Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”: Reality before the Rhetoric? (original) (raw)
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FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
Asia-Pacific Review, 2019
The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) is the most important feature of Japan’s foreign policy under the Abe Administration. One of the most important questions is whether this vision aims to contain a rapidly rising China. Along with the amelioration of the relationship between Japan and China, this diplomatic strategy has been evolved from the quadrilateral security cooperation among leading democracies in this region, namely the US, Japan, Australia, and India, to a more comprehensive regional cooperation. This article regards the latter diplomatic strategic as the “FOIP 2.0” and that there emerges a possible harmony between Japan’s FOIP and China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Rising Powers Quarterly , 2018
This article explicates the aims and objectives of the Abe administration's central policy initiative towards the Indo-Pacific region: its " Free and Open Indo-Pacific " (FOIP) strategy, which was officially unveiled in 2016. It argues that whilst the FOIP is talked of as one of the most important organizing ideas in Japan's contemporary foreign policy, there is actually little consensus as to what the FOIP really entails and what it may mean for the country's emerging national security posture. Using a novel analytical framework to test for potential points of contact between the FOIP and three critical strands of Japan's national security (key alliances, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces outside of territorial defense, and security cooperation with ASEAN nations) the article shows why extant constitutional constraints on the use of the force combined with limited resources given over to defense make it unlikely that Japan will play a more robust role in pursuit of the FOIP's main goal: the maintenance of open seas.
The United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan
ISAS Insights, 2018
Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.
Executive Summary The Donald Trump administration in the United States (US) has expanded its articulation of a 'Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) region by announcing strategic investments and economic cooperation. India and Japan are fundamental to the realisation of the US vision of the region. For India and Japan, however, a deeper commitment to the US vision would depend on several factors. These include the prospects of the FOIP becoming a security-oriented strategy to counter China, as opposed to a regional connectivity programme; avoiding the legitimacy issues encountered by China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); and acquiring an inclusive character. The BRI has been inviting considerable criticism for pushing countries into debt traps and extracting strategic concessions for infrastructure funds. Coupled with developments like the revival of the 'Quad' Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the US, the FOIP has the possibility of becoming a security-centric anti-China initiative. This would be to the discomfort of India and Japan, which would hesitate to take sides. Both countries would also wish for greater economic legitimacy and vision of a broader regional economic order from the FOIP, as opposed to it being an initiative for expanding US commercial presence in the region. Notwithstanding announcements of regional infrastructure investments and cooperation efforts, India's repeated emphasis on an 'inclusive' FOIP, Japan's decision to selectively engage with the BRI and their respective geopolitical approaches to the region and strategies towards China, will decide their commitment to the FOIP. However, staying engaged in the FOIP can give both an opportunity of enhancing geo-political and geo-economic contribution through an agenda of regional connectivity.
Redirecting Strategic Focus in the Age of the Indo-Pacific
Comparative Connections, 2018
Japan and Southeast Asia faced a new regional dynamic in 2017 following the inauguration of President Donald Trump in the United States and Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s accommodative foreign policy toward China. US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Philippines’ unwillingness to discuss the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award forced Japan and some Southeast Asian states to redirect their strategic focus. Most Southeast Asian states increasingly welcome Japan’s regional initiatives in trade, security, and development to fill the vacuum created by these policy shifts. Japan has actively emphasized the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the geographic scope of which goes well beyond East Asia and covers the entire Pacific Ocean to East Africa. This new strategic focus has revitalized Japan’s cooperation with Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, there are serious challenges that Japan needs to overcome, particularly in clarifying ASEAN’s roles in the strategy.
Rising Powers Quarterly, 2018
Japan's intention of creating a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy will potentially combine the strategic interests of four countries (Japan, India, the US and Austra-lia), the political and economic potential of two continents (Asia and Africa), and two oceans (Indian and Pacific). This vision seeks to improve connectivity, promote stability and foster prosperity in the wider region while also attempting to counter the hegemony of any particular state. Should this nascent strategy be suitably defined and implemented by Japan and its lynchpin partners, it may prove revolutionary in reinforcing the current balance of power across much of the globe. This article looks at Japan's relationship with eastern Africa and attempts to define its policy alternatives vis-à-vis the region by locating them contextually. It argues that states of eastern Africa possess complex foreign policies and a web of connections to rising powers that are often ignored or misunderstood, thus making strategies pursued by large powers such as China, India or Japan potentially fraught with difficulty as they may become enmeshed in regional power squabbles.
JAPAN: COMING UP WITH THE INDO-PACIFIC CONCEPT
INFRASTRUCTURE, IDEAS, AND STRATEGY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC, 2019
Dr Rahul Roy-Chaudhury is the Senior Fellow for South Asia at the IISS. He leads the Institute's South Asia research programme, looking at India's neighbourhood foreign and security policies; Pakistan, Afghanistan and regional security; counter-extremism and terrorism; regional nuclear matters; and the Indian navy and the Indian Ocean. Rahul gives select policy-relevant talks and briefings, and regularly organises several 'track 1.5' meetings.
India-Japan Vision 2025: Deciphering the Indo-Pacific Strategy
Indian Foreign Affairs Journal , 2018
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s strategic pursuit of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, anchored in his conceptualisation of ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ and founded on the principle of concert of democracies, has created space for India in Japan’s Grand Strategy. India has been identified as a key variable in the geopolitical churning that is shaping the Indo-Pacific discourse both in Japan and the US. However, as policy positions are articulated by respective leaders, ambiguities around the Indo-Pacific puzzle demands more clarity. While President Trump and Prime Minister Abe are aligned in terms of pursuing the Indo-Pacific strategy with the objective of managing the US-led strategic order amidst Chinese attempts in claiming equity in international affairs with alternative ideas and institutions, Prime Minister Modi has articulated India’s Indo-Pacific vision as a free, open and ‘inclusive’ construct. India’s approach toward geopolitical realities is guided by a balance between engagement and autonomy. While there is alignment of interests which has led India to develop an ‘action oriented partnership’ for its Indo-Pacific Vision 2025 with Japan and pursue robust security and economic engagement with the US but containment of China has not been the objective of India’s foreign policy approach. Meanwhile, Japan’s strategy is shaped by the complex interplay of security and economic interests within the Japan-US-China triangle. Although there are certain gaps in each country’s nuanced interpretation of the Indo-Pacific construct, a few common elements define India-Japan ‘winning combination’ in the Indo-Pacific such as upholding ASEAN centrality; the objective of securing strategic stability and economic prosperity based on the pillars of shared universal values; facilitating infrastructure and connectivity between the sub-regions including Bay of Bengal, Mekong region and the Indian Ocean for better economic integration and leveraging regional production networks and value chains; and securing maritime global commons by strengthening security cooperation with like-minded partners. India-Japan Vision 2025 is rooted on ‘action oriented partnership’ advancing universal values and furthering rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. As regional fluidity both in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics are unfolding greater uncertainty, India and Japan as two major Asian powers and economies have coordinated in forward thinking while steering the challenges and realising the opportunities that this maritime super-region has to offer.
The Origin and Evolution of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Vision
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION: STATES’ STRATEGIES AND REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS VOLUME I: STATES’ STRATEGIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, 2024
Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision (FOIP) has moved to the forefront of Japan’s foreign policy since 2017. Nonetheless, it re- mains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junc- tures in FOIP’s evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a de- marcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junc- tures pushed FOIP to evolve?; and 2) Are these changes being insti- tutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan’s FOIP vision evolution cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institu- tionalism, rather, Japan’s maritime strategy and its FOIP are sensi- tive to power distribution changes associated with China’s re-emer- gence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid ap- proach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of China’s rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politi- co-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S. alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying and deepening its strategic partnerships.