Medicare Physician Group Practices: Innovations in Quality and Efficiency (original) (raw)
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Medicare physician group practice demonstration design: quality and efficiency pay-for-performance
Health care financing review, 2007
The Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) demonstration is Medicare's first physician pay-for-performance (P4P) initiative. The demonstration, which is legislatively mandated, establishes incentives for quality improvement (QI) and cost efficiency at the level of the PGP Ten large physician groups are participating in the demonstration, which started on April 1, 2005, and will run for 3 years. In this article the authors provide an overview of the PGP demonstration's key design elements, including the selection process for PGP participants; beneficiary assignment; comparison population; measurement of demonstration savings; performance payments; and quality measurement and reporting. A summary of early case study findings is also provided.
Paying physician group practices for quality: A statewide quasi-experiment
Healthcare, 2013
This article presents the results of a unique quasi-experiment of the effects of a large-scale pay-forperformance (P4P) program implemented by a leading health insurer in Washington state during 2001-2007. The authors received external funding to provide an objective impact evaluation of the program. The program was unique in several respects: (1) It was designed dynamically, with two discrete intervention periods-one in which payment incentives were based on relative performance (the "contest" period) and a second in which payment incentives were based on absolute performance compared to achievable benchmarks. (2) The program was designed in collaboration with large multispecialty group practices, with an explicit run-in period to test the quality metrics. Public reporting of the quality scorecard for all participating medical groups was introduced 1 year before the quality incentive payment program's inception, and continued throughout 2002-2007. (3) The program was implemented in stages with distinct medical groups. A control group of comparable group practices also was assembled, and difference-in-differences methodology was applied to estimate program effects. Case mix measures were included in all multivariate analyses.
Effect of physician-specific pay-for-performance incentives in a large group practice
The American journal of managed care, 2010
To assess the effect of a physician-specific pay-for-performance program on quality-of-care measures in a large group practice. In 2007, Palo Alto Medical Clinic, a multispecialty physician group practice, changed from group-focused to physician-specific pay-for-performance incentives. Primary care physicians received incentive payments based on their quarterly assessed performance. We examined 9 reported and incentivized clinical outcome and process measures. Five reported and nonincentivized measures were used for comparison purposes. The quality score of each physician for each measure was the main dependent variable and was calculated as follows: Quality Score = (Patients Meeting Target / Eligible Patients) x 100. Differences in scores between 2006 and 2007 were compared with differences in scores between 2005 and 2006. We also compared the performance of Palo Alto Medical Clinic with that of 2 other affiliated physician groups implementing group-level incentives. Eight of 9 rep...
Bringing managed care incentives to Medicare's fee-for-service sector
Health care financing review, 1996
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) could work with eligible physician organizations to generate savings in total reimbursements for their Medicare patients. Medicare would continue to reimburse all providers according to standard payment policies and mechanisms, and beneficiaries would retain the freedom to choose providers. However, implementation of new financial incentives, based on meeting targets called Group-Specific Volume Performance Standards (GVPS), would encourage cost-effective service delivery patterns. HCFA could use new and existing data systems to monitor access, utilization patterns, cost outcomes and quality of care. In short, HCFA could manage providers, who, in turn, would manage their patients' care.
Health Affairs, 2012
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan partnered with providers across the state to create an innovative, "fee for value" physician incentive program that would deliver high-quality, efficient care. The Physician Group Incentive Program rewards physician organizationsformal groups of physicians and practices that can accept incentive payments on behalf of their members-based on the number of quality and utilization measures they adopt, such as generic drug dispensing rates, and on their performance on these measures across their patient populations. Physicians also receive payments for implementing a range of patient-centered medical home capabilities, such as patient registries, and they receive higher fees for office visits for incorporating these capabilities into routine practice while also improving performance. Taken together, the incentive dollars, fee increases, and care management payments amount to a potential increase in reimbursement of 40 percent or more from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan for practices designated as high-performing patient-centered medical homes. At the same time, we estimate that implementing the patient-centered medical home capabilities was associated with $155 million in lower medical costs in program year 2011 for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan members. We intend to devote a higher percentage of reimbursement over time to communities of caregivers that offer high-value, system-based care, and a lower percentage of reimbursement to individual physicians on a service-specific basis.
JAMA health forum, 2021
IMPORTANCE The Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) is a major Medicare value-based purchasing program, influencing payment for more than 1 million clinicians annually. There is a growing concern that MIPS increases administrative burden, and little is known about what it costs physician practices to participate in the program. OBJECTIVE To examine the costs for independent physician practices to participate in MIPS in 2019. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This qualitative study identified and interviewed leaders of physician practices participating in the US Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) MIPS program, including those in MIPS alternative payment models. Time required and financial costs were calculated from responses to in-depth, semistructured interviews conducted from December 12, 2019, to June 23, 2020. Physician practices were categorized by size (small, 1-9 physicians; medium, 10-25; and large, Ն50), specialty (primary care, general surgery, or multispecialty), and US census region. Participants were asked about 2019 costs related to clinician and staff time, information technology, and external vendors. Time was converted to financial costs using the Medical Group Management Association's Provider Compensation and the Management and Staff Compensation databases. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES Annual time spent by staff on MIPS-related activities and mean per-physician costs to physician practices in 2019. RESULTS Leaders of 30 physician practices (9 [30.0%] small primary care, 6 [20.0%] small general surgery, 4 [13.3%] medium primary care, 4 [13.3%] medium general surgery, and 7 [23.3%] large multispecialty) represented all US census regions, and 14 of the 30 (46.7%) practices participated in a MIPS alternative payment model in 2019. The mean per-physician cost to practices of participating
Medical Care Research and Review, 2018
Physician practices have been growing in size, and becoming more commonly owned by hospitals, over time. We use survey data on physician practices surveyed at two points in time, linked to Medicare claims data, to investigate whether changes in practice size or ownership are associated with changes in the use of care management, health information technology (HIT), or quality improvement processes. We find that practice growth and becoming hospital-owned are associated with adoption of more quality improvement processes, but not with care management or HIT. We then investigate whether growth or becoming hospital-owned are associated with changes in Medicare spending, 30-day readmission rates, or ambulatory care sensitive admission rates. We find little evidence for associations with practice size and ownership, but the use of care management practices is associated with lower rates of ambulatory care sensitive admissions.
Medical Group Characteristics and the Cost and Quality of Care for Medicare Beneficiaries
Health Services Research, 2018
Objective. To estimate the relationship between outcomes of care and medical practices' structure and use of organized care improvement processes. Data Sources/Study Setting. We linked Medicare claims data to our national survey of physician practices (2012-2013). Fifty percent response rate; 1,040 responding practices; 31,888 physicians; 868,213 attributed Medicare beneficiaries. Study Design. Cross-sectional observational analysis of the relationship between practice characteristics and total spending, readmissions, and ambulatory care-sensitive admissions (ACSAs), for all beneficiaries and five categories of beneficiary defined by predicted need for care. Principal Findings. Practices with 100+ physicians and 50-99 physicians had, respectively, annual spending per high-need beneficiary that was 1,870(12.5percent)and1,870 (12.5 percent) and 1,870(12.5percent)and1,824 higher than practices with 1-2 physicians, and readmission rates 1.64 and 1.71 higher. ACSA rates did not vary significantly by practice size. Outcomes did not vary significantly by ownership or by practices' use of organized processes to improve care. Conclusions. Large practices had higher spending and readmission rates than the smallest practices, especially for high-need beneficiaries. There were no significant performance differences between physician-owned and hospital-owned practices. Policy makers should consider the effects of specific policies on provider organization, pending further research to learn which types of practice provide better care.