The anthropocentric advantage? Environmental ethics and climate change policy (original) (raw)
Related papers
2018
Environmental ethicists often criticize liberalism. For, many liberals embrace anthropocentric theories on which only humans have non-instrumental value. Environmental ethicists argue that such liberals fail to account for many things that matter or provide an ethic sufficient for addressing climate change. These critics suggest that many parts of nature -- non-human individuals, other species, ecosystems and the biosphere have a kind of value beyond what they contribute to human freedom (or other things of value). This article suggests, however, that if environmental ethics are inclusive and also entail that concern for some parts of nature does not always trump concern for others, they have a different problem. For, when there are many things of value, figuring out what to do can be extremely difficult. Even though climate change is likely to cause problems for many parts of nature it will probably be good for some other parts. Inclusive environmental ethicists need a theory takin...
Does nature matter? The place of the nonhuman in the ethics of climate change
The Ethics of Global Climate Change, 2011
Reviews: Climate Change ed. Michael Hulme. Draft version online at http://faculty.washington.edu/smgard/ index2.shtml. 5 John Broome, Valuing Policies in Response to Climate Change: Some Ethical Issues, 2009, www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/stern\_review\_supporting\_technical\_material\_john\_broome\_261006.pdf p. 12. 6 Donald Brown et al., White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change, 10, 16, 18. http:// rockethics.psu.edu/climate/whitepaper/whitepaper-intro.shtml. 7 The two fullest accounts I can find are Robin Attfield, "Mediated Responsibilities, Global Warming and the Scope of Ethics."
Environmental Ethics: Anthropocentrism, Biocentrism, and Ecocentrism
In Search of Moral Equilibrium and Wisdom, 2021
Sustainable practices such as conservation, protected species, renewable energies, green technologies, reforestation, eco-friendly, and fair treatments of non-human species, among others, have dominated research and debates in environmental ethics. The preceding approaches seek to address various environmental concerns that range from deforestation, climate change, global warming, drought, mining, famine, overpopulation, over-fishing, oil drilling, pollution, ozone depletion, green gases, carbon emission, and nuclear waste. In addition to discussing those concerns, this chapter will highlight various perspectives on environmental ethics, which feature biocentrism, utilitarianism, interdependence between humans and nature, and shared substance with nature. Overall, as the title suggests, the tensions in discourses on environmental ethics tend to, more often than not, revolve around human needs and the care of nature and other living organisms. Notably, answers to questions about human responsibilities and obligation toward non-human species and the environment have been as contested as they are divergent.
Anthropocentrism as environmental ethic
2016
OF DISSERTATION ANTHROPOCENTRISM AS ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, humancentered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings with nature. Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the environmental degradations associated with our species. On the other hand, a handful of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a foundation for environmental ethics. According to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, “If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism” (Norton 2004:11). Norton notes that although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the various reasons they have for advocating...
Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism
Environmental Values, 1997
Ethical reasoning of all types is anthropocentric, in that it is addressed to agents, but anthropocentric starting points vary in the preference they accord the human species. Realist claims about environmental values, utilitarian reasoning and rights-based reasoning all have difficulties in according ethical concern to certain all aspects of natural world. Obligation-based reasoning can provide quite strong if incomplete reasons to protect the natural world, including individual non-human animals. Although it cannot establish all the conclusions to which anti-speciesists aspire, it may establish many of them with some clarity.
2014
The purpose of this study is to settle theoretical dispute between anthropocentrism and eco-centrism on whether new ethics is necessary or not. In particular, the study aims at establishing whether either anthropocentric or eco-centric moral theory can be a sufficient basis for new environmentalism as their respective proponents argue. The central question of this study is: is either anthropocentrism or eco-centrism adequate or an alternative theory but in which the two antagonistic moral approaches are reconciled necessary and possible? Through historical survey we see that anthropocentric vs. ecocentric theoretical controversies have persisted with consequential serious negative impact on environmentalism. An attempt by eco-centrists to defend their position with testimonies from antiquity and with scientific facts and theories has not convinced anthropocentrists. Surprisingly, the latter invoke the same scientific facts and theories as used by eco-centrists as a counter-argument,...
Anthropocentrism: A study on environmental ethics
Man is a moral being. Non-humans are devoid of moral sense because they cannot distinguish between 'is and ought', 'right and wrong'. On account of moral awareness human actions can be judged as desirable and undesirable. It is a fact that moral concepts and moral valuations are meaningful only in human domain. There can be no disagreement about the fact that human-beings have their moral obligations for their fellow-beings. But the central question in environmental ethics is; whether human-beings have any obligation for the non-human species and towards nature. In the broad sense of the term, nature consists of flora, fauna and different other elements in nature such as the mountains, rivers, forests, earth and atmosphere. Though non-humans do not have moral sense the real issue is whether and to what extent human-beings have any moral duty, moral obligations for the non-humans over and above their duty towards their fellow human-beings.
Today, support is gathering around the notion that environmental concerns and goals are most likely to be addressed and achieved through actions and policies that put human welfare first and incorporate the concerns of sectors of society to which environmentalists have traditionally been opposed. Kevin Elliott support of Anthropocentric Indirect Arguments (AIAs) delineates the logic of this approach. I think AIAs are probably the least worst strategy for nudging the needle on environmental and energy policy, and Elliott’s defense of their usefulness is sensible and timely. However, I see a potential problem if AIAs were to become widely used—and thus easily abused--in political parlance: “Slippery” AIAs may garner support for policies that are good for the environment relative to business as usual (BUA), but that are suboptimal and ultimately disastrous for the environment. I briefly look at how this problem might play out with respect to three related issues: energy independence, energy efficiency (EE), and natural gas (NG)