Terrorism investigations and prosecutions in comparative law (original) (raw)

2016, The International Journal of Human Rights

The purpose of that event and of this special issue is to highlight thematic similarities and differences between the meta-models of accusatorial and inquisitorial criminal procedures and to assess their implications and outputs as applied to terrorism investigations and prosecutions. The focus of our research reflects the fact that terrorism has become a global preoccupation and therefore the reactions of nation states facing up to the same agenda become comparable. By contrast, before 9/11, those countries most afflicted by terrorism struggled to engage the attention of fellow nations, and so a lack of energy characterised international cooperation and comparative developments. Even the mighty United States had to resort to subterfuge and force in the absence of wholehearted assistance from allies, such as in the case of Fawaz Yunis, who was lured from Lebanon onto a yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea with promises of a drug deal and arrested once the vessel entered international waters. 1 Many countries had no terrorism at all, and even some which had experienced destabilising terrorism campaigns, such as (West) Germany, produced a minimal legislative response confined to tangential issues (such as the role of lawyers and prison conditions). 2 By contrast, the United Kingdom (UK) had not stinted on domestic legislation against terrorism before 9/11, the latest compendium, the Terrorism Act 2000, arriving on 19 February 2000. However, British diplomats had long striven with limited success to win allies in countering terrorism, such as in the tasks of closing off funding for the IRA 3 or securing the rendition of fugitives. 4 The tide turned immediately following the 9/11 attacks. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 of 28 September 2001, article 3, demanded the promotion of international cooperation and the national implementation of the then 12 terrorism-related multilateral treaties including, above all, the UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Finance 1999. 5 As an indicator of the response, the four nations which had become signatories to the Convention before 9/11 (Botswana, Sri Lanka, UK and Uzbekistan) were joined within two years by 128 others. As inspected and documented by the UN Counter Terrorism Committee (at least until it stopped publishing the details in 2006), 6 a profusion of