Australia, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945?51: From V-J Day to ANZUS (original) (raw)

The traditional image of Australia as one of the most consistently reliable allies of the United States is substantially correct. However, it implies a tendency to subservience on the side of the junior partner that generally has been conspicuously lacking. The two Pacific nations customarily have been as one on major ideological and strategic issues. Their relationship in other areas justly could be called turbulent, particularly during the tense and frustrating years of developing East-West confrontation immediately after the defeat of the Axis. The recurring collisions between Canberra and Washington in this period did not reflect any real ideological difference between the Australian Labor government and the Truman administration. The main source of contention was paradoxically the bipartisan determination of Australian leaders to establish a binding security relationship between their country and the United States and the equally firm and bipartisan resolve of American policymakers not to embark upon anything of the kind in the existing circumstances. Australia wanted an alliance; the United States wanted cooperation; and neither got what it wanted. Strains in the relationship had been apparent even before the defeat of their common enemies. Australian Prime Minister John Curtin and Minister for External Affairs Herbert V. Evatt were appalled to discover early in 1942 that the Americans had originated the "Atlantic First" strategy, which assigned top priority to the defeat of Germany rather than to Japan.' This revelation engendered suspicions of American intentions in the Pacific that at times approximated paranoia. Allied successes in the Pacific through 1943 gradually allayed Australian anxieties over the possibility of Japanese victory. From then on