Strategic analysis of complex security scenarios (original) (raw)
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1984
The. fulurv. polilical-mi/ilary (mvironment will bt; Nl chuvdclvri/.vd by "low-inlonsity cnnßicl," defined as a Var rung« of operations involving Soviel special intelligei.co, V^ Soviel psychological war/are, Soviel support for terrorism Q (ind insurgency, and increasing use o/Soviet proxies. The ■ primary focus of these activities ivill be in the Third World, Q focused along the sea lanes 0/communication vital to the security of the Western industrial democracies. Slill in a ^T p<;riod of isolation entered into about 1970, the Cnited Slales will not be prepared to make requisite decisions on defense capabilities until the late 1980s, unless the Soviets do something provocative which galvanizes U.S. public opinion. The Soviets will not give us the functional equivalent 0/Pearl Harbor. Thus, decisions which should be made to counter the low-intensity threat in the mid to late 1990s will be foregone. Ma/or foreign policy decisions by the United States could change these forecasted trends. This briet' forecast is based on three separate yearlong studies completed at the Georgetown University Center For Strategic and international Studies (CSIS). The first two, entitled respectively "The Future of Conflict in the 1980s" and "Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 198ÜS," were done under contract for the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The third, done under contract for the Army, was entitled, "Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000.',' All three studies have recently been published by Lexington Books. Although different teams of CSIS analysts worked on the studies, the steering committees included the same senior stafflames R. Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Amos A. Jordan William |. Taylor was project director or co-director of all three studies. Each of the studies had different specified sets of tasks but, in general, those tasks required a forecast of the long-term worldwide environment, providing a bounded range of conflict scenarios in five regions of the world. We were to identify the broad regional trends and political-military phenomena, derive implications for U.S. national security, develop broad strategic requirements for U.S national security to the year 2000, and provide alternative! solutions to strategic problems. This precis covers only the forecast. Clearly we are dealing with the realm of uncertainty. Anyone who tells us that he or she can "predict" the
Comparison of Theoretical Approaches to Security.pdf
This paper seeks to examine the security study and the analytical understanding of its paradigm which has been a thing of great interest for Philosophers, thinkers and critical analysts. Their theoretical approach in the discus of causes, answers given, why, how, and what lead to the security problems in the international system or relations? Three of the most influential theoretical approaches are Realism, Constructivism and Liberalism. To provide answers as to why the world is what it is (a stage of survival of the fittest by any means as explained by the realists), concepts such as anarchy, self-help, materials, static or cruel nature of man, power, military and deterrence (the US vs the Soviet Union as was the case during cold war). This explains how the realists portray threat perception. The liberals threat perception and their claims of “what ought to be” seek to provide a peaceful framework for existence, thus to eliminate the threat of one’s existence according to liberalism. This is viewed from two parts: The Economic Liberalism and the Institutional Liberalism, respectively dealing with issues such as cooperation, governance without government, integration, for example, European Union, democratization, interdependence etc. And the last, being the Constructivist approach which approaches security issues by focusing on the social construction of security (constructive securitization and DE securitization), dimension, culture or identity and historical factors or antecedence which involved actors, events and actions.
Preface The " scourge " of terrorism inscribes into the logic of illegal violence, though one must accept there is a lot of subtypes which merits to be discussed. Cyber-terrorism not only seems to be an emergent form of terrorism that escapes to the definition of illegal violence but the paradox lies in the fact sometimes the nation-state, which was originally designed to protect citizens, violates the constitutional rights in the name of security. Cyber-espionage, cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime are concepts inextricably intertwined. Snowden´s case reveals two important assumptions. On one hand, the discourse of surveillance appeals to what Foucault denominated as " the economy of discipline " , which means that any perceived risks allude to a much deeper and preexisting economic matrix (Foucault, 2003). On another, while states devote considerable time and efforts struggling against terrorism to make from this society a better place, important constitutional rights are being vulnerated (Korstan-je, 2015). In addition, unlike classic terrorism, cyber-terrorism operates from a virtual landscape which is very hard to grasp. In this ever-changing and globalized World, the steps of nations to prevent future terrorist attacks are at snail pace. This does not mean nation-states are inefficient to keep the social order, but terrorism operates in the dark side of uncertainness. Since nobody knows where the next blow will take place, specialists have many limitations to forecast the next attack. The forces of securities are clearly identified, but not terrorists. This point opens the doors to a clear sentiment of paranoia and panic, which are the main goals of terrorism. As Luke Howie (2010) puts it, terrorists do not want to kill a lot of peoples, they like a lot of people watching what they have accomplished. This suggests that terrorists and media are two sides of the same coin. The challenge for democratic societies consists in developed democratic solutions to prevent undemocratic expression of violence. In doing so, they should not to lose the sight that terrorism and cyber-terrorism shares the same commonality respecting to trust. Both act to undermine the necessary trust in order for lay people to legitimate their loyalties to authorities.
2021
1 Elitsa Petrova is Associate Professor in the field of "Social, Economic and Legal Sciences", Doctor in Economics and Management and Doctor of Science in Security and Defense. She is a lecturer at the Vasil Levski National Military University, Bulgaria. She is an author of over 150 scientific publication. She is a member of scientific boards and a reviewer of over 20 journals and conferences. eISSN: 2719-6763
Blue Horizons IV: Deterrence in the Age of Surprise
2014
: This study examines the implications of exponential technological change on the panoply of threats the US Air Force may have to face in the future and how the Air Force should posture itself to best deter those threats. Specifically, this study: examines the changes in the array of threats for which be needed in the future, due to the proliferation of disruptive technologies; explores the relevance of deterrence theory to both existing and new threats, some of which may surpass nuclear weapons in the risk they pose to both the United States and humankind; and recommends new ways of applying deterrence theory in order to reduce the risk that new disruptive technologies will be used against the United States or its interests. Building on previous Blue Horizons studies, this work assumes that science and technology growth will continue and will drive proliferation of advanced and potentially dangerous technologies. It posits that the result of rapid advances in nanotechnology, biotec...
Pre-print, 2024
Typically, training AI defense agents to assume the worst-case attacker knowledge (pessimistic approach) can lead to suboptimal performance compared to assuming more realistic, limited attacker knowledge (optimistic approach). The recent 2024 GAMESEC research (arxiv 2409.1923720 Galinkin, Pountourakis, and Mancoridis (2024) "The Price of Pessimism for Automated Defense") explores how different assumptions about attacker knowledge, when building AI agents for automated cyber defense, affect the agent's effectiveness. The 2012 Conficker study (by dyb et al) provides a real-world case study that supports the 2024 paper's findings about the "price of pessimism". The CWG's experience shows that overestimating the attacker's knowledge and capabilities can lead to inefficient and less effective defense strategies. The GAMESEC paper formalizes this intuition within a simulated environment and demonstrates its validity using reinforcement learning techniques, offering a more general and quantitative perspective on the importance of accurate attacker modeling in automated cyber defense.
2009
Information has always been a key element of national power and influence. However, now enabled by modern digital technologies, worldwide communications and information networks have fundamentally reshaped patterns of international trade, finance, and global intercourse, affecting not only economic but also political and social relationships as well. Under these circumstances, few countries, even those with authoritarian systems, can or choose to retain the closed autarchic economies as they did in the past because of economic and financial interdependencies. Moreover, new actors, many of them entities other than states, now play important roles in the international system and interact in novel ways. As a consequence, these forces have helped to refashion international relations after the collapse of the bipolar structure and in the wake of the Cold War. Because they possess particular strengths and weaknesses, we now clearly recognize that modern digital information systems (what are commonly called "cyber systems") are powerful tools and weapons on the one hand as well as sources of great potential vulnerability on the other, affecting not only our economic and social patterns, but also our national security. Digital information-and the cyber infrastructure that processes and carries it-has its own special characteristics; and these qualities are sufficiently different than those of analogue information that many consider "cyber" to be a distinct medium or domain. Considering both the benefits and vulnerabilities of our cyber dependency, together these factors have created a powerful interest in better securing our information and the cyber infrastructures through which it is processed and transmitted. As part of an overall strategy to protect our information resources and cyber capabilities, applying the lessons and tools of deterrence to the cyber domain merits attention as one important component of a comprehensive security strategy.
Frontiers in psychology, 2017
Game Theory is a common approach used to understand attacker and defender motives, strategies, and allocation of limited security resources. For example, many defense algorithms are based on game-theoretic solutions that conclude that randomization of defense actions assures unpredictability, creating difficulties for a human attacker. However, many game-theoretic solutions often rely on idealized assumptions of decision making that underplay the role of human cognition and information uncertainty. The consequence is that we know little about how effective these algorithms are against human players. Using a simplified security game, we study the type of attack strategy and the uncertainty about an attacker's strategy in a laboratory experiment where participants play the role of defenders against a simulated attacker. Our goal is to compare a human defender's behavior in three levels of uncertainty (Information Level: Certain, Risky, Uncertain) and three types of attacker...