism and debate over the years. The article discusses the positive aspects of the use of this principle and the possible human rights violations that may be encountered if this use is not appropriate.
The Substance of Subsidiarity: The Interpretation and Meaning of the Principle after Lisbon
The Treaty of Lisbon has firmly strengthened the subsidiarity principle by empowering national parliaments to scrutinize legislative proposals on compliance with the principle. But how do they apply subsidiarity, how do they interpret the principle and what criteria do they derive from it? First experiences indicate that national parliaments do not apply the new subsidiarity mechanism to simply block EU legislation. They further demonstrate the need for developing and applying objective criteria. As such, the principle may grow into a principle with a legal meaning and significance.
The Subsidiarity Principle and National Parliaments Role: From Formal Need to Real Use of Powers
Administrative sciences, 2020
Subsidiarity constitutes a guiding principle of the EU exercising power and the idea of involving national parliaments in the EU legislative procedure was seen as the best solution to increase democracy and transparency of the EU decision-making process at the European Convention established in 2001. Such a mechanism enables national parliaments to ensure the correct application of the principle of subsidiarity by the institutions taking part in the legislative process. This article examines how this principle is implemented by the national parliaments and EU responsible institutions. What is the novelty derived from the Treaty of Lisbon? Do national parliaments participate actively in the implementation of subsidiarity? If yes, what are the tools at their disposal? To answer all of these questions we try to shape a framework for understanding the phenomenon. 1. Introductory Considerations In the past, the procedural dimension of subsidiarity has been the dominant perspective but the recent reforms have, consequently, aimed to strengthen this dimension by involving the national parliaments as the watchdogs of subsidiarity principle. This article aims to examine the role of the national parliaments under the policy-making process after the Lisbon Treaty and their commitment to carry out their tasks. In the beginning we focus on the context and development of the subsidiarity principle in order to understand how this idea was introduced and what were the reasons for this. After a brief overview of the subsidiarity principle meaning, in the second part we focus on national parliaments and their role as the legal provisions states. We look at both the ex-ante mechanism for the subsidiarity control as well as the category of competences subject to subsidiarity evaluation. The last part, which has a core role for our research, analyzes the involvement of the national parliaments as a result of the subsidiarity principle application. We are interested to look at the numbers resulting from the entire process, reasoned opinions issued by member states and the top most active chambers by submitting reasoned opinions and general opinions to the Commission. We will briefly introduce an overall picture starting with the first reasoned opinion issued in 2010 and then we look in detail at reasoned opinions issued between 2016 and 2018. Furthermore, we try to identify the individual proposals and packages that received the greatest number of reasoned opinions in 2018 and the member states' implication on this matter. In the final remarks we present the main findings of our work and try to provide some possible explanations to the current state of the application of the subsidiarity principle by national parliaments.
Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union
Comparative European …, 2004
Subsidiarity has been introduced at the 1991 Maastricht conference as a principle of European governance. This article traces its development over the past 15 years and attempts to assess the effect of the subsidiarity principle on European governance. The impact of subsidiarity varies across time and across issue area. This is related to the fact that the European Union is at the same time characterized by inter-state relations and relations typical of a ‘regular’ political system. This specific nature of the European polity requires us to analyze policy-making in terms of different policy arenas which are sometimes inter-state in nature and sometimes more ‘regular’. This concept of European policy-making differs from the approaches currently dominating the field: intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. Although the effect of subsidiarity varies with the different natures of European policy arenas, the principle has tended to strengthen the position of the national governments of the Member States. This tendency has been continued in the operation of the Open Method of Coordination and the proposals regarding subsidiarity in the European Convention.
Rather than the introduction of the principle of subsidiarity itself in the Treaties in 1992, it is the creation of the Early Warning System in the Lisbon Treaty that has really contributed to the enhancement of the cooperation between EU institutions and national parliaments. The European Commission has been the primary interlocutor of parliaments in this framework, although the European Parliament also receives and follows-up on national parliaments' reasoned opinions. Despite positive developments visible both at EU and at national level, important challenges remain in particular in relation to the limited scope offered by the EWS for more political engagement. As illustrated by the success of the Political Dialogue with the European Commission and by the recent " green card initiative " , parliaments are eager to play a role in EU affairs, but they want this role to be positive rather than negative as currently foreseen by the Treaties.
German Law Journal
This contribution discusses National Parliaments’ subsidiarity objections raised in the context of the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) to the European Public Prosecutor Office proposal, and the European Commission response to them. It argues that National Parliaments raised important points, on how does subsidiarity apply respectively, when the wording of the Treaty grants the Council the option to act, as opposed to an obligation to act; on how to assess the inefficiency of the national level; on how does subsidiarity apply in a geographically fragmented context, and on the legitimacy for the EU to regulate non cross-border behaviors. It criticizes the Commission's hasty dismissal of all National Parliaments’ objections, and its decision to leave the proposal's text untouched. It further argues that the Commission's interpreted the EWM as an arena where to test the political feasibility of the proposal, as it had occurred in the past, rather than as a proper subsidiarity ...