New perspectives on diplomacy: a new theory and practice of diplomacy; New perspectives on diplomacy: contemporary diplomacy in action (original) (raw)
Related papers
Peace Proposals, Diplomacy, and War: Was an Opportunity Lost for an Early Settlement in Vietnam?
Journal of Cold War Studies, 2015
This forum includes essays by six leading experts on the Vietnam War discussing the recent book by James G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), which recounts the various secret efforts mediated by East European governments to foster peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam that would bring an end to the war. All of the commentators praise the book and the scope of Hershberg's research, but most of them do not share Hershberg's belief that a major chance for peace was genuinely “lost.” All the commentators agree that Hershberg provides a rich, nuanced analysis and has performed a valuable service in outlining future directions for research on the topic. The forum ends with a reply by Hershberg to the six contributors.
“We Don’t Want a Munich” Hanoi’s Diplomatic Strategy, 1965–1968.pdf
This paper explores Hanoi’s diplomatic strategy during the early stage of the Vietnam War. It draws from Vietnamese, Western, and other materials to elucidate the meanings and usages Hanoi attached to diplomacy in those years, to describe the related maneuverings of North Vietnamese leaders, and to identify the forces shaping those maneuvers. Following the onset of war Hanoi rejected negotiations with Washington, but that did not mean that the so-called “diplomatic struggle” was non-existent, or unimportant. State and party organs used diplomacy to manipulate and mobilize world opinion, to mitigate the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and to secure necessary material assistance from socialist allies to sustain the war until “final victory” over the United States and its South Vietnamese allies. Diplomacy thus served as a veritable instrument of war for Hanoi. Admittedly, diplomatic priorities changed over time, but diplomatic struggle itself remained at the heart of its “Anti-American Resistance.”
Review of Akira Iriye, The New Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 3, The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), and A. S. Thompson and C. G. Fentzos, eds., The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History, 1865 to the Present (New York: Routledge, 2014). Diplomacy and Statecraft 26:1 (March 2015), 172-177. Compares the two books approaches to the interwar period in particular, especially in terms of the contrast between Iriye's emphasis on the peaceful nature of US policy, and the Routledge Handbook's foregrounding of military issues at this time.
The Missed Chance for US-Vietnam Relations, 1975-1979
After the end of the Vietnam War, both the Vietnamese and American governments wanted to normalize relations, and yet they failed to do so until 1995. Why was this the case? This paper focuses on the missed chance for normalization of relations between 1975-79. I argue that domestic economic imperatives rather than pride was the primary driver of Vietnam's insistence on postwar reparations. By the time the Chinese-Khmer Rouge threat had driven Vietnamese leaders to drop this condition, American leaders sought to prioritize normalization of relations with Beijing first. I argue that this decision was taken mainly at National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's own initiative to counterbalance Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa rather than due to Chinese pressure, and that the Carter Administration did not conclusively shelve normalization plans with Vietnam until the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia.