Disputatio on the Distinction between the Human Person and Other Animals: the Human Person as Gardener (original) (raw)

HOW THE NONHUMAN MADE US HUMAN

The age of modern reasoning, where the rational human mind and it's development was increasingly perceived as the very essence of being human, the Other,-in the form of nature and animals were also decimated in substance. Aristotle the father of modern philosophy believed that animals were incapable of reason and therefore were to be regarded as inferior to man in the same manner as were slaves. Bible also reflected the sentiments with a decree of man as master over animals " Let (man) have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over all the wild animals and all the creatures that crawl on the ground". Descartes' view was more extreme as it took animal existence to a still lower level. He believed animals were assembled as machines and that they were incapable of having thoughts, feelings language or consciousness (Wilson, 2010). As human thought progressed along the lines of decimating the consciousness of animals and importance of engagement with nature, the trend was reflected in discourses on morality too. Thomas Aquinas, the very influential figure in the theme of Christian morality stated, a man when he kills an ox commits a crime against another man and not against he ox (Thomas & Richard, 2002). Scientific taxonomy aided the rational human mind to extract essences of plants and animals and 'objectively' 'analytically' scrutinize them as specimens and taxonomical categories. Aided by the trends in development, philosophy, morality and science, today in the 21 st century the nonhuman is the passive, dismissible other. The 'visual labels' of ours (influenced by our sciences, philosophies and moralities) when attached to things, makes them invisible (Shephard 1995). The aim of this paper to argue the case of the active

The Anthropological Difference: What Can Philosophers Do To Identify the Differences Between Human and Non-human Animals?

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 2012

This paper considers the question of whether there is a human-animal or ‘anthropological difference’. It starts with a historical introduction to the project of philosophical anthropology (sct. 1). Section 2 explains the philosophical quest for an anthropological difference. Sections 3–4 are methodological and explain how philosophical anthropology should be pursued in my view, namely as impure conceptual analysis. The following two sections discuss two fundamental objections to the very idea of such a difference, biological continuity (sct. 5) and Darwinist anti-essentialism (sct. 6). Section 7 discusses various possible responses to this second objection – potentiality, normality and typicality. It ends by abandoning the idea of an essence possessed by all and only individual human beings. Instead, anthropological differences are to be sought in the realm of capacities underlying specifically human societies (forms of communication and action). The final section argues that if the...

MPhil Philosophy Dissertation: Human and Vegetal Life

Rossella Vingelli , 2023

This dissertation examines the post-anthropocentric perspective of thinkers like Stefano Mancuso, Emanuele Coccia and Stefano Boeri, who promote a new awareness of plants as active agents in urban environments. Mancuso shows that plants are autonomous living beings, challenging anthropocentrism. Coccia develops an ethics of plant life that recognises plants' intrinsic value beyond their usefulness to humans. He argues that plants independently perceive the world, rethinking human-nature relations toward ecology and sustainability. Boeri's urban planning highlights plants' ability to address the climate emergency in cities. He envisions green cities where plants improve quality of life, balancing humans life and the environment. The key insights are that plants should not be seen as decorative objects but as actors shaping urban spaces through their interactions. A post-anthropocentric awareness recognised plants' role in sustainable and harmonious cities, benefiting human and nonhuman inhabitants. This perspective could transform urban planning to integrate nature better and promote ecological well-being.

Three Quests for Human Nature: Some Philosophical Reflections

The notion of ‘human nature’ has long since captured the interest and imagina- tion of philosophers, theologians, and scientists; as such, it appears that the study of human nature is one amenable to inter-disciplinary cross-fertilization. However, it is not obvious that there is a single coherent project being undertaken, neither between nor within disciplines. Rather, we argue that there are three main quests for human nature – the quest for universal human nature, the quest for human unique- ness, and the quest for innate human nature – and that different philosophical, theo- logical, and scientific enterprises emphasize (or, indeed, neglect) different quests. Furthermore, these different intellectual enterprises may differ more fundamen- tally, namely in their very object of enquiry, the definition of the theoretical term ‘human being.’ For scientists, the term ‘human being’ is often treated as being coter- minous with the term Homo sapiens; that is, ‘human being’ is a biological category, a species. This definition is now, rightly or wrongly, taken for granted by philosophers and theologians, but it is not necessarily the most appropriate. It remains an open question whether, for any given philosophical and/or theological project, the bio- logical concept Homo sapiens is the most appropriate way to understand the term ‘human being.’ This paper considers these issues by scrutinizing two cases – from evolutionary psychology and theological anthropology – in each case examining the adequacy of the biological concept Homo sapiens for its purpose, as well as the viability of each of the three quests for human nature.

The ways of knowing of plants, animals, and man

This is a transcendental, rudimentary epistemology of biology, necessarily from both philosophical and biological points of view. It broadly consists of the comparative ways of knowing of plants, animals and humans. This provides an overall survey of the major life forms, including the most diverse animals, insects. Philosophically it is based transcendentally in parallel, tripartite fashion on Kant's Transcendental Idealism [Britannica ], C.S. Peirce's Categories [Burch ] and the more practical concept of the personhood [Smith,2013 ] of the experiencer. Each of these is roughly explored as well on three stages or levels of awareness. These three stages are the necessary categorization of the ways of knowing of all living beings. We hope that this permits, on a speculative and exploratory level, a somewhat deeper understanding of what the comparative experiences may be like for all living beings, hopefully applicable to the entire universe.

In Defense of the Human Difference

Environmental Philosophy, 2018

Against the prevalent trend in eco-criticism which is to deny the human difference, I summon a set of untimely tropes from metaphysics in the interest of advancing an ecological humanism: the difference in kind between human consciousness and animal sensibility; the uniquely human capacity for moral discernment; and the human being's peculiar freedom from the material conditions of existence. While I agree with eco-critics who argue that anthropocenic nature is not only finite, but sick: sickened by our abuse and neglect, I disagree that this abuse is simply a result of insisting on the human difference (" anthropocentrism "), nor is species egalitarian-ism the way forward. On the contrary, the eco-collapse, referred to as the sixth great extinction event is the consequence of a general disavowal of the human's special call to take responsibility for the relation between the human and the non-human, and only a reawakening of this responsibility can restore health to anthropocenic nature. The non-human cannot effect this restoration, for that is not its vocation. A difference in vocation is not necessarily a difference in moral worth, and so the human difference does not justify denying the " intrinsic value " of the non-human. Humanity is uniquely responsible both for the mess we are in and for cleaning it up.