Developmental patrimonialism ? Questioning the orthodoxy on political governance and economic progress in Africa (original) (raw)

Rethinking the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and economic development in Africa

Is it possible to work with the grain of neo-patrimonial politics to boost investment and growth in Africa? Current donor orthodoxy is that neo-patrimonialism is irredeemably bad for economic development, but evidence from other regions, together with a re-examination of the African record itself, suggests that this may not be true. We present evidence from case studies of Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi and Rwanda to show that provided mechanisms can be found to centralise economic rents and manage them with a view to the long term and neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends.

Patrimonial Politics as a Functional Threat to Good Governance and Development in West Africa

Beyond the abstract use of the term ‘patrimonialism’ and its variants appended with prefix “neo-” or adjectives ‘modern’, ‘traditional’ or ‘developmental’, the leadership challenges in Africa manifesting in festering governance crisis have not benefitted from the deserved scholarly debate in a particularized manner. From the writings of the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), in particular his Economy and Society and his tripartite dichotomy of leadership – legal, traditional, and charismatic – to the different notions of patrimonialism, patronage or clientelism employed by notable writers like Roth (1968); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Eisenstadt (1973), all have fallen short of explaining the functional threat to destructive politics and underdevelopment of African societies. Even the neo-liberal scholars like Le Vine’s (1980) attempt to coin ‘African patrimonialism’ have foundered in understanding the pattern of political organisation, struggle and puzzling change translating into democratic authoritarian rule of the few, characterized by co-optation, factionalism, and clientelism, and other modes of elitist domination.

APPP Working Paper No. 12. Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Malawi

2010

Economic governance in Malawi has never been without problems. Yet, for significant periods, the country's development performance has been better than might be expected given its geographical location and natural resource endowments and the global context of the time. This paper argues that underlying the episodes of better performance are institutional configurations which include: centralized, long-horizon rent utilization, a disciplined economic technocracy, and an inclusive form of ethno-regional politics. In particular, the 1964-79 phase of the presidency of Kamuzu Banda conforms closely to the concept of 'developmental patrimonialism', defined in this way. It tends also to support the proposition that regimes of this type are associated with relatively good development outcomes. Furthermore, the characteristics and performance of subsequent regimes (Banda II, Muluzi and Mutharika) are consistent with the emerging theory.

Developmental patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda

African Affairs, 2012

In the modal pattern of governance for development in sub-Saharan Africa, political competition fuels unbridled corruption which undermines the interest and ability of the state to provide the public goods necessary for transformative, poverty-reducing development. APPP research has identified a type of deviation from the modal pattern which is more realistic than the standard 'good governance' alternative, which we are calling developmental (neo)patrimonialism. This paper considers whether Rwanda since 2000 is a current example of this type of regime, and argues that in several but not all respects it is. A defining feature of developmental patrimonialism is the interest and ability of the ruling elite to impose a centralised management of the rents which are an unavoidable feature of early capitalism, and to deploy these with a view to the long term. The relevance of this to the Rwanda case hinges on an interpretation of the role of the private holding company owned by the ruling party, known successively as Tri-Star Investments and Crystal Ventures. We maintain that these arrangements, which are controversial with donors, have provided Rwanda with the 'early-stage venture capitalism' it needed to achieve economic recovery post-1994 and to maintain respectable rates of investment and socioeconomic progress under otherwise unfavourable conditions during the last decade.

Neo-Colonialism and the Developmental Challenges of Post-Colonial Africa

Jurnal Pertahanan: Media Informasi ttg Kajian & Strategi Pertahanan yang Mengedepankan Identity, Nasionalism & Integrity

Liberal political economists typically ascribe the reasons, natures, and dynamics of development and security in the global South, including Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to internal deficiencies. As a result, among other things, weak institutions, policy deficits, ethnicity, corruption, bad leadership, and all other signs of an entity in desperate need of salvation have been recognized as dangers to the corporate existence and survival of African and other developing countries. While the decolonization of African and other developing countries has provided impacted peoples a sense of political belonging, the historical processes required to promote these nations' economic potential have been weakened. As a result, the capacity of postcolonial states to chart their development paths and reinvent themselves has been malignly berated, denied, and frustrated by neo-colonialist aspirations, strategies, and actions, those who had grudgingly and dishonestly foisted cancerous indepe...

African development and the marginalisation of domestic capitalists

Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper Series, 2019

The revival of industrial policy discussions has operated in parallel to reports of increasing domestic wealth accumulation across the African continent. Regional and continent-wide industrialisation has begun to be rhetorically linked to discussions of regional common markets and through the African Continental Free Trade Area. Yet, there is barely any mention of integrating African capital into the African industrial policy agenda. Where such discussions have appeared, they have emerged through the ‘Africapitalism’ narrative, which ignores the role of the state and politics in supporting and sustaining domestic business groups. Instead, the re-imagination of industrial policy on the continent relies on foreign investors, particularly the relocation of Chinese industry to various parts of the continent. This paper has two core objectives. The first is to explain why the study of African capitalists – popular in the 1980s and 1990s – has remained relatively dormant since then. Dominant narratives – through neopatrimonalism and dependency-inspired arguments – have been pessimistic about the potential of African capitalists to deliver structural transformation. Gradually, these narratives, alongside intellectual trends within mainstream social science and African studies, have discouraged the study of politics of state–business relations in Africa. Yet African capitalists have become increasingly prominent in popular culture. Many of the wealthiest and most prominent capitalists have emerged through owning diversified business groups across the continent. This paper argues that more attention should be dedicated to the study of the politics of the emergence and sustenance of African diversified business groups (DBGs). To achieve this goal, a fluid categorisation of DBGs is introduced, building on Ben Ross Schneider’s previous work. By examining three country case studies – Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania – this paper highlights how a range of DBGs are emerging across three very different political contexts.