“Aquinas on the Moral Progress of the Weak Willed.” In Das Problem der Willensschwäche im mittelalterlichen Denken / The Problem of Weakness of Will in Medieval Thought, edited by Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, 221–47. Leuven: Peeters, 2006. (original) (raw)
Related papers
2021
To achieve the end of the moral life, one must act well or virtuously, but in the eyes of St. Thomas Aquinas, virtue requires that one be well-disposed. The next question is: what is the subject of dispositions and how is one best disposed to act in a virtuous way and so develop a virtuous character? Using an insight from Aristotle, Thomas would identify three aspects of the human person which are subject to dispositions that prepare one for a life of virtue: the body, the lower powers, and the intellect. For each of these three subjects, both Aristotle and Aquinas acknowledge the influence of personality or temperament, upbringing (habituation), and education. Our aim in this paper is to systematize the core of Aquinas's thought on these three factors which influence the human person in the development of his or her moral character. It is my hope that the research here presented will provide a way for St. Thomas Aquinas’s profound thought to more fully enter into the debate regarding individual human development and enrich the contemporary culture as it once enriched the lives of those young men entrusted to the care of the great Dominican priest.
Journal of Religious Ethics, 1999
Aquinas is often presented as following Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics when treating moral virtue. Less often do philosophers consider that Aquinas's conception of the highest good and its relation to the functional character of human activity led him to break with Aristotle by replicating each of the acquired moral virtues on an infused level. The author suggests that we can discern reasons for this move by examining Aquinas's commentary on the Sententiae of Peter the Lombard and the Summa theologiae within their historical context. The author's thesis is that Dominican pastoral and intellectual concerns led Aquinas to argue that moral virtue must necessarily be ordered toward the highest good. Understanding this purpose helps to explain his presentation of moral virtue and its implications for standard philosophical interpretations of his work.
ProQuest. Emmaus Academic version (with alterations and complete translations) coming soon, 2020
This dissertation, which is to be published in the summer of 2021 as "Conforming to Right Reason" by Emmaus Academic (with translated footnotes, an introduction by Steve Long, and an index, etc.), investigates St. Thomas Aquinas' account of what appoints the end to the moral virtues. Given that the moral virtues are located in the appetites (either in the rational appetite known as the will or in the sensitive appetite), the question that arises is whether the end these virtues point an individual towards are antecedently cognized in virtue of some other habit or power or whether, on the contrary, they are responsible for all virtuous action independent of the intellect. Some renowned theologians have argued that the knowledge the virtuous man has regarding the ends he pursues comes about merely by inclination. There is, on this account, reasoning about means but little to no reasoning about ends themselves. One might think of certain New Natural Law theorists who think that prior to choice, there is no morally significant order of goods to be pursued (because such goods are incommensurable) or of the moral motivation theorists such as Keenan who maintain that "strivings" of the will are "antecedent to questions of intention and choice." One of the reasons their theories are sometimes considered consistent with Aquinas is that he says the moral virtues, which are present in the appetitive part of the soul, provide the ends to prudence, which uses those ends as the beginning of its deliberation. What I intend to show, however, is that the notion the prudent man subjects everything he does to the inclinations of his appetites (even if those appetites have been purified by the presence of grace) is not consonant with St. Thomas' view. This is because in the final analysis, that which appoints (praestituit) the end to the moral virtues is, strictly speaking, a form of understanding or reason that is distinct from prudence. After an initial chapter on the end in general and what it consists in, the second chapter will explore the kind of causality exercised by the intellect while investigating the claim that Aquinas had a somewhat radical progression towards a more voluntarist attitude as he matured. The third chapter turns to the specific way in which synderesis and prudence exercise causality in regard to their appointing of the end and proposes a way of understanding Aquinas to be accurate both when he says in I-II, q. 66 that prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues and in II-II, q. 47 when he denies it does while insisting the natural reason (synderesis) does so instead. In that chapter, both faith and conscience will be discussed as other indispensable elements involved in the appointing of ends.
Aquinas, Averroes, and the Human Will
2017
Scholars have largely read Aquinas' critique of Averroes on the issue of will and moral responsibility in a positive light. They tend to accept Aquinas' account of Averroes' theory and its shortcomings, failing to read Averroes' theory in its own right or take a critical eye to Aquinas' understanding of Averroes. This dissertation will provide that critical eye by addressing four key issues associated with the location and function of the will: (A) the nature of the Intellects as both separate and "in the soul," (B) the notion that the Intellects are "form for us," (C) the relationship between the individual human being and the intelligibles in act, and (D) the location and function of the will. In addressing these four issues several questions will be raised and answered. First, it will be necessary to examine whether Aristotle, on whom both medieval thinkers rely for their disparate understandings of will and intellect, has a faculty of will in his system and what role the intellect plays in moral decision making. Next, we must determine what Averroes and Aquinas positions are on these issues and how they relate to that of Aristotle. Finally, the two philosophers must be brought into dialogue with one another as we determine the strength and cogency of Aquinas' critiques of Averroes' view of the will and the intellects. Is it coherent? Through the course of this examination it will be demonstrated that Aristotle did not have a faculty of will in his philosophy and that the understanding of will attributed to him by Averroes and Aquinas actually has its roots in Stoic, Neoplatonist, and Peripatetic philosophy. It will also be demonstrated that, despite the view of many contemporary scholars of Aquinas, Aquinas' particular critiques of Averroes regarding the will are not tenable. Despite this, we will see that the nature of the intellects and, more importantly, the intelligibles in act is central to moral agency for Averroes; here, Aquinas' criticisms are more convincing. ABBREVIATIONS CNE Sententia Libri Ethicorum and Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics conf. Confessiones deUnitate De Unitate Intellectus and On the Unity of the Intellect Against the Averroists SCG Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei Contra Errores Infidelium seu <> LCDA Averroes Cordobensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros and Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle lib. arb. De libero arbitrio MCDA Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima QDAnima Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima and Questions on the Soul Sent S criptum Super Libros Sententiarum magistri petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis ST Summa Theologiae trin. De trinitate TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………..i ABBREVIATIONS……………………………………………………………………….ii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………1 1.1 General introduction…………………………………………………………..1 1.2 The Issues……………………………………………………………………...3 1.2.1 Does Aristotle have a faculty of will in his system? What is his view of the intellects?…………………………………………………………...4 1.2.2 Are either Averroes or Aquinas following Aristotle regarding the will or the intellects?…………………………………………………………...6 1.2.3 What is Averroes' position and what motivates this position? Is it coherent?….…………………………………………………………………….…7 1.2.4. Does Averroes' view hold up against the critiques of Aquinas?……9 1.3 Methodology……………………………………………………..…………..12 1.3.1 Aristotle and other influences……………………………………...12 1.3.2 Reading Averroes and Aquinas on their own terms………………..14 1.3.3 Assessing Aquinas' critique…………………………………….….16 1.4 Conclusion.…………………………………………………………………..18 CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF WILL BEFORE AVERROES AND AQUINAS…………………………………………………………...19 2.1 Introduction………………………………………..………………………....19 2.2 Aristotle and his interpreters…………………………………………………21 2.2.1 The Texts of Aristotle……………………………………….……...21 2.2.2 Interpretations of Aristotle………………………………………....29 2.3 The Greek tradition after Aristotle…………………………………………...32 2.3.1 The Stoics……………………………………………………….….33 2.3.2 The Platonists and Peripatetics…………………………………….43 2.4 Augustine on the will and its freedom…………………….………………....48 2.4.1 The Texts…………………………………………………………...49 2.4.2 Interpretations of Augustine's view………………………………..58 2.5 The Arabic Tradition…………………………………………………………62 2.5.1 Translating Aristotle into Arabic…………………………………...63 2.5.2 Al-Farabi…………………………………………………………...64 2.5.3 Avicenna………………………………………………………....…69 2.6 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...79 CHAPTER 3: AVERROES………………………………………………………………83 3.1 Introduction………………………………………………….……………….83 3.2 The Texts…………………………………………………….……………….84 3.2.1 Commentary on Plato's Republic: The Theoretical/Practical divide and the the cogitative faculty…………………………………………….85 3.2.2 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: The will and the deliberative process………………………………………………………92 3.2.3 Commentaries on the De Anima: The cogitative power, and the Intellects.…………………………………………………………………97 3.2.3.1 Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima…………...97 3.2.3.2 Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle……….104 3.3 Analysis and interpretation: The resulting view of moral action and responsibility ………………………….…………..……………………………114 3.3.1 Knowledge and the Intellects……………………………………..114 3.3.2 Willing and the deliberative process……………………………...122 3.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….124 CHAPTER 4: AQUINAS………………………………………………………………128 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………128 4.2. Aquinas' view………………………………………………………………129 4.2.1. The soul and its relation to the body………………………….….129 4.2.2. The intellective principle(s) of the human soul………………….142 4.2.3 Internal sense powers and their relation to the intellects: the importance of cogitation.……………………………………………….149 4.2.4 The view of knowledge attainment which this picture entailsrelation to both universal and practical knowledge…………………….153 4.3 Will and its relation to the intellect and the human being in general….…....155 4.3.1 The relationship between the will and the intellect and their objects…………………………………………………………….…….155 4.3.2 The function of the will……………………………………….…..162 4.3.3 The process of willing from intellectual consideration to action…171 4.4 The emerging view of moral agency and responsibility……………………176 4.5 Conclusion …………………………………………………………..……..178 CHAPTER 5: AN ANALYSIS OF AVERROES VIEW OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LIGHT OF THE CRITIQUE OF AQUINAS……………………………………….180 1. Aquinas is here referencing to De Anima 3.9 (432b5-6), where Aristotle explain that "wish is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational" (p.
St. Thomas Aquinas on Impairment, Natural Goods, and Human Flourishing
National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly, 2020
This essay examines St. Thomas Aquinas's views on different types of impairment. Aquinas situates physical and moral impairments in a teleological account of the human species, and these impairments are made relative in light of our ultimate flourishing in God. For Aquinas, moral and spiritual impairments are of primary significance. Drawing on Philippa Foot's account of natural goods, we describe what constitutes an impairment for Aquinas. In the Thomistic sense, an impairment is a lack or privation in relation to that which is appropriate to the human being, known by our nature and ultimate perfection. For Aquinas, perfection lies in the transformation necessary for union with God.
Power Made Perfect in Weakness: Aquinas's Transformation of the Virtue of Courage
On Aquinas’s account of this virtue, martyrdom fits best as its paradigm act. By this choice of paradigm, he underscores the way that the virtues of faith, hope, and charity inform courage, and the way grace infuses virtue and produces a joy that can overcome even the greatest fear and sorrow this world has to offer. Martyrdom, as the exemplar act of courage, is best suited to illustrate the features of this virtue so as to counter any mistaken conceptions of courage—those relying solely on human power and control— that ancient and modern ideals alike might tempt us to hold. Aquinas’s choice ofmartyrdom as his paradigm introduces new dimensions of courage and redefines the standard elements of other portraits. His paradigm introduces a new understanding of power, one that resists the world’s eager use of force and offers grace-filled possibilities for human beings precisely in their vulnerability and weakness. Aquinas’s portrait of courage supplies new dimensions of love to counteract fear, and transforms the basis of hope and daring from human heroics to a relationship of humble dependence on divine assistance. In doing so, it also opens up this virtue to an entirely new range of practitioners. The infant in the baptismal waters is a fitting picture of human frailness and trust before the gift of divine grace and power, and captures the essential point of Aquinas’s baptismal transformation of courage. By modeling courage on the example of Christ’s own suffering and steadfast witness, Aquinas directs our moral gaze beyond the limits of human life and power to a life in which virtue and happiness are perfected by a power that is both beyond us and yet can become our own.