The Phenomenological Kant: Heidegger’s Interest in Transcendental Philosophy (original) (raw)

Husserl, Heidegger, and the Transcendental Dimension of Phenomenology

Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, 2007

Understanding phenomenology as a philosophical approach in which human-world relationships are analysed, as well as the constitution of subjectivity and objectivity within these relationships, this paper addresses some issues related to the transcendental dimension in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. An attempt is also made to re-address some issues related to phenomenology and its transcendental dimension as understood by adherents of hermeneutical phenomenology such as Paul Ricoeur. In essence, the focus of the paper is on exploring the following issues: what is this transcendental turn in Husserl's philosophy? Is this an 'unfortunate turn' toward a neo-Kantian brand of transcendental idealism? What is the significance of this transcendental dimension in Husserl's phenomenology? Is there any distinctive phenomenological programme that, despite their differences, is common to both Husserl and Heidegger? This line of questioning proceeds from the observations made by Paul Ricoeur that, "with the development of his 'hermeneutics of facticity', Heidegger rejected Husserl's neo-Kantian brand of transcendental phenomenology in favour of a de-transcendental and historicized way of doing philosophy, that Heidegger understood the subject to be 'factic', in contrast to Husserl's pure ego as the source of the world constitution"(Hahn, 1995). Ultimately, however, the thrust of this exploration is towards understanding the transcendental way of doing philosophy and the so-called historicized way of philosophizing as two distinct ways to reach one common goal, the transcendental dimension of meaning.

Heidegger's Phenomenology: 1919-1929

2020

In this work, I show Martin Heidegger's development of the phenomenological method from 1919 to 1929 as his main approach to all philosophical inquiry. In Chapter 1: Phenomenology as the Hermeneutics of Factical Life, I first show how Heidegger begins his philosophical career in 1919 with lectures that describe phenomenology as an 'original science' that seeks to study the structural character of life in itself. Through the four subsections of Chapter 1, I show how Heidegger continues to formulate distinct stages of phenomenological methodology through these early lectures that aid in his task to continue the explication of life vii problematization of a purely ontological thinking of being itself through various lectures following Sein und Zeit. Here, through a radicalization of metaphysics as the study 'beyond beings,' Heidegger provides a new understanding of phenomenology as the path to the thinking of being in its pure possibility.

Heidegger’s Failure to Overcome Transcendental Philosophy

Transcendental Inquiry Its History, Methods and Critiques, 2016

Heidegger engaged in a number of attempts to reformulate transcendental philosophy, such as in terms of fundamental ontology and world-disclosure in the second half of the 1920s, so as to break with it. An early attempt to disentangle himself from the transcendental tradition can be seen in his early post-war turn toward existence- and life-philosophy and hermeneutics, and also in his so-called “turning” (Kehre) in the mid-1930s. In this chapter I argue that, despite his anti-transcendental gestures and rhetoric, and Husserl’s view that he had betrayed transcendental philosophy for the sake of philosophical anthropology, Heidegger could not consistently abandon or overcome the problematic of transcendental philosophy through his displacement of the constitution of sense and meaning from the subject (Dasein) and its horizon of meaning to the event and openness of being (Sein), as advocates of his later thinking have claimed.

A ground completely overgrown: Heidegger, Kant and the problem of metaphysics

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2018

While we endorse Heidegger's effort to reclaim Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as a work concerned with the possibility of metaphysics, we hold, first, that his reading is less original than is often assumed and, second, that it unduly marginalizes the critical impetus of Kant's philosophy. This article seeks to shed new light on Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and related texts by relating Heidegger's interpretation of Kant to, on the one hand, the epistemological approach represented by Cohen's Kant's Theory of Experience and, on the other, the metaphysical readings put forward by Heimsoeth, Wundt and others in the 1920s. On this basis, we argue that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant remains indebted to the methodological distinction between ground and grounded that informed Cohen's reading and was transferred to the problem of metaphysics by Wundt. Even if Heidegger resists a 'foundationalist' mode of this distinction, we argue that his focus on the notions of ground and grounding does not allow him to account for Kant's critique of the metaphysical tradition.

A Proposal for Translating Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual, 2021

Translators of Heidegger’s interpretations of other thinkers face a challenge: they must contend not only with Heidegger’s distinc- tive choice of words, but also the terminology of his subject, whether it be Aristotle, Kant, or Schelling. The response by and large has been to focus on Heidegger's turns of phrase, at the expense of the thinker he interprets. In this paper, I challenge this practice, using Heidegger's interpretive works on Kant as a test case. If we overlook the terms of the author Heidegger interprets, we miss a major source of Heidegger's phrasing, and lose the connotations that he invokes by using these terms. Further, such translations reinforce the damaging assumption that Heidegger's interpretations venture far off-topic. I argue that when Heidegger references Kantian turns of phrase, these terms should be translated to match the standard English translation of Kant, and show how following this method of translation deepens our understanding of Heidegger's Kant interpretation. In the appendix, I provide two passages exemplifying this method of translation.

Husserl Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology The Ethics of the Transcendental

Ferrarello, S. (2020). "The Ethics of the Transcendental". In Husserl, Kant and Transcendental Phenomenology. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. , 2020

In this paper I will investigate the ethical implications that Kant's and Husserl's notions of the transcendental exert on the meaning-giving activity of one's life. Hence, the paper will focus first on how Kant arrived at his view of the transcendental as a bridge between being and meaning; second, the paper will show the Kantian heritage in Husserl and describe how Husserl's interpretation of the transcendental facilitates an understanding of it as fully based on the ethical commitment expressed by the epoché and reduction. The aim of this comparison is first to clarify whether or not Kant's and Husserl's philosophical use of the transcendental invites an individualistic ethical attitude in relation to the constitution of meanings within the life-world; second, the goal is to see if our affective, emotional, in one word interpretive answer, to the tran-scendental rule triggers in humans a way to interpret reality that emphasizes the separation more than the interconnectedness of reality itself.

Review of Kant and Phenomenology

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2012

To set the stage, it is helpful to lay out the overall strategy Rockmore pursues. There is no denying that phenomenology-both in word and in spirit-has existed before Husserl, and Rockmore is right to call Husserl on his claim to have founded phenomenology. But one could defend Husserl by saying that he means something very specific by the term and by his lights would not consider Hegel's philosophy a phenomenology. This leads directly to the problem with