Governance and administration in a 'new' democracy: the case of formal control of the free-to-air television in Thailand (1997-2006) (original) (raw)

Regulation, Reform and the Question of Democratising the Broadcast Media in Thailand

Javnost the Public, 2001

This paper discusses the struggle for the democratisation of the broadcast media in the context of the social and political reform in Thailand during 1997-2000. A new law to set up an independent regulatory body was enacted in March 2000. The gist of the legislation is to restructure state ownership of the broadcasting media and to reallocate them into three categories of ownership. These are state, commercial and community licenses. The unprecedented change in the law came about after Article 40 of the 1997 Constitution stipulated that radio spectrum for radio and television transmission and radio communications are national resources to be used for public interests. Although the new Constitution has effectively brought about legal reform in the media law the actual process of structural and institutional transformation have yet to take shape. There are indications that the state agencies owning radio and television stations are against the restructuring of their ownership rights. On the other hand, large private media operators are eager to become the new player in the industry at all costs. Allying themselves with the influential state agencies they stepped in together to control the selection process of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). This leaves the community sector, whose right has been guaranteed by law, in a perilous and exposed position. The liberalising process will bring about a further privatisation of radio and television, since the new commercial licenses are expected to transfer state ownership right or state property into private property. In addition, the television and radio stations operated by the state agencies will be commercialised.

The State of Democracy in Thailand

2015

Most scholars agree that consolidation of democracy requires mass approval in order to sustain this form of government. Even overwhelming support for democracy among peoples of developing nations, however, cannot guarantee democracy in the face of determined elites who have access to instruments of military power (Linz and Stepan, 2001). The military, after fifteen years of democracy, overturned a democratically-elected government in Thailand on September 19, 2006, as in 1991, on the pretext of “corruption in government. ” Whether “corruption ” warranted such a drastic remedy has yet to be determined, 1 but what is clear is that the Thai aristocracy is still willing to sacrifice democracy when they find control of government slipping from their grasp. The aristocracy was willing to tolerate a ban on all political activities, including meetings of political parties, assemblies of more than five people, and restrictions on the news media – specifically bans on criticism of the regime ...

Constitutions, Regimes and Power in Thailand

2007

Constitutions are both a site of social and political conflict and a means to structure and limit political participation. This article emphasizes the contested nature of constitutions and constitutionalism to explain how and why modes of participation have been affected. It maintains that constitutions are themselves punctuated by struggle over the kinds of participation that are promoted, tolerated, and suppressed. There is good reason for a focus on Thailand and its constitutional struggles over the past decade. Thailand is often said to have had serial coups and serial constitutions. The drafting of the 1997 constitution was a long process, pitting various social groups against each other, but grew out of a broad-based political opposition to military rule. A military coup in September 2006 scrapped the 1997 constitution, and established a highly controlled process to develop a new basic law. The process to develop the new constitution specifically limited participation to the elite and carefully selected representatives of civil society from the middle class.

The Politics of Media during Thailand's Social Upheavals: Change and Continuity

After the Coup: the National Council for Peace and Order Era and the Future of Thailand, 2019

We advance two claims in this chapter. First, political elites have continued to exert control and influence over traditional and social media in three major ways: a) establishing new institutions to reduce media independence, b) taking direct ownership of media outlets in order to advance their political agenda, and c) shaping the content and discourse of both traditional and social media through state channels. Specifically, we argue that the Thai military and its conservative-royalist allies made a comeback in their dominance over the media during two recent periods of authoritarian rule (2006 – 2007 and 2014 – 2015). Our second claim is that the intense political conflicts in Thailand during the past decade have deepened the partisanship of the media. The chapter addresses the strictly “political dimension”, the relationship between media organizations and political parties or groups. In the short to medium-term, the expansion of Internet access and growth in new media usage is unlikely to contribute significantly to meaningful political change in Thailand. The institutional constraints that limit press freedom and civil liberties will, that is, militate against the greater engagement of citizens via those media.

Thailand's Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution, 1997–-2007

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of …, 2009

The "People's Constitution" drafted in 1997 was seen as a watershed event in Thai constitutional history due to the breadth and depth of its reforms. Yet just ten years later, in August 2007, a new Constitution was promulgated, the 18th since Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932.

The Constitutional System of Thailand : A Contextual Analysis

The Constitutional System of Thailand : A Contextual Analysis

The Criminal Law, the NACC and the Fight Against Corruption IX. Thailand's Constitutional Jurisprudence A. Human rights cases B. Cases concerning corruption C. Election cases D. Cases concerning powers of economic regulation E. Cases concerning appointment processes F. Politically sensitive cases in the 2007 Court X. Conclusion Further reading x Contents 6 ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE I. Introduction II. The Council of State and the Origins of Administrative Justice III. The Administrative Courts A. The independence of the Administrative Courts B. Characteristics of the Administrative Courts C. The performance of the Administrative Courts and the wider role of administrative law in Thailand D. Prominent Court decisions IV. The Office of the Thai Ombudsman A. Introduction B. Remedial action and the Thai Ombudsmen V. Conclusion Further reading 7 HUMAN RIGHTS 217 I. Introduction 217 II. Historical and Cultural Context of Human Rights 218 III. Human Rights Under the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions 222 IV. The National Human Rights Commission 226 V. Human Rights and the Southern Conflict 229 VI. The Broadcast Media, Conflict of Interest and Freedom of Speech VII. The Lèse-Majesté Law A. Current application of lèse-majesté B. Human rights and lèse-majesté VIII. Conclusion Further reading 8 CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE THAI CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE Glossary Index Historical Analysis and Contemporary Issues in Thai Constitutionalism Introduction-Legal and Constitutional History before 1932-The 1932 Revolution-Constitutional Developments Postwar The Continuing Struggle for Democratic Constitutionalism-The Drafting of the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions-Why has the Coup/ Constitution Cycle Continued?-Role of the Monarchy and the Military in the Thai Polity-Conclusion 1 In view of the fact that the expected readership of this book will be mainly non-Buddhist, we have rendered dates in the Western 'BCE/CE' fashion as opposed to the Buddhist 'BE' fashion. 2 F Reynolds, 'Dhamma in Dispute: the Interactions of Religion and Law in Thailand' (1994) 28:3 Law and Society Review 433.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THAILAND: AMENDING IN THE SPECTRE OF PARLIAMENTARY DICTATORSHIP

Journal of Comparative Law, 2019

This article focuses on a series of amendments of the now-defunct 2007 Constitution. From 2010 to 2014, the battle to amend was at its peak as politicians endeavored to regain their lost power. Some initiatives succeeded, whereas others failed. It looks specifically at the role of the Constitutional Court as an unexpected gatekeeper, presenting itself as the guardian of the constitution and democracy, but in the end contributed to the conditions that led to the coup. This oxymoron originated in the fear of the elected authoritarian regime of Thaksin. This article argues that such fear is misplaced in the Thai context, which is more complicated than the Constitutional Court described it to be. When such fear is overrated, it becomes counter-productive to democracy. That fear created a false sense of crisis among the elites when the people simply ask for a new constitutional arrangement. It paves the way for the rise of military dictatorship as the 2007 Constitution ended with the 2014 coup.

Constitutional afterlife: The continuing impact of Thailand's postpolitical constitution

Icon-international Journal of Constitutional Law, 2009

Thailand's constitution of 1997 introduced profound changes into the country's governance, creating a " postpolitical " democratic structure in which an intricate array of guardian institutions served to limit the role of elected politicians. Ultimately, the constitutional structure was undermined in a military coup against populist billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra, who had taken over many of the institutions designed to constrain political power. Nonetheless, the 1997 constitution appears to be having a signifi cant afterlife, in that its institutional innovations have survived the enactment of a new Constitution and continue to constrain the political process. This article describes the Thai situation and speculates on the conditions for constitutional afterlife.