Being human in the world: Toward a relational account of moral agency through environmental ethics. -In Lucas Andrianos (ed.), ECOTHEE - Ecotheology and Environmental Ethics, 2009. (original) (raw)
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Ethics and the Earth : The Use and Limits of Moral Philosophy for Environmental Ethics
2008
This essay examines the foundations of contemporary environmental ethics vis-à-vis classic paradigms of modern moral philosophy by contrasting in particular the “ocular-phenomenological” and the “rational-discursive” modes—the former emerging from the work of Schopenhauer, Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, the latter by way of Kant, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas. This essay argues that, while the rational-communicative approach seems best fitted for success within the broader field of social ethics, it is in fact the phenomenological viewpoint which is ultimately more sympathetic with the modern environmental movement, and which is also coincident with religious ethics of attention and compassion, particularly those of East Asian traditions. If environmental issues are to be taken seriously, the framework of conventional moral theory (which tends towards the Kantian sort) needs to be expanded to admit the non-human, relinquishing the latent language of instrumentality and control that...
Contributions to Anthropocosmic Environmental Ethics
Th is essay is an articulation of various contributions to anthropocosmic environmental ethics—an approach to environmental ethics emerging within the study of religion and ecology. In an anthropocosmic approach to environmental ethics, humans are intimately intertwined with the environment. Rather than placing value on a particular center (e.g., anthropocentric, biocentric, ecocentric) and thus excluding and marginalizing something of peripheral value, an anthropocos-mic approach to ethics seeks to facilitate the mutual implication of humanity and the natural world, thereby affirming the interconnectedness and mutual constitution of central and peripheral value. Although the adjective " anthropocosmic " may seem obscure or vague, an examination of the genealogy of the term, beginning with its appearance in the works of Mircea Eliade, discloses numerous resources that have important contributions to make to the development of viable environmental ethics.
Ecological challenges to ethics
Polonia Sacra, 2016
This article is an attempt to shed new light on the environmental challenges of ethics related to over ‑exploitation of the world by humanity. This article aims to formulate guidelines for the project of new ethics that will be able to respond to these challenges, to appreciate the intrinsic value of the world without diminishing the value of human being. The starting point of the analysis is the increase of ecological awareness, observable both among scientists and politicians as well as among citizens and the Church. In the next part of the article, contemporary ecological ethics are compared with traditional anthropocentric ethics. The paper presents the diagnosis of the reasons for the exploitation of nature resulting with ecological crisis and offers a method of overcoming the crisis. It argues in favour of anthropocentrism, but rejects its radical version. In the last part of the paper there is a proposal to create a new ethics, appropriate for us and the world, which would be an extension and refinement of Christian ethics in dialogue with contemporary secular trends.
In a recent article appearing in this journal, Theresa Scavenius compellingly argues that the traditional "rational-individualistic" conception of responsibility is ill-suited to accounting for the sense in which moral agents share in responsibility for both contributing to the causes and, proactively, working towards solutions for climate change. Lacking an effective moral framework through which to make sense of individual moral responsibility for climate change, many who have good intentions and the means to contribute to solutions for climate change tend to dismiss or put off addressing the root causes. With this tendency arises the practical problem that climate change calls for urgent global collective action, both in terms of mitigation (addressing the root causes, especially by reducing GHG emissions) and adaptation, in order to prevent global temperature rise from exceeding 2C and thereby avoid worst case climate scenarios. In this paper, I develop a phenomenological theoy of ecological responsibility, which addresses the conceptual problem Scavenius highlights, with the aim of contributing to a clarification of the sense in which moral agents share responsibility for both the causes and solutions for climate change. To develop this theory, I draw from, combine, and transform insights from the late work of Husserl on open horizons, transcendental intersubjectivity, and genetic phenomenology with breakthroughs from Emmanual Levinas in articulating an original, asymmetrical theory of unlimited, diachronic responsibility. In drawing from Husserl, I show how what Levinas describes as the source of a demand for unlimited, diachronic responsibility (an encounter with the infinity of the other) can be phenomenologically reinterpreted in terms of a horizon of indeterminacy. I then show how horizons of indeterminacy arise in phenomenological descriptions of both human and nonhuman entities disclosing the demand for responsibility as a broad-ranging demand for unlimited, diachronic ecological responsibility. An important implication of this phenomenological theory of ecological responsibility is that it contributes to clarifying the sense in which individual moral agents share in responsibility for long range collective moral problems such as climate change. In a recent article appearing in this journal, Theresa Scavenius compellingly argues that the traditional "rational-individualistic" conception of responsibility is ill-suited to accounting for the sense in which moral agents share in responsibility for both contributing to the causes and, proactively, working on solutions for climate change (Scavenius 2017, p. 239). Lacking an effective moral framework through which to make sense of individual responsibility for climate change, many who have otherwise good intentions and the means to contribute to solutions for climate change are dismissing or putting off addressing it. The practical problem with this tendency is that climate change calls for urgent prioritization and global collective action, both in terms of mitigation (especially through the reduction of GHG emissions) and adaptation, in order to prevent global temperature from exceeding a rise of 2C and thereby avoid worst case climate scenarios (IPPC 2007). In this paper, through a phenomenological approach, I develop an asymmetrical theory of ecological responsibility which, I contend, contributes to clarifying the sense in which moral agents share in responsibility for the causes as well as for contributing to solutions for climate change. The concept of asymmetry in ethics may be understood in various ways. In one sense, it may be viewed as a way of characterizing the moral agent/moral patient relationship, such as in the relationship of a parent to their infant, or a child to an aging parent suffering from dementia. In such human to human relationships, the moral responsibility of the moral agent, who is in a position of power in the relationship, entails acting for the good of the moral patient. In another sense—traceable in Aldo Leopold's development of " The Land Ethic " (Leopold 1949)— asymmetry arises in an inverse manner through the smallness, interdependence , and reliance of the moral agent on
Environmental Ethics and the Need for Theory
Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae, 2023
Environmental ethics calls into question whether moral obligations invariably arise within relationships and communities, and whether wrong can only be done if some identifiable party is harmed. The aim of this paper is to appraise these assumptions, to argue for negative answers, and to draw appropriate conclusions about the scope of moral standing (or moral considerability). Its findings include the conclusions that our moral obligations (or responsibilities) extend to people and non-human creatures of the foreseeable future, as far as the impacts of present actions and policies can themselves be foreseen, that moral standing attaches to the possible people and other living creatures of the future, and (with Derek Parfit) that ethics is to some degree impersonal, being concerned with future quality of life for whoever lives in future centuries, whether they are currently identifiable or not. This in turn requires sustainable forms of social practice and of the human population. Another conclusion is that these findings are compatible with the approach of stewardship which the author has defended elsewhere, since stewardship need neither be anthropocentric nor managerial, and precludes current and future human agents treating the natural world as we please.
Environmental Ethics and the Need for Theory Etyka środowiskowa i potrzeba teorii
Environmental ethics calls into question whether moral obligations invariably arise within relationships and communities, and whether wrong can only be done if some identifiable party is harmed. The aim of this paper is to appraise these assumptions, to argue for negative answers, and to draw appropriate conclusions about the scope of moral standing (or moral considerability). Its findings include the conclusions that our moral obligations (or responsibilities) extend to people and non-human creatures of the foreseeable future, as far as the impacts of present actions and policies can themselves be foreseen, that moral standing attaches to the possible people and other living creatures of the future, and (with Derek Parfit) that ethics is to some degree impersonal, being concerned with future quality of life for whoever lives in future centuries, whether they are currently identifiable or not. This in turn requires sustainable forms of social practice and of the human population. Another conclusion is that these findings are compatible with the approach of stewardship which the author has defended elsewhere, since stewardship need neither be anthropocentric nor managerial, and precludes current and future human agents treating the natural world as we please.
Normative Implications of Ecophenomenology. Towards a Deep Anthropo-Related Environmental Ethics
Environmental Values, 2024
Corporeality of human beings should be taken seriously and be included in their self-understanding as the ‘nature we are ourselves’. Such an ecophenomenological account has important normative implications. Firstly, I argue that the instrumental value of nature can be particularly well justified based on an ecophenomenological approach. Secondly, sentience is inseparable from corporeality. Therefore, insofar as it is a concern of the ecophenomenological approach to take corporeality and its implications seriously, sentient beings deserve direct moral consideration. Thirdly, it can strengthen the so-far underestimated category of eudaimonic values of nature, which can be best developed through an ecophenomenological reconstruction. Taken together, ecophenomenology is vital for environmental ethics and helps us to leave behind its widespread ‘centrism’. Ecophenomenology should therefore, both methodically and philosophically, be included into the discussion of environmental ethical problems.