Combating the Recruitment and Radicalization of Potential Terrorists: A State-Based Methods and Effectiveness Analysis for Application to Counter White Supremacy Terrorism in the USA (original) (raw)

The Three Ps of Domestic Extremism in the United States

ICSVE Brief Reports, 2022

The question of the rise of domestic extremism in the United States is one which is regularly commented upon by journalists, political pundits, and scholars of numerous academic fields. The data supports a sharp rise in hate crimes over the past five years, including those directed at Asian Americans during the COVID-19 pandemic. Violent extremist groups that have existed in the United States for decades if not centuries like the Ku Klux Klan and National Socialist Movement continue to gain members and sympathizers but are increasingly joined at rallies and protests, and in violent crime, by newer groups like the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys. Notably, members of the latter two groups have been charged with seditious conspiracy for their actions during the January 6th riot at the U.S. Capitol; their violent attempt to keep former President Trump in power was one never seen since the end of the Civil War. What is it that has contributed to the observed rise in domestic extremism, in the United States in particular? Our own research, as well as that of others, has consistently shown that the making of a terrorist or violent extremist consists of four parts: the group, its violence-justifying ideology, social support for that ideology which may exist in one’s local community or online, and individual needs and vulnerabilities. For those living outside of active combat zones, such as those becoming radicalized in the United States, those individual needs and vulnerabilities often include those for belonging, dignity, meaning, purpose, and significance. This “lethal cocktail of terrorism” is a psychosocial one which applies equally to violent extremists of all ideologies, whether they are militant jihadists, white supremacists, incel shooters, single-issue terrorists, or those on the far left. Presently, we present an additional model which applies to the broader social milieu in the United States and has brought about the recent rise of domestic extremism described above. This model may appear to be sociological or political in nature, yet each of its components can affect the individual psychology of any American. Under these conditions, the ingredients of the lethal cocktail are made all the more potent, and any American can be at risk for radicalization to violent extremism. We have entitled this lethal cocktail-amplifying model the “3P” model of domestic extremism.

A Local and Global Threat: The White Racially and Ethnically Motivated Terrorism

Modern Diplomacy, 2020

Far-right violence, right-wing extremism, and racially and ethnically motivated terrorism are on the rise globally—including Western countries such as the United States. FBI Director Christopher Wray has implied that the white-supremacist threat is significant and increasing. A 2020United Nations report and a 2019 report from The Soufan Center show that compared with some Islamic extremist terrorism, racially and ethnically motivated terrorism have occurred more frequently and resulted in more casualties over the last years. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, the number of white nationalist groups in the United States increased 55 percent between 2017 and 2019, prompting the civil rights organization to conclude that white nationalism poses a serious threat to national security and pluralistic democracy in the United States. The Anti-Defamation League has reported similar findings, noting that “white supremacists have committed 78% of right-wing extremist-related murders” over the last10 years, that right-wing extremists were responsible for 90 percent of domestic extremist-related murders, and that white supremacists, particularly, were responsible for 81 percent of the killings in the year of 2019.

Why Treating White Supremacy as Domestic Terrorism Won’t Work and How to Not Fall for It

Vigilant Love #StopCVE, 2020

In October 2020, President Trump refused to condemn white supremacists, even telling the far-right militia, the Proud Boys, to“stand back and stand by.” As the Proud Boys and other white supremacist groups rallied around Trump’s statement, teachers, psychologists, and other youth workers expressed an urgent need to “mitigate[] the influence of fascist ideologies on young people’s behavior” and “counter fascist recruitment of youth.” In fact, the Department of Homeland Security published a 2020 report identifying “white supremacist extremists” as “the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland.” By defining white supremacists as domestic terrorist threats, both the federal government and youth workers have sought to apply antiterrorism methods, such as the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) framework, to white communities. Can these antiterrorism methods effectively fight white supremacist violence?

Race, Entrapment and Manufacturing "Homegrown Terrorism"

Georgetown Law Journal, 2023

At what point does offensive speech cross the line from being constitutionally protected to criminal? Rarely—would be the response of a free speech purist. Indeed, the First Amendment is intended to protect unpopular, offensive, and even subversive speech. Although this lesson may be taught to American schoolchildren, it is not the lived experience of Muslim dissidents, especially at the more extreme end of the political spectrum. And yet, the white extremists whose racist and anti-government hate speech has skyrocketed since the election of President Obama have not received attention commensurate to their growing influence. Only after they seized the United States Capitol in January 2021 did the government shift its domestic security priorities to meaningfully address the threat posed by far-right-wing groups. Such disparate treatment of political extremists of different racial and religious identities prompts the question: Is the problem one of law or of law enforcement? This Article argues that selective counterterrorism enforcement allocates disproportionate resources targeting Muslim communities; all the while, entrapment law fails to protect these communities from predatory sting operations. The extent to which otherwise First Amendment-protected activities are criminalized is most glaring in post-9/11 terrorism prosecutions in which Muslim defendants ensnared in sting operations have raised an entrapment defense. Specifically, a defendant’s social media posts—prior to the sting operations—are used as evidence of his predisposition to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding that the plot was developed and led by an informant or undercover agent. Offensive speech is bootstrapped into showing a defendant’s willingness to commit a crime. Although numerous journalists and lawyers have come to this conclusion, the empirical basis is underdeveloped. This Article empirically tests this normative claim, based on the author’s database of 646 federal terrorism-related cases brought against Muslims between 2001 and 2021. The analysis reveals a criminalization of religious and dissident Muslims who have engaged in extremist speech but who have not engaged in violence without government ensnarement, while far-right supremacist groups are simultaneously granted license to plan politically motivated violence, culminating in a siege on the U.S. Capitol.

Deterrence for Online Radicalization and Recruitment in the 21st Century - Prepublication version

2021

In the midst of global health and economic crises, more immigration than ever before, and continually updating technology, it is critical that security professionals are prepared for the coming changes in the world of radicalization, recruitment, and terrorist activity more generally. The present study examines the testimony of 261 ISIS defectors, returnees, and imprisoned cadres as well as 16 far right/white supremacists, focusing particularly on six Canadians’ trajectories into and back out of ISIS (n=3) and white supremacist violent extremism (n=3). The article delves into the increasing risk of radicalization and recruitment occurring solely online, the exponential growth of far right and white supremacist violent extremism, as well as ISIS’s plans for resurgence since the fall of the territorial Caliphate and how COVID-19 has contributed to the future of both militant jihadist terrorism and violent extremism in general. Although neither sample of the 261 ISIS interviews or 16 far right/white supremacist interviews should be considered representative by any means, it is notable that, of the four ISIS members who were living in Canada at the time they joined ISIS (one Canadian citizen was a dual citizen who lived in the United Kingdom and another’s testimony will not be included in this article due to privacy concerns), three were influenced by or recruited over the Internet, and one was recruited solely over the Internet. Of the far right/white supremacist interviews, internet recruitment was mentioned but less salient, probably because the time period of recruitment was pre-social media. Moreover, in contrast to other Western-born ISIS members who cited discrimination at home as a motivation to join ISIS, none of the Canadian members said that they experienced any meaningful discrimination in Canada. Rather, they were motivated more so by a desire to feel personally significant (n=3) and to help the Syrian civilians suffering under the Assad regime (n=3). This article explores how personal narratives, in addition to quantitative data, can inform effective terrorism deterrence in Canada.

Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America

2007

• EU members have pursued two different integration strategies to deal with the presence of Muslim populations within their borders. Some countries, like Great Britain and the Netherlands, have adopted a multicultural policy that attempts to promote tolerance and integration while allowing immigrants and ethnic groups the ability to keep their cultural identities and practices. In contrast to multiculturalism, countries like France employ assimilation, which expects immigrant communities to adapt to the norms of its host country, as its integration strategy. • There are common negatives and positives in spite of the differences with different European Muslim communities. On the positive side, there is a consistent desire from Muslims to want to integrate into the societies in which they live. On a more negative note, regardless of the different national strategies, overall Muslim integration within the EU countries has been poor. • Discontent with one's own socioeconomic , political status is only a part of the equation. Radicalization is a four-step process that involves 1) cognitive opening, 2) religious seeking, 3) framing, and 4) socialization. Integration, discontent and issues of self-identity most directly impact the cognitive opening. The amount of religious knowledge, or the lack thereof, directly impacts the second and third stages. By the fourth stage, the person moves from being a student of the movement to a committed member. The ideology is internalized and reinforced by being surrounded with others who share similar views and contained within an organization that is disconnected from the rest of society. The use of the Internet can also have a significant impact on the development of this process. • The phenomenon of the "homegrown" terrorist is not new. Domestic terrorists have identical or nearly identical ways of militarily and ideologically carrying on their fight in the absence of a centralized command structure without regard to whether the source of inspiration is domestic, foreign, or transnational. • Strategies for radicalism prevention and terrorist attack prevention require coordination and robust cooperation between public and private sectors. In particular good relations between Muslim communities and local law enforcement and government are essential. Muslim communities need to build and expand institutions and programs that give support to Muslim youth. Law enforcement communities should take a local community policing approach to counterterrorism (CT) by fostering good relations with Muslim communities. For themselves, Muslim communities need to ensure that youth are not seduced by radical ideologies through establishing and expanding social support networks. As a long term strategy to continue Muslim Americans' successful integration, local, state and federal governments should continue and expand scholarships and fellowships for minority applicants that encourage public service and public policy career tracks. Furthermore, Muslim and non-Muslim non-governmental organizations and should develop and expand strategic partnerships and have more general operating grants available.

The fungible terrorist: abject whiteness, domestic terrorism, and the multicultural security state

Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2022

Taking the Capitol riots of January 6 as a point of departure, this article queries the utility of abject white violence to the US security state through a focus on the latest push for domestic terrorism legislation. Drawing on the first-ever National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism released by the White House in June 2021, we trace how the US security state constructs white supremacist violence as both abject and anachronistic, a creative project of history-making through which the liberal security state operationalizes that violence to bolster and expand US empire and counterinsurgency. Further, we explore how the fungibility of abject whiteness within contemporary US counterterrorism creates a metonymic power by which the foreign and domestic cohere, collapse, and diverge through the figure of the racialized terrorist to suit the needs of the imperial state. While the state’s current push for domestic terrorism legislation publicly portrays a stance of historical reconciliation and multicultural protectionism, the figure of the domestic terrorist functions as a conduit through which the violence of the state is rerouted. Through this vision of besieged multiculturalism, the liberal security state seeks to creatively refashion US empire domestically and at the global scale.