How Greek Sceptics argued for and against the gods (original) (raw)

"Ancient Skepticism: Pyrrhonism," Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 246–258.

Philosophy Compass, 2011

Pyrrhonism was one of the two main ancient skeptical traditions. In this second paper of the three-part series devoted to ancient skepticism, I present and discuss some of the issues on Pyrrhonian skepticism which have been the focus of much attention in the recent literature. The topics to be addressed concern the outlooks of Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Sextus Empiricus.

From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 2022

This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.

In Praise of Pyrrhonian Scepticism

Daily Philosophy , 2022

Radical scepticism has a good claim to be both the longest lasting tradition in philosophy and the consistently least popular. There's a lot to be said for it.

Ancient scepticism : a chance for happiness

1999

In this paper, an attempt will be made to examine the concept ataraxia as it appears in the works of Pyrro of Elis, Sextus Empiricus and other philosophers belonging to the ancient sceptical tradition. This school of thought is primarily concerned with the avoidance of disturbance (ataraxia), and they do this by suspending judgment. But the suspension of judgment is only possible given the suspension of belief. They wish to avoid disturbances which arise not only in the act of disputing judgments, but also those which arise by virtue of believing the premises involved in the dispute. The sceptic says that ataraxia comes by chance where "chance" means that ataraxia is inexplicable and naturally so. Just as the sceptics will not engage in a language of essences because they question the possibility of presenting nature in such a language, neither will they engage in the pursuit of something which cannot, in principle, be pursued-absence from trouble. For exactly how does one pursue an "absence"? Whether we agree with the ancient sceptic's way or not, there is a degree of wisdom in their recommendations that we suspend judgment on what is, in principle, not judgeable. If human happiness is such a matter, we cannot fault the sceptics for questioning philosophical attempts to arbitrate what happiness is, especially if happiness stands over and against nature. According to legend, the philosopher who first experiences "freedom from disturbance" or ataraxia is Pyrrho of Elis 1. Pyrrho's disciple Timon presents us. with this image: "Such was the man I saw, unconceited and unbroken by all the pressures that have subdued the famed and unfamed unlike... O Pyrrho, how and whence did you discover escape from servitude to the opinions and empty theorising of sophists? How did you unloose the shackles of every deception and persuasion?" 2 The question raised by this and other remaining fragments is how Pyrrho is able to achieve ataraxia. The text which most scholars use to probe this question is found in Eusebius 3. Eusebius tells us: "It is necessary, first of all, to inquire about our knowledge; for if by nature we are unable to know anything, it will not be necessary to look at the rest.

THE ANCIENT SCEPTIC ATTITUDE AND DISAGREEMENT

KRITERION (Revista de Filosofia. Publicación de: Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da UFMG), 2023

It is argued that a philosophical “sceptic attitude”, found originally in the Socratic approach and arguably in the Pyrrhonist’s treatment of disagreement, should be taken to be an epistemically positive attitude in the sense that it fosters a serious philosophical examination of what is taken to be true, without entailing the radical scepticism often associated with it. We argue that if the two sides of a disagreement are equivalent (at that moment, given the evidence available), it doesn’t require one to consider the disagreement as undecidable without qualification and so to suspend judgment indefinitely. If this is so, we claim, the Pyrrhonian disagreement-based position will be significantly restricted as a form of scepticism and should instead be seen as promoting an epistemically propitious sceptic attitude.

Neo-Pyrrhonism: a contemporary version of skepticism

Sententiae, 2023

When one engages in philosophizing, one usually has a critical attitude towards accepted ideas. Philosophy is, among other things, a way to scrutinize widespread prejudices; it is an investigation of the reasons one has both for and against certain general, basic, and important beliefs; it is a critical attitude towards dogmas of all kinds: religious, political, ethical, among many others that permeate human life. Rationality and critical spirit go hand in hand. This critical attitude is directed not only to other people's dogmas, but also those in our own thinking. Many are hidden, and it takes a lot of effort to identify and eradicate them. One should not have certain beliefs one has not assessed in the first place. This rational, critical investigation is, perhaps, philosophy most important contribution to human life, an attitude that is indeed necessary for our time. Anti-dogmatism is what animates most people that look for philosophy to improve their own way of thinking and living their everyday lives. As soon as one starts philosophizing, however, this critical spirit is often lost. Instead of questioning those dogmas that permeate everyday life, the new born philosopher immediately takes skepticism as his target. The "true philosophy" is now conceived as that which overcomes the skeptical challenge. If a philosophy does not stand this challenge or, worse, if it leads to skepticism, then it is rejected or even considered refuted. It seems that the critical spirit is at least partially extinguished by the very activity that should promote it most. Antidogmatism is converted into anti-skepticism [Aikin 2010: 172-176]. How did this happen? Historically speaking, Descartes' first Meditation (and his answer to his methodical doubt) and Hume's excessive skepticism (and his mitigated skepticism as a solution to his doubts) turned skepticism into a main worry in doing philosophy. For both of them, the first philosophical task is to answer those skeptical doubts, and tradition followed them. In contemporary analytical philosophy. G. E. Moore [1959], with his defense of common sense and his proof of an external world, set the same agenda: philosophy has not only to resist the skeptical attack, but to refute skepticism. Those who seek philosophy quickly learn that they should try to prove that the world exists, that there are other minds (or, rather, people), that the future will resemble the past, that the past exists and so on and so forth. These are the problems that they have to solve, they take the problems for granted, and think their task is to answer them. Since no one has

Can the Pyrrhonian Sceptic Suspend Belief Regarding Scientific Definitions?

History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23(1), 2020

In this article, I tackle a heretofore unnoticed difficulty with the application of Pyrrhonian scepticism to science. Sceptics can suspend belief regarding a dogmatic proposition only by setting up opposing arguments or considerations for and against that proposition. Since Sextus provides arguments exclusively against particular geometrical definitions in Adversus Mathematicos III, commentators have argued that Sextus’ method is not scepticism, but negative dogmatism. However, commentators have overlooked the fact that arguments or considerations in favour of particular geometrical definitions were absent in ancient geometry, and hence unavailable to Sextus. While this might explain why they are also absent from Sextus’ text, I survey and evaluate various strategies to supply arguments in support of particular geometrical definitions. https://philpapers.org/rec/WILCTP-9