Review: Kant and the Creation of Freedom: A Theological Problem. By Christopher Insole. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. (Journal of the American Academy of Religion) (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Problem of Freedom in the Context of the Law of Causality in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason
2005
The main concern of the thesis is the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality and to investigate how Kant makes a room for freedom. Kant, firstly, in "Analytic", constitutes the conditions of knowledge upon which the objective validity of the law of causality entirely rests. This process of constitution also determines the limits of experience. On the other hand, Kant, in "Dialectic", postulates freedom as a noumenal cause together with the law of causality. Transcendental freedom, in this case, is a problematic concept which transcends the limits of experience, as it seems to destruct the unity of experience. However, Kant gives up neither the law of causality nor the idea of freedom, but rather he insists upon the idea that they can exist together without contradiction by asserting the distinction between phenomena and noumena as different grounds on which these iv two different types of causalities rest. According to Kant both are indispensable, as the former is necessary for the knowledge and the latter is absolutely needed for morality. In this context this thesis aims to explain the objective validity of natural causality which is proved in Second Analogy and the transcendental ground of the idea of freedom which is established in the solution of Third Antinomy in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. And it is discussed whether Kant's solution of this issue is satisfactory and legitimate or not.
Freedom Immediately after Kant
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019
Kant's effort to defend the coexistence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will-the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold's attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte's theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: The key lies in what I call Fichte's Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome.
Bolstering the Keystone: Kant on the Incomprehensibility of Freedom
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 2020
In this paper, I give an explanation and defense of Kant's claim that we cannot comprehend how freedom is possible. I suggest that this is a significant point that has been underappreciated in the secondary literature. My conclusion has a variety of implications both for Kant scholars and for those interested in Kantian ideas more generally. Most notably, if Kant is right that there are principled reasons why freedom is beyond our comprehension, then this would lift an undesirable explanatory burden off the shoulders of his ethical and metaethical views. It would be a boon for Kantians if they could ground their lofty claims about the unique, elevated status of rational agency without committing to an implausible view of libertarian freedom. On the negative side, there are certain debates concerning moral motivation and transcendental idealism that might have to change in response to Kant's claims about the incomprehensibility of freedom.
Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Freedom and the Divine Mind
Modern Theology, 2011
Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre-critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the (created) source of space, time and causation. Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcedental freedom. I show that Kant has significant theological difficulties ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties. I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so-called ‘neglected alternative’, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation.
Cambridge University Press, 2023
Kant's early critics maintained that his theory of freedom faces a dilemma: either it reduces the will's activity to strict necessity by making it subject to the causality of the moral law, or it reduces the will's activity to blind chance by liberating it from rules of any kind. This Element offers a new interpretation of Kant's theory against the backdrop of this controversy. It argues that Kant was a consistent proponent of the claim that the moral law is the causal law of a free will, and that the supposed ability of free will to choose indifferently between options is an empty concept. Freedom, for Kant, is a power to initiate action from oneself, and the only way to exercise this power is through the law of one's own will, the moral law. Immoral action is not thereby rendered impossible, but it also does not express a genuine ability.
A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant's Notion of Freedom
I acknowledge the help of my entire family members; firstly, my parents, Sir and Lady E.I. Adoh-Ogbuta (KSJI), who God has been using to support every aspect of my life. I also appreciate my siblings who have made impacts in my life. I specially appreciate my bishop, Most Rev. Dr. John Oke'Oghene Afareha, for his love support towards my vocation, and also my Vocations Director; Rev. Fr. Emmanuel Brume. I appreciate the Rector and seminary formation team, especially my H.O.D Philosophy Rev. Fr. Dr. Peter Egbe, with exceptional thanks to Very Rev. Fr. Dr. Anselm Ekhelar my Rector who also doubles as my moderator, your guidance, love and understanding has been the backbone of this piece. You are exceptionally great.
Kant and the creation of freedom: a response to Terry Godlove
In his review of my book, Terry Godlove raises some robust objections to the exegesis of Kant that I present in my recent book, Kant and the Creation of Freedom: a Theological Problem (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). I respond to these criticisms in this article. Properly to locate Godlove's exegetical objections, I dedicate the first section to setting out the arc of the argument I trace. I then set out and treat in turn Godlove's main objections to my exegesis: that it depends upon an interpretation of transcendental idealism which makes the doctrine 'flatly inconsistent and probably just silly'; that I neglect the most plausible account interpretation of Kant's various statements about transcendental idealism; and that I 'pick and choose' supporting texts too narrowly, leading to an unbalanced presentation, which is too convenient to my thesis. I conclude with some general methodological reflections— stimulated by Godlove, but not aimed at him—about how historical philosophical texts are often treated. I express some anxieties about the principle of charity that underlies much current exegesis, and 'rational reconstruction' of historical texts, and I propose a case for what might be called 'creative decomposition' (not of the text, but of the self).
A Lawful Freedom: Kant's Practical Refutation of Noumenal Chance
his paper asks how Kant's mature theory of freedom handles an objection pertaining to chance. This question is significant given that Kant raises this criticism against libertarianism in his early writings on freedom before coming to adopt a libertarian view of freedom in the Critical period. After motivating the problem of how Kant can hold that the free actions of human beings lack determining grounds while at the same maintain that these are not the result of 'blind chance,'
What is the status of freedom, according to Kant? How convincing is his theory of freedom?
The question of freedom in Kant's first critique arises from the Third Antinomy of pure reason, the seeming contradiction between nature and freedom. In Kant's words, the question could be put thus: " whether it is a correct disjunctive proposition that every effect in the world must arise either from nature or freedom, or whether instead both, each in a different relation, might be able to take place simultaneously in one and the same occurrence ." The relations which he refers to is the different ways that we can think of causality, namely causality from nature and causality from freedom. Could the causal laws of nature coexist with this superseding causality through freedom? In this essay I will elaborate on Kant's theory of freedom as well as explore various problems arising therein.