Regulatory Cooperation in International Trade and Its Transformative Effects on Executive Power (original) (raw)
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One of the paradoxes of economic globalisation is that ever closer economic ties mean that any significant global agreement would fundamentally reshape the entire picture, which renders highly desired agreements difficult to reach. As a result, regionalisation of trade and investment agreements increases transaction costs business, hence the need for regulatory convergence. Although the easiest route of universal regulation does not appear available any soon, it does not mean that we are doomed to regulatory havoc. There are alternatives, including the trickle-up process under TTIP, whereby parties undertake to review and compare relevant domestic regulation and to cooperate towards development of new rules. Most of all, however, TTIP regulatory cooperation is about broader vision of economics and politics. By adopting the TTIP Chapter on regulatory cooperation the EU and the US hope to acquire an advantage of the market standard-setter, as both negotiating parties undertake to “promote international standards”.
International regulatory cooperation (IRC), an assortment of governmental techniques for facilitating trade by minimizing the burden on business of variation in international regulations and standards, is an increasingly important component of bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Yet as a practice of global governance, IRC is relatively understudied by critical scholars of neoliberalism and globalization. This thesis enquires into the practices of IRC and the role of state and non-state participants in the Canada-U.S. Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC). My research draws publicly available accounts of the RCC and earlier bilateral (Canada-U.S.) regulatory cooperation efforts into conversation with the experiences of two dozen RCC participants from government, the private sector and civil society. Applying a governmentality analysis to a case study of the RCC, I conclude that IRC can be understood as a subtle technique for governing the global economy at a distance through the production of "good" (i.e., selfmaximizing) regulators and regulated subjects.
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Governments increasingly are seeking to use bilateral and regional trade agreements to reduce the cost-increasing effects of differences in product market regulation. They also pursue regulatory cooperation independent of trade agreements. It is important to understand what is being done through bilateral or plurilateral mechanisms to address regulatory differences, and to identify what, if any, role trade agreements can play in supporting international regulatory cooperation. This paper reflects on experience to date in regulatory cooperation and the provisions of recent trade agreements involving advanced economies that have included regulatory cooperation. We argue for a re-thinking by trade officials of the modalities and design of trade negotiations and the incorporation of institutional mechanisms that draw on insights of experimentalist governance approaches to enhance the scope for international regulatory cooperation.
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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an effort by the United States and the European Union to reposition themselves for a world of diffuse economic power and intensified global competition. It is a next-generation economic negotiation that breaks the mould of traditional trade agreements. At the heart of the ongoing talks is the question whether and in which areas the two major democratic actors in the global economy can address costly frictions generated by their deep commercial integration by aligning rules and other instruments. The aim is to reduce duplication in various ways in areas where levels of regulatory protection are equivalent as well as to foster wide-ranging regulatory cooperation and set a benchmark for high-quality global norms. In this volume, European and American experts explain the economic context of TTIP and its geopolitical implications, and then explore the challenges and consequences of US-EU negotiations across numerous sensitive a...
The EU and the US are at the origin of most international institutions and rules for both trade and finance, and both have long exported their preferred policies to the rest of the world. Today, this hegemonic position is increasingly challenged by the rise of new centers of economic power such as China, India and Brazil. This introductory article introduces the "supply-and-demand model of regulatory power" guiding this Special Issue and, drawing on the latter's contributions, illustrates the interplay between EU/US regulatory outreach and emerging economies' domestic politics in explaining the embracement or rejection of EU/US trade-related agendas.
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