Security and Privacy Flaws in a Recent Authentication Protocol for EPC C1 G2 RFID Tags (original) (raw)

Security Analysis of an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 Compliant RFID Authentication Protocol

2018

Design of secure authentication solutions for low-cost RFID tags is still an open and quite challenging problem, though many protocols have been published in the last decade. In 2013, Wei and Zhang proposed a new lightweight RFID authentication protocol that conforms to the EPC-C1G2 standard and claimed that the protocol would be immune against all known attacks on RFID systems. In this paper, we consider the security of this protocol and show that it cannot provide secure authentication for RFID users. An attacker, by following our suggested approach, will be able to impersonate server/reader, and destroy synchronization between the back-end server and the tag. Finally, we enhance this protocol, and by using formal and informal security analysis we show that the enhanced protocol strongly inhibits the security flaws of its predecessor.

Practical Attacks on a RFID Authentication Protocol Conforming to EPC C-1 G-2 Standard

Arxiv preprint arXiv:1102.0763, 2011

. They have claimed that their protocol is secure against adversarial attacks and also provides forward secrecy. In this paper we will show that the proposed protocol does not have proper security features. A powerful and practical attack is presented on this protocol whereby the whole security of the protocol is broken. Furthermore, Yeh et al. protocol does not assure the untraceabilitiyand backwarduntraceabilitiy aspects. Namely, all past and next transactions of a compromised tag will be traceable by an adversary.

Attacks On A Mutual Authentication Scheme Conforming To EPCglobal Class-1 Generation-2 RFID System$

projectice.eu

EPCglobal introduced Electronic Product Code (EPC) to identify objects and trace them in a wide network area. EPCglobal and ISO confirmed EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (EPC-C1G2) that includes the requirements of lightweight RFID tags. However, these tags are vulnerable to some inevitable attacks such as tracking by adversaries, tag cloning and data leakage. Lately, many authentication and privacy protection protocols have been published to protect RFID systems. Some of them do not adequately satisfy these security issues. Chen and Deng proposed a mutual authentication and privacy protection protocol conforming to EPC-C1G2 standard to ensure RFID security and privacy of the tags. In this paper, we show that most of the privacy protection and authentication protocol objectives are not met in Chen and Deng's proposal. We also show that an adversary can impersonate not only the tags but also the legitimate reader. In addition, we show that a counterfeit tag can be simply cloned. For these reasons, Chen and Deng's scheme is not a secure and reliable protocol to use in EPC-C1G2 specification.

RFID authentication protocol for mobile readers satisfying EPC-C1-GEN2 standard of passive tags

2018 Technologies for Smart-City Energy Security and Power (ICSESP)

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) applications have gained a lot of popularity using which the products can be uniquely identified using the radio signals. With the advancement of technology, the need for mobile RFID readers have been increased rapidly. A lot of RFID authentication protocols have been proposed and most of them have considered the channel between reader and server as secure and also most protocols requires high computational power for RFID tags and according to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standards of passive tags the one-way hash functions are difficult to compute for passive tags. This paper presents an efficient authentication protocol for mobile RFID readers where an insecure channel is considered between server and reader and also at the same time it can be used for low cost RFID tags. In the proposed protocol authentication is achieved by using low cost cryptographic functions such as a combination of XOR and Pseudo Random Number Generator. The simulation of this protocol is done using AVISPA tool and the security analysis of this proposed protocol is analyzed and hence is proved to be resistant to eavesdropping, replay attack, desynchronization attack, reader impersonation, tag impersonation, traceability and also man-in-the-middle attacks.

An efficient and secure authentication protocol for RFID systems

International Journal of Automation and Computing, 2012

The use of radio frequency identification (RFID) tags may cause privacy violation of users carrying an RFID tag. Due to the unique identification number of the RFID tag, the possible privacy threats are information leakage of a tag, traceability of the consumer, denial of service attack, replay attack and impersonation of a tag, etc. There are a number of challenges in providing privacy and security in the RFID tag due to the limited computation, storage and communication ability of low-cost RFID tags. Many research works have already been conducted using hash functions and pseudorandom numbers. As the same random number can recur many times, the adversary can use the response derived from the same random number for replay attack and it can cause a break in location privacy. This paper proposes an RFID authentication protocol using a static identifier, a monotonically increasing timestamp, a tag side random number and a hash function to protect the RFID system from adversary attacks. The proposed protocol also indicates that it requires less storage and computation than previous existing RFID authentication protocols but offers a larger range of security protection. A simulation is also conducted to verify some of the privacy and security properties of the proposed protocol.

SLRV: An RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol Conforming to EPC Generation-2 Standard

TELKOMNIKA (Telecommunication Computing Electronics and Control), 2015

Having done an analysis on the security vulnerabilities of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) through a desynchronization and an impersonation attacks, it is revealed that the secret information (i.e.: secret key and static identifier) shared between the tag and the reader is unnecessary. To overcome the vulnerability, this paper introduces Shelled Lightweight Random Value (SLRV) protocol; a mutual authentication protocol with high-security potentials conforming to electronic product code (EPC) Class-1 Generation-2 Tags, based on lightweight and standard cryptography on the tag's and reader's side, respectively. SLRV prunes de-synchronization attacks where the updating of internal values is only executed on the tag's side and is a condition to a successful mutual authentication. Results of security analysis of SLRV, and comparison with existing protocols, are presented.

Security and Privacy on Authentication Protocol for Low-cost RFID

2005

In the near future, radio frequency identification (RFID) technology is expected to play an important role for object identification as a ubiquitous infrastructure. However, low-cost RFID tags are highly resource-constrained and cannot support its long-term security, so they have potential risks and may violate privacy for their bearers. To remove security vulnerabilities, we propose a robust mutual authentication protocol between a tag and a back-end server for low-cost RFID system that guarantees data privacy and location privacy of tag bearers. Different from the previous works , our protocol firstly provides reader authentication and prevent active attacks based on the assumption that a reader is no more a trusted third party and the communication channel between the reader and the back-end server is insecure like wireless channel. Also, the proposed protocol exhibits forgery resistant against simple copy, or counterfeiting prevailing RFID tags. As tags only have hash function and exclusive-or operation, our proposed protocol is very feasible for low-cost RFID system compared to the previous works. The formal proof of correctness of the proposed authentication protocol is given based on GNY logic.

Weaknesses in Two Recent Lightweight RFID Authentication Protocols

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2010

The design of secure authentication solutions for low-cost RFID tags is still an open and quite challenging problem, though many algorithms have been published lately. In this paper, we analyze two recent proposals in this research area. First, Mitra's scheme is scrutinized, revealing its vulnerability to cloning and traceability attacks, which are among the security objectives pursued in the protocol definition [1]. Later, we show how the protocol is vulnerable against a full disclosure attack after eavesdropping a small number of sessions. Then, we analyze a new EPC-friendly scheme conforming to EPC Class-1 Generation-2 specification (ISO/IEC 180006-C), introduced by Qingling and Yiju [2]. This proposal attempts to correct many of the well known security shortcomings of the standard, and even includes a BAN logic based formal security proof. However, notwithstanding this formal security analysis, we show that Qingling et al.'s protocol offers roughly the same security as the standard they try to improve, is vulnerable to tag and reader impersonation attacks, and allows tag traceability.

Security Techniques Based on EPC Gen2 Tag for Secure Mobile RFID Network Services

Knowledge-Based Intelligent …, 2006

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology will be a ubiquitous reality in daily life in the near future. The R&D groups in global now have paid attention to integrate RFID with mobile phone devices as well as to associate with the existing mobile telecommunication network. Such a converged technology and services would lead to make new markets and research challenges. However, privacy threats on RFID tags embedded into products has become stumbling block. Therefore, this paper propose a new security technique for mobile RFID service, which can be support to secure RFID service and uses the privacy protection in mobile RFID network services.

An Enhanced Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems

IEEE Access

In this paper, we analyse the security of two mutual authentication protocols that have been recently proposed by Gao et al. (IEEE Access, 7:8376-8384, 2019), a hash-based protocol and a Rabin public key based protocol. Our security analysis clearly shows important security pitfalls in these schemes. More precisely, in each protocol, we introduce efficient approaches to desynchronize the tag and the reader/server. The proposed attacks are almost deterministic and the complexity of each attack is a session for the hash-based and three sessions for Rabin public key based protocol. In addition, in the case of the hash-based protocol, we extend the proposed desynchronization attack to a traceability attack in which the adversary can trace any given tag based on the proposed attack with probability of almost one. In the case of Rabin public key based protocol, we extend the proposed desynchronization attack to a tag impersonation attack with the success probability of one. Besides, we propose an enhanced version of the Rabin public key based protocol to provide a secure authentication between the tag and the reader. We evaluate the security of the proposed protocol formally using the Scyther tool and also in Real-or-Random model.