Tied Aid and Welfare (original) (raw)
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Journal of International Economics, 1995
The paper examines the effects of tied-aid on the welfare of both the donor and the recipient countries. We depart from the previous literature by assuming preexistence of quantitative trade distortions. To mitigate these distortions the donor country provides aid that is tied to the rationed good. Conditions for the presence of the transfer paradox and of the enrichment of
Journal of Development Economics, 1995
Most less-developed countries (LDCs) use foreign economic aid to finance public consumption goods, or public intermediate inputs. This paper constructs a two-country general equilibrium trade model, where an income transfer that takes place between the two countries is used by the recipient to finance a public consumption good. Within this framework, the paper identifies the conditions under which the income transfer improves or deteriorates the donor country's terms of trade, and shows that the transfer can be welfare enriching for the donor, and welfare immiserizing for the recipient country. The paper also demonstrates that the transfer can raise (reduce) world welfare, in which case a welfare increase (decrease) in both the donor and the recipient country is possible.
Optimal foreign aid and tariffs
Journal of Development Economics, 2002
This paper investigates the optimal choice of foreign aid when trade policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion. Three alternative scenarios, depending on the timing of the actions, and on whether aid is tied, are analyzed. It is shown that, in the case where aid is decided before tari®s, untied aid can lead to the reduction of the recipient's optimal trade tax. This opens up the possibility that optimal aid is positive and that the world achieves a Pareto-e±cient equilibrium. When the donor can tie the aid to a reduction in the recipient's tari®, the optimal aid level is always positive, and the world can always achieve a Pareto-e±cient equilibrium.
A Dynamic Analysis of Tied Aid
In this paper we examine the impact of tied aid on capital accumulation and welfare in the presence of a quota on imports. Using a simulation model we establish that tied aid can lower the relative domestic price of the manufactured good and therefore reduce the stock of capital. In the presence of a strong production externality from capital accumulation and high tying ratio, tied aid may immiserize the recipient country. [71 words]
The Financing of Foreign Aid and Welfare: Income Versus Consumption Tax
Review of Development Economics, 2000
Empirical evidence shows that developed countries use income or consumption taxes to generate tax revenue, of which they transfer a certain fraction as aid to less developed countries. This paper constructs a two-country general equilibrium trade model that takes into account these realities, and examines the terms of trade, employment and welfare effects of international transfers when the donor country increases the fraction of its income or consumption tax revenue transferred as aid. The desirability of each method of aid financing is discussed from the viewpoint of national and world welfare, and conditions are identified under which aid improves world welfare with the one method of financing, and may worsen it with the other.
Moral Hazard and the Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid
2007
The paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of a donor's choice of the composition of unrestricted and in-kind/restricted transfers to a recipient and how this composition is adjusted in response to changes in the moral hazard behavior of the recipient. In-kind or restricted transfers may be used, among others, to control a recipient's moral hazard behavior but may be associated with deadweight losses. Within the context of foreign aid, we use a canonical political agency model to construct a simple signaling game between a possibly corrupt politician in a recipient country and a donor to illustrate the donor's optimal choice of tied (restricted) and untied foreign aid. We clarify the condition under which a reduction in the recipient's moral hazard behavior (i.e., improvement in the level of governance) leads to a fall in the proportion of tied aid. We test the predictions of our theoretical analysis using data on the composition of foreign aid by multilateral and bilateral donors.
Tied to Capital or Untied Foreign Aid?
Review of Development Economics, 1998
A two-country trade model of foreign aid is developed. The aid-receiving country suffers from Harris-Todaro type unemployment. Aid is either untied, tied to sector-specific capital, or tied to intersectorally mobile capital. These types of aid are compared by examining their terms-of-trade and welfare effects to show that (i) welfare paradoxes are possible, (ii) the world as a whole may gain from aid, (iii) a conflict of interest concerning the type of aid may arise between donor and recipient, and (iv) under plausible conditions untied aid is better for the recipient and the world.
Chapter 11 A Dynamic Analysis of Tied Aid
Frontiers of Economics and Globalization, 2007
In this paper we examine the impact of tied aid on capital accumulation and welfare in the presence of a quota on imports. Using a simulation model we establish that tied aid can lower the relative domestic price of the manufactured good and therefore reduce the stock of capital. In the presence of a strong production externality from capital accumulation and high tying ratio, tied aid may immiserize the recipient country. [71 words]
Logic of Aid in an Intertemporal Setting
Review of International Economics, 2004
AbstractThe paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual effects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to influence the preferences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.
Poverty, Inequality and Development, 2006
This paper analyses the impact of aid, and its optimal allocation, when conditionality is ineffective. It is assumed that the recipient government will implement its own preferences no matter what. In this set up, aid can still affect the behavior of a recipient, not through conditionality but through changing resource constraints. We analyze the problem in the tradition of models of optimal non-linear income taxation. We find that unconditional aid increases national income and makes the poor better off in the recipient country, but that there is a crowding out effect as the recipient country reduces labor supply in response to increased aid. On optimal allocation of aid across countries, we find that poorer countries should get more aid, as should countries with governments that are more inequality averse, which conforms to intuition. However, a striking finding is that more unequal countries should get less aid. JEL classification codes H21;O19