Frege on thinking and thoughts (original) (raw)
Though Frege occasionally discusses actual thinking in his writings, frequently in order to contrast it with timeless thoughts or Gedanken, most scholars would agree that his scattered remarks on that issue do not deserve closer attention. The new book by Pieranna Garavaso and Nicla Vassallo (henceforth: G&V) challenges that assumption. According to G&V, Frege did not only devote ''much attention to human mental processes'' (1); he also thought these processes to be highly relevant to epistemological issues. The book contains four main chapters, all of which are based on previous work by G&V. Thus, to a large extent, the chapters can be read independently of each other. Chapter 2 discusses the ''many faces of Frege's anti-psychologism'' and argues for the surprising claim that Frege, a paradigmatic anti-psychologist, is actually committed to some kind of psychologism. This claim is based on Haack's distinction between three possible stances that may be held regarding the relation between logic and human thinking: according to strong psychologism, logic is descriptive of mental processes; weak psychologism claims that logic is prescriptive of mental processes; and anti-psychologism claims that logic ''has nothing to do'' with mental processes (24). In this sense, according to G&V, Frege's position ought to be described as a weak or prescriptive psychologism: ''For Frege, the laws of logic prescribe how actual thinking may be correct; so there is a connection between the laws of logic and actual thinking: the former prescribes the rules for the latter'' (25). I doubt that this is a correct rendering of Frege's position. Admittedly, Frege repeatedly stresses the normative function of logic, sometimes comparing it to ethics in this respect, but he nevertheless claims that the laws of logic proper-for instance, the laws expressed by Begriffsschrift axioms such as p ? (q ? p)-are
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Philosophy Compass, 2015
This two-part paper reviews a scholarly debate on an alleged tension in Frege’s philosophy of logic. In section 1 of Part 1 I discuss Frege’s view that logic is concerned with establishing norms for correct thinking, and is therefore a normative science. In section 2 I explore a different understanding of the role of logic that Frege seems to advance: logic is constitutive of the very possibility of thought, because it sets forth necessary conditions for thought. Hence the tension: the view according to which logic is normative for thought seems to be incompatible with the idea that abiding by the laws of logic forms a precondition for thought. In section 1 of Part 2 I survey a number of interpretations of Frege’s conception of logic that deal with this question. I show that they are for the most part either normative readings (emphasising the former understanding of the nature of logic) or constitutive readings (emphasising the latter). Finally in section 2 I adjudicate the debate and aim at reconciling the normative and the constitutive strands in Frege’s conception of logic.
Frege on the Normativity and Constitutivity of Logic for Thought II
Philosophy Compass, 2015
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Logic, Judgement, and Inference. What Frege Should Have Said about Illogical Thought
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2018
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