Chimpanzees: Alien Minds or Kindred Spirits? (original) (raw)

Primates and evolution of the human mind

2006

Thomas Suddendorf ow did the human mind evolve? Why do we appear to be so different from other animals? These rather profound questions have attracted plenty of speculation in philosophy, anthropology and psychology. Yet, many remain appropriately sceptical about the proposals that have been put forward. How could one possibly go beyond just-so stories and make proper scientific progress in this domain? Although there is an ever growing archeological record of our ancestors, minds unfortunately do not fossilise. Many reconstructions, such as those showcased in popular TV documentaries, seem little more than plausible conjecture at best. In recent years, researchers have increasingly looked to extant primates for clues as to how to breathe life into the fossilised remains of our forebears. But there has been little explicit discussion in psychology of how the study of primates can inform us about the evolution of the human mind. Here I will present ways through which real progress may be made. Humans are primates (see ). Like other primates, and unlike most other mammals, we rely more on vision than smell and our brains are large relative to our body size. There are clear continuities between the anatomy and physiology of humans and our closest living relatives. Yet, humans are the only primates to have colonised most habitats on this planet, built a diversity of civilisations, gained immense power to create and destroy, and invented elaborate ideas about divine beings that care about humans. These differences may reflect our special minds. Indeed, to many people, human minds appear so vastly superior to anything that can be found in the animal kingdom that it is difficult to reconcile this apparent gap with Darwin's (1859) notion of descent with modification. Curiously, however, there is no established inventory of uniquely human mental traits. The first way in which the study of primates can help us, then, is in establishing what in fact the differences are that appear to set us apart from other primates.

The degree of chimpanzee theory of mind and the evolution of modularity

2005

Whether or not chimpanzees have the ability to mentally represent others' mental states or theory of mind (ToM) has yet to be definitively established. This results from three problems. First, modular theory of mind accounts lead researchers to adopt an either/or approach to psychological faculties which obfuscates both within-and across-species variability. Second, present research continues to rely on the continued trend to polarize nature and nurture. Third, the bulk of the work compares humans with chimpanzees rather than looking at the entire range of primate species. I propose "degree approach" by way of the Integrated Causal Model which particularizes the key components to ToM while maintaining the tenets of modularity theory. According to this account, while chimpanzees may not have a ToM that is equal to our own, they nevertheless exhibit behaviors that are indeed indicative of having one as illustrated by comparison to other extant primate research.

Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: A Proposal From the Armchair

Cognitive Science Technical Report, 2001

Sam Scott. Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: A Proposal from the Armchair. Carleton University Cognitive Science Technical Report 2001-06 (www.carleton.ca/iis/TechReports). November, 2001. © 2001 Sam Scott. ... Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: A Proposal from the Armchair

Chimpanzee Theory of Mind: Looking in All the Wrong Places?

Mind & Language, 2005

I respond to an argument presented by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk that the current generation of experiments on chimpanzee theory of mind cannot decide whether chimpanzees have the ability to reason about mental states. I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's proposed experiment is subject to their own criticisms and that there should be a more radical shift away from experiments that ask subjects to predict behavior. Further, I argue that Povinelli and Vonk's theoretical commitments should lead them to accept this new approach, and that experiments which offer subjects the opportunity to look for explanations for anomalous behavior should be explored.

Embodied Animal Mind and Hand-Signing Chimpanzees

The Pluralist, 2011

Chimpanzee language studies have generated much heated controversy, as Roger Fouts can attest from first-hand experience. Perhaps this is because language is usually considered to be what truly distinguishes humans from apes. If chimps can indeed be taught the rudiments of language, then the difference between them and us is not as great as we might have thought. It is a matter of degree rather than kind, a continuity, and our species is not so special after all. The advantage of this continuity thesis, as Fouts has emphasized, is that it conforms to the general tenets of evolutionary theory, and fits well with the evidence from paleontology and genetics that suggests that apes and humans are close cousins. It also has profound implications for the way we treat our primate relatives. Opposed to continuity theories are those that posit a discontinuity between humans and apes, perhaps due to a "language instinct" (e.g.. Pinker) or a specialized cognitive module. The advantage of this view is that it accords with prima facie observations that we humans are unique in our cognitive abilities, our complex cultures, our desire for meaning, our fondness for stories and rituals, and our tendency to ponder our ultimate fate. The problem with the discontinuity view is that it lacks an evolutionary explanation of how a new instinct or module arises, or exactly what these might be in terms of human biology. Perhaps more importantly and as Fouts has pointed out, it tends to support the view that humans are special, and consequently reinforces, particularly in Western cultures, our domination over other species. Parallel to the continuity-discontinuity debate is a dispute over how to interpret complex animal behavior. There are those who insist on being hard-nosed and, in the name of being scientific, avoid all mentalistic terms. But many people in both the sciences and humanities find such paradigms too restrictive to describe and understand complex animal behavior. They contend that since there is an evolutionary continuity between apes and humans, apes must be cognitive creatures in much the same way that humans are. Thus we can use terms from human folk psychology when talking about other animals. For some, this includes talking about animal consciousness. Fouts, I believe, is on this side of this debate. Unfortunately, mentalistic and folk psychology views have their own problems. One is that they usually rely on a Cartesian and Lockean view of mind, something Fouts wisely wants to avoid. Mind is something non-physical "inside" the animal that forms representations of the outside world. Fouts contrasts a Cartesian view with Darwinian continuity; but affirming evolutionary continuity does not necessarily dispel Descartes' delusion, which is mind-body dualism and a representational psychology. Applying a mentalistic folk psychology to animals risks foisting a quasi-Cartesian mind onto our animal relatives. The second widely acknowledged problem with a mentalistic view of animals is anthropomorphism. This is where the debate can become particularly acrimonious. Is

A threat to man's uniqueness? Language and communication in the chimpanzee

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 1979

The possibility of talking chimpanzees has greatly aroused the public interest and provoked controversy among the lay public and scientists alike. Why has there been such a furor? Premack and Rumbaugh, and Pribram in his foreword to the Rumbaugh book, all point to man's concept of himself as radically different from all other creatures, as unique. They emphasize Cartesian dualism as the basis for this uniqueness and point

2004: We don’t need a microscope to explore the chimpanzee mind

2016

Abstract: The question of whether chimpanzees, like humans, reason about unobserv-able mental states remains highly controversial. On one account, chimpanzees are seen as possessing a psychological system for social cognition that represents and reasons about behaviors alone. A competing account allows that the chimpanzee’s social cognition system additionally construes the behaviors it represents in terms of mental states. Because the range of behaviors that each of the two systems can generate is not currently known, and because the latter system depends upon the former, determining the presence of this latter system in chimpanzees is a far more difficult task than has been assumed. We call for recognition of this problem, and a shift from experimental paradigms that cannot resolve this question, to ones that might allow researchers to intelligently determine when it is necessary to postulate the presence of a system which reasons about both behavior and mental states. 1. Emergenc...