Tropes and Relations (original) (raw)
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Tropes and Strict Internal Relations
In this paper, we show that entities can be simple even if they stand in arbitrarily different internal relations: internal relations that vary independently from each other. Our argument is framed as a first answer to Douglas Ehring’s argument against the Standard trope nominalism, on which tropes, particular properties, are simple. We argue that Ehring’s argument to the result that the Standard tropes are not simple is not sound as it is premised on an incorrect principle. Our argument is based on introducing the distinction between grounded and strict internal relations and drawing on the ontological content/form distinction, which goes unnoticed too often. We are able to show there can be simple entities whose formal being is different from their ontological content.
The aim of this thesis is to investigate what ontology serves as the most compelling in relation to the ongoing problem of material constitution. Like any investigation, my aim is to establish a simple, explanatory, coherent theory that covers as much ground as possible. Does the trope-nominalist have the solution? Perhaps Brentanian reism can resolve this ontological enigma? Do we simply take the Ockhamist ideal by postulating as few kinds of fundamental entities as possible, accepting the single- category ontology, simplicitier? At a glance this certainly seems like the attractive solution, but such ‘solutions’ should be resisted - it is certainly not as simple as one might suppose. Ockham’s razor doesn’t explicitly stipulate one-category ontologies as the most favorable; what is salient here is the phrase “as few entities as possible.” One-category ontologies may indeed have insurmountable hurdles, which could pose as a motivation for us to reject the theory and seek alternative solutions. I shall investigate these considerations by examining the traditional notion of substance and accident, which will be examined in light of one pivotal assumption: there are tropes, and that these are the most fundamental metaphysical entities.
S. Laurence and C. Macdonald (eds.), 1998
Our day-today experience of the world regularly brings us into contact with middlesized objects such as apples, dogs, and other human beings. These objects possess observable properties, properties that are available or accessible to the unaided senses, such as redness and roundness, as well as properties that are not so available, such as chemical ones. Both of these kinds of properties serve as valuable sources of information about our familiar middle-sized objects at least to the extent that they enable us to understand the behaviours of those objects and their effects on each other and on us. I see the apple on the table before me, and in doing so I see its redness, its roundness, and so on. I do not see, but know that it has, a certain chemical constitution. The knowledge gained of the apple by means of both properties tells me something about the nature of that apple. In general, most, if not all, of the properties that objects in the observable world possess serve as the basis of our knowledge of such objects. But the subject-predicate form of much of our discourse and thought about objects suggests that substances are one kind of thing, properties another. We use subject terms such as names to identify objects, predicate terms to attribute properties to them. What, then, is it for an object to have a property? And what is the relation between an object and its properties? These two questions and their treatment have a long and respected tradition in philosophy. In what follows, I shall briefly outline some classic answers to them and the difficulties associated with those answers, in order to provide a basis upon which to discuss the view that, at root, reality consists of individual, particularized qualities known as tropes. This view, and the theory that grounds it, has been thought by many philosophers over the centuries to offer an important and ultimately more satisfactory answer to the two questions
Axiomathes, 2008
Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals.
Douglas Ehring (2011) has proposed a conception of natural classes of tropes to fulfill the roles usually attributed to universals. Natural classes of tropes can evade the difficulties that affect the classic theory of tropes –as it has been defended by D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell– where tropes are simple and, by themselves, are particulars and have an intrinsic nature. Natural classes of tropes also are preferable to primitive resemblance classes of tropes, because they can explain the characteristics of the relation of resemblance and, also, can ground an internal relation of resemblance between tropes. It is contended here that the conception proposed works very differently if tropes are conceived as modifier tropes or as module tropes. In the first case, tropes cannot be grouped directly in natural classes, because tropes have no intrinsic character. They ground the character possessed by their bearer, but they have none. So, the character attributed to a trope due to its belonging to a natural class is dependent, on its turn, on the natural classes or the resemblance classes into which the objects that bear those tropes enter. In the second case, tropes do have a character. Then, they can enter ‘directly’ into natural classes. The problem in this case, though, is that tropes seem to have many different characters and seem vulnerable to the traditional problems of the ‘imperfect community’ and the ‘company’ that affect resemblance nominalism.
Formal Issues of Trope-Only Theories of Universals [Pre-print]
Erkenntnis, 2022
The paper discusses some formal difficulties concerning the theory of universals of Trope-Only ontologies, from which the formal theory of predication advanced by Trope-Only theorists seems to be irremediably affected. It is impossible to lay out a successful defense of a Trope-Only theory without Russellian types, but such types are ontologically inconsistent with tropes' nominalism. Historically, Tropists' first way to avoid the problem is appealing to the supervenience claim, which however falls on its terms and, thus, fails as a ground for a solution to the higher-order or 'type' problem. A later solution involves the invariance of primitive equivalence relations in order to make universals ontologically innocuous. However, I argue that this latter solution fails to meet the requirements imposed an ontologically unbiased nominalist attitude. So, this paper discusses how Trope-Only theories alter standard formal moves in Nominalism, and also is interested in clarifying further the formal assumptions for these problems.
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 64 (2002), 137-155, 2002
The concept of a trope (understood as an individual property and not as a figure of speech) plays an important role in contemporary analytical metaphysics. It is, however, often far from clear what the logic of this concept really is. Indeed, there are two equally important intuitions underlying the concept of trope, two intuitions that generate two quite different conceptual frameworks. According to the first intuition, a trope is a particularised property -a property taken as an individual aspect of a particular object. A trope is thus the colour of this table or the shape of this sculpture. In the light of this conception tropes are, as it were, direct abstractions from concrete individuals. According to the second intuition a trope is still such an individual (and abstract) colour or such an individual (and abstract) shape, but now it is not only abstracted from the concrete individual of which it is a trope but also taken in abstraction from the very fact that it has been abstracted this way. We can imagine that the cognitive access to these tropes is obtained by a kind of a double abstraction.
Revisiting Universals with Special Reference to Tropes
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2020
The main purpose of this paper is to uphold the very fact that there are many ways of understanding the concept Universal and also the several issues revolving round it but then the fundamental aim must be to free the ontology of any extra pressure. Thus, the prime aim of the paper is to exhibit the different ways in which discussions relating to Universals were usually dealt with. The thrust nevertheless lies on the reference of Tropes which is found to be more apt in providing a less cumbersome ontology. The aim thus is not to provide a comparative study on whether Universals are more fundamental than Particulars but to show that the usual ways of discussing Universals could be looked differently and secondarily; both Universals and Particulars are ways of explaining an object as a whole. The point thus is to concentrate on our understanding of the given object. The purpose of bringing in the reference of Tropes thus proves that there can be discussions that arise from the discussions of Universals undoubtedly but nevertheless can provide better opportunities. The methods applied are the revisiting of concepts like non-relational tie, relation of attachment, the explanation on Supervenience and finally the concept of Tropes (the ontological glue and what is it for a substance to have properties, etc.). There is also a special effort made of introducing the concept "generality" and "peculiarity." Tropes stand true to a great extent to expectations especially as independent entities. Though it is true that they form clusters to help in the emergence of substances as a whole, their explanatory powers are a sure welcome. In philosophy, we always try to reach the simplest element or an explanation that would serve as a unit or as the fundamental, and Universals and Tropes serve this purpose in their own way.