The Philosophical Significance of Secondary Uses of Language in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy (original) (raw)

The Aesthetic Dimension of Wittgenstein's Later Writings

Wittgenstein on Aesthetic Understanding, ed. Garry Hagberg (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 3-29

In this essay I argue the extent to which meaning and judgment in aesthetics figures in Wittgenstein’s later conception of language, particularly in his conception of how philosophy might go about explaining the ordinary functioning of language. Following a review of some biographical and textual matters concerning Wittgenstein’s life with music, I outline the connection among (1) Wittgenstein’s discussions of philosophical clarity or perspicuity, (2) our attempts to give clarity to our aesthetic experiences by wording them, and (3) the clarifying experience of the dawning of an aspect, which Wittgenstein pictures as the perception of an internal relation. By examining Wittgenstein’s use of “internal relation” from the Tractatus to his later writings, I come to challenge the still prevalent understanding of Wittgenstein’s appeals to grammar as an appeal to something given (e.g., to a set of grammatical rules). Instead, as I argue, Wittgensteinian appeals to grammatical criteria should be understood as modeled by the form of justification found in our conversations about art.

The Contemporary Significance of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy

2014

In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.

Meaning and Linguistic Usage: Ten Comments on Later Wittgenstein

2021

The "use" theory of meaning arose from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. On this approach, language and meaning are public affairs and learnable from public sources. Wittgenstein's teaching to "look for the use" of language was partly aimed in criticism of Cartesianism and similar doctrines of modern epistemology-down to the early work of Bertrand Russell. Wittgenstein rejected the notion that we might start off with reference to private, indubitable ideas or impressions and build from them to justify our knowledge of the external world. Language, meaning and reference are first of all public in character; and there can be no purely private language with meanings and/or referents which could only be known to a single person. We learn the language used to describe the world and to ascribe mental states to self and others on the basis of publicly available usage and (defeasible) criteria of application; and linguistic usage is grounded and understood in relation to our ongoing cultural practices, interactions and activities. The commonalities of perceptual experience-and the general reliability of perception-arise from biological evolution, and common evolutionary descent; and these are the biological facts underlying the philosophical appeal, persistence and plausibility of empiricism. The commonalities of thought, in contrast, arising out of the plasticity of mind, depend on interpreting linguistic expressions in a common, publicly available, object-oriented language. The empirical lexicographers who formulate definitions for dictionaries follow and elaborate Wittgenstein's advice on meaning and usage. Dictionary definitions and entries are based on extensive empirical studies of usage. Moreover, along with consulting experts, the same empirical practice is also important in writing dictionaries of technical terms of use in the various sciences. This point is important in understanding the relationship between the "use theory" and the languages and practices of the sciences. Dictionary definitions, understood as common meanings, generally aim to classify, comprehend or encompass, unify and explain the empirical evidence of usage. As will be argued, this last point constitutes a departure from or development of Wittgenstein and the "use theory."

From Wheels Turning Idly to Meaning as Use. Pragmatist Tendencies in the “Middle” Wittgenstein

in Realism, Relativism, Constructivism. Contributions of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 9-15 August 2015, ed. by C. Kanzian, J. Mitterer, K. Neges (pre-proceedings), pp. 29-31, 2015

This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I argue that one of the roots of this reflection is the pragmatist conception of truth as usefulness, which was most likely debated between Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey in 1929. After introducing Wittgenstein’s (temporary) perspective of a phenomenological language, I will show its shortcomings and the philosopher’s need to give account of the working of words in ordinary language. I will then examine Wittgenstein’s remarks about the pragmatist conception of truth and more generally about usefulness, and conclude that, although he usually expressed doubts about pragmatism, the “middle” Wittgenstein presented pragmatist tendencies which were pivotal in the development of his thought.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE MATTER OF LANGUAGE. Towards a Poetics of Thought

Wittgenstein’s silence in his later work is not, like the first, a sign of a tragic limitation, but rather amounts to the liberation of the word. For in the recognition of its poetic birth and of its sacramental power, the word is capable once again of making manifest, in the imponderables of the tongue, the transcendental matter of consciousness.

Essays on the philosophy of Wittgenstein

2010

This is the first of two volumes containing the proceedings of the 32 nd International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg/Lower Austria, August 2009. The overall topic of this conference, "Language and World", can be seen as central to Wittgenstein's philosophy. When he was once asked by Yorick Smythies what he regarded as the greatest problem in philosophy, Wittgenstein's answer was "Subject and predicate". We have decided to dedicate this first volume solely to Wittgenstein's philosophy. The four sections only provide a very basic structure. Several contributions easily fit into more than one section. Some of the contributions even might have needed an altogether different heading. The chapter "Wittgenstein's Nachlass" results from a workshop on new aspects of Wittgenstein's published and unpublished writings. The editors would like to express their gratitude to all the contributors and to those who took part in the many and lively discussions during the conference. Without them this volume would never have happened. We would also like to thank the board of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and our publisher Dr. Rafael Hüntelmann for supporting us all the way through. This volume and the conference were sponsored by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Science and Research as well by the Government of the Province of Lower Austria. We are very grateful for their generous funding.

Wittgenstein's Contributions to the Discourse of Language and Meaning

The role of language as a vehicle of thought makes way for human thinking to be as multifaceted and diverse as it is. This is for the reason that with language, one can describe the past or speculate about the future and so deliberate and plan in the light of one’s beliefs about how things stand. To cement this view, language enables one to imagine counterfactual objects, events, and states of affairs. In this connection, it is intimately related to intentionality, the feature of all human thoughts whereby they are essentially about, or directed toward, things outside themselves. If, as is the case, language allows one to share information and to communicate beliefs and speculations, attitudes and emotions, then, it creates the human social world, uniting people into a common history and a common life-experience. In the end, what we see is that language is an instrument of understanding and knowledge. Along these lines, the philosophical investigation of the nature of language—the relations between language, language users, and the world—and the concepts with which language is described and analyzed, both in everyday speech and in scientific linguistic studies become pertinent and absolutely imperative. On the whole, philosophy of language as an academic and philosophical discipline is distinct from linguistics. This is for the reason that its investigations are conceptual rather than empirical. But this, however, does not mean that philosophy of language will not call to mind the message in which linguistic and other related disciplines reveal. Of course, it must pay attention to the facts which linguistics and related disciplines reveal.