The ‘French Bitterness’: Populism and Mobilization in the Light of Global Upheavals and New Cleavages (original) (raw)
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Populism in Western Democracies : A View from France
2019
This article first tries to characterize contemporary Western populist movements. It then details the key points of E. Laclau's penetrating analysis of populism, with a view to using it in a perspective other than its author's own. It hypothesizes that the center of gravity of the populism in the West resides in a reference to the demos, rather than ethnos or plebs. It goes on to probe the causes of growing citizen alienation, the main source of populism. It suggests that the social aspect, notably the destabilization of the lower-middle classes induced by the Neo-liberal order, does not exhaust the issue. Institutional demands soon emerge to remedy a perceived disenfranchisement of majorities generated over half-a-century by the rise of culturally-defined minority groups, resulting in a "tyranny of minorities". Further, citizens resent being treated as minors by a "framed democracy" in which their capacity for discernment is ignored, and their assent dis...
B. Boëne_Populism in Western Democracies_A View from France_8 Feb 2019.pdf
Drawing upon the extensive literature on populism that has accumulated since the 1960s, this article first tries to characterize contemporary Western populist movements (I). It then details the key points of one of the most penetrating analyses of populism – E. Laclau’s On Populist Reason (II) –, with a view to using it in a perspective other than its author’s own (III). Having identified “civic” nuances among populist currents of the Left as well as of the Right, and in between them a moderate populist vote expressing disenchantment with government parties, it hypothesizes (on the basis of secondary analysis of existing studies) that the centre of gravity of the populist nebula in the West resides in a reference to the demos, rather than ethnos or plebs, and that the balance of forces within the populist support base is in its favour. It goes on to probe the causes of growing citizen alienation – the main source of populism. It suggests (based on fifteen unstructured interviews) that while the social aspect – the destabilization of the lower-middle classes induced by the neo-liberal order – is important, it does not exhaust the issue (IV). One reason is that the audience of populist themes is much wider than that central segment of societies ; another is that social demands only serve to trigger protests, and are soon followed by institutional demands to remedy a perceived disenfranchisement of majorities that has come about over the last half-century due to the rise of culturally-defined minority groups, accommodated by ruling and expressive elites. The ensuing “tyranny of minorities” has resulted in multiple everyday life constraints and reduced freedoms for the many, generating more frustration than meets the eye (V). The same result is achieved when citizens are treated as minors by a “framed democracy” in which their capacity for discernment is deliberately ignored, and their assent dispensed with, by ruling elites in the name of a presumed higher moral good, or directives from unelected faraway power centres (VI). The root cause of the malaise that has set in is the ascent of individualism and relaxation of citizenship norms from the 1960s onwards, which has led to a situation where authority and power are questioned or feared, and political leadership becomes weak. Now reduced to a managerial role, it takes to accommodating activists and militants, delegates policy-making to independent, nonpartisan authorities, expert committees or international organizations, and thus becomes unresponsive to the will of majorities, which (because they had hitherto been passive) it does not fear to ignore or manipulate. In reaction, majorities first went through a phase of apathy (which saw abstention rise), then started resorting to protest votes. Elite deafness or impotence has eventually led to a third stage, in which majorities are now abruptly reasserting their power and demanding a reaffirmation of citizenship. The current surge of populism bluntly informs us that the outer limits of the master-trend initiated in the 1960s have now been reached. Seen in that light, “civic” populism is a response to a deactivation of democracy rather than a threat to it (VII). Systems of representative democracy, put in place over two centuries when the masses were uneducated, are not aging well now that average education have considerably increased and majorities want to make themselves heard. Should that demand be ignored, the problem raised would become structural – and more acute : institutional reform in the direction of redefining the relationships between elites and grassroots, majority and minorities, is thus in order – the sooner the better (VIII).
The Rise of Populism and Violent Extremism in France: Two Sides of the Same Coin
EuropeNow, Council for European Studies (CES), Columbia University, 2018
In one of the feature essays, Aude Jehan analyzes the rise of populism and violent extremism in France over the past several decades, tracing tensions in identity politics and the impact of long-term feelings of marginalization among France’s Muslim communities, which represent the largest Muslim population in Europe. Describing trends including political leaders’ declarations of multiculturalism’s failure, state polices banning headscarves, growing anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment among the general public, and the impact of the Paris 2015 terror attacks on recorded acts of racism and Islamophobia, Jehan explains the underlying developments that have contributed to voters’ frustration, anger, and criticism of traditional French political parties and the rise in support for Marine Le Pen and the far right more broadly. In the second half of her essay, Jehan describes President Macron’s new strategy to counter radicalization and fight terrorism, called “Prevent to Protect.”
Transnational Populism: The Populist Challenge from the Left?
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This contribution aims at specifically investigating DiEM25’s attempt to create a hegemonic movement. Hegemony, in this case, means the successful creation of a “discourse”—in Laclau’s (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 105–6) terms—and altogether of a bloc—in Gramsci’s (1971: 12– 13, 57) interpretation—which is antagonistic to the social and political system, based not only on the alliance of various political protest movements but on their acknowledgement of being part of one homogeneous collective, with a common “demand”.
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Populism, 2021
Laclau’s theory on populism which is inseparable from his strategic endeavour to formulate a novel form of left-wing emancipatory politics has set off a variety of critiques, most notably from scholars who associate themselves with different strands of democratic theory. This paper picks out and uses Lefortian theory on democracy, utilizing it in order to figure out the different ways in which Laclau’s account could be construed and criticized. It argues that there are two possible interpretations of Lefort’s democratic theory with two different political implications, one liberal and the other radical-democratic and that they provide us with two different ways to formulate a critique of Laclauian populism. It particularly addresses the historical conjuncture from which Lefort’s democratic theory emerges and investigates how his ambiguous encounters with the intellectual milieu in France in the 70s, namely the ‘antitotalitarian moment’ undergird these two possible interpretations. This article’s elaboration on these two interpretations for addressing Laclau’s populism finalizes with a comparison between the political implications of the two and with a new proposal to invigorate counter-populism along the lines of Etienne Balibar as a (Lefortian) radical-democratic alternative to Laclau’s populism.
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This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.
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This speaking out article argues that populism is not only a phenomenon that characterizes extremist figures such as Farage, Trump or Le Pen. Drawing on Laclau’s conceptualization of populism, we show how French President Emmanuel Macron developed in 2017 a form of anti-extreme electoral populism relying upon (1) the creation of a new political frontier between ‘progressive reformers’ and ‘backward-looking conservatives’, and (2) a number of key empty signifiers, such as ‘Revolution’, ‘(The Republic) onwards’ and ‘and at the same time’. These discursive levers allowed Macron’s campaigns to incarnate a gradually larger plurality of demands, modulating the openness of equivalential chains over three successful electoral steps: the presidential first round, the presidential second round and the parliamentary elections. In parallel, his movement gradually moved from emergent organizing through a partial organization to a bureaucratized and hierarchized party. Thus, our analysis illumina...
A Theoretical Analysis of Populist Movements in Europe
CoHERE explores the ways in which identities in Europe are constructed through heritage representations and performances that connect to ideas of place, history, tradition and belonging. The research identifies existing heritage practices and discourses in Europe. It also identifies means to sustain and transmit European heritages that are likely to contribute to the evolution of inclusive, communitarian identities and counteract disaffection with, and division within, the EU. A number of modes of representation and performance are explored in the project, from cultural policy, museum display, heritage interpretation, school curricula and political discourse to music and dance performances, food and cuisine, rituals and protest. WP2 investigates public/popular discourses and dominant understandings of a homogeneous 'European heritage' and the ways in which they are mobilized by specific political actors to advance their agendas and to exclude groups such as minorities from a stronger inclusion into European society. What notions of European heritage circulate broadly in the public sphere and in political discourse? How do the 'politics of fear' relate to such notions of European heritage and identity across and beyond Europe and the EU? How is the notion of a European heritage and memory used not only to include and connect Europeans but also to exclude some of them? We are interested in looking into the relationship between a European memory and heritage-making and circulating notions of 'race', ethnicity, religion and civilization as well as contemporary forms of discrimination grounded in the idea of incommensurable cultural and memory differences. This essay concentrates on the theoretical review of the current state of populism in Europe, which has been an important subject of study since the 1960s. The essay starts with a discussion on the definition of populism referring to the works of different scholars since the 1960s. Subsequently, it elaborates the features of contemporary populism, which has become very widespread in the last decade in a Europe hit by financial and refugee crises. Thirdly, the essay discusses the correlation between the 'end of ideology' discussions of the 1960s and the rise of populist political discourses along with neo-liberal forms of governance. The essay concludes with a brief discussion on the levels of analysis in the inquiry of populism to find out what is more relevant to consider: the leader, or the party?