Aquinas, Suarez, and Malebranche on Instrumental Causation and Premotion (original) (raw)

2012, International Philosophical Quarterly

In the analysis of Aquinas, instrumental causation is central to his doctrine of providence, yet their connection is not widely understood. On the one hand, early modem thinkers like Nicolas Malehranche claim that any notion of instrumental causation is unintelligible as a mode of divine operation. Alternatively, certain Thomists commit Aquinas to the doctrine of premotion, which partially resolves the problem of instrumental causation, but only at the cost of eliminating the causal freedom of creatures. In this paper I address these two issues. After providing an outline of Aquinas's position on instrumental causation, I first argue that Thomistic instrumentalism is not the target of Malebranche's objections, for Malebranche endorses a view very much like that of Aquinas. Secondly, I discuss the doctrine of premotion and offer some reasons for thinking that Aquinas was not a premotionist. 'Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles (hereafter SCG) III.67, my emphasis. All quotations for SCG are from St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Vemon J. Bourke (Notre Dame IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1975). In the beginning of the third book of the Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas states the following: "We have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God, and who of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover, He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above. Hence it follows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him: since we dominate over those things that are subject to our will. And this is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, forasmuch as in their making He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work: since He is the universal efficient cause of all being." SCG III.I.