Horowich and Miller on Dispositionalist Theories of Meaning (original) (raw)
In the rule-following considerations Kripke’s Wittgenstein raises the objection that dispositions cannot be the appropriate base for a reduction of meaning properties since they are finite, while meanings have an infinitary character. The objection charges any dispositionalist theory of meaning with indeterminacy. Paul Horwich (1995) has attempted a defence of dispositionalism pointing out that the argument for indeterminacy presupposes an inflationary conception of truth-theoretic notions. In his view a deflationary approach to truth-theoretic notions helps elude the sceptical conclusion. Alexander Miller (2000) has reacted to Horwich’s attempt and maintained that the distinction between inflationism and deflationism does not play any substantial role in the anti-dispositionalism argument. I agree with Miller on this point, nevertheless I argue that Miller’s criticism of Horwich’s defence of dispositionalism is question begging against the conception of meaning that Horwich espouses.
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