Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes’ scepticism (original) (raw)

Reason in check: the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus

Hermathena

"Many philosophers have challenged the problem of skepticism. I argue that none of them successfully dispute the system established by Sextus Empiricus. But not just that; my main thesis is that this kind of skepticism is unsolvable. I maintain that there are two fundamental strategies in Sextus' 'Outlines of Phyrrhonism'. One of them is that the basic description of skepticism has a paradoxical character. The other focuses on the Five Modes of Agrippa that comprise a system of dialectical moves for suspending judgment. The modes have, as a system, the capacity to reposition in any circumstance, so it is impossible to justify to the skeptic why he needs to abandon his skepticism. I explain, in brief, why the most important objections to skepticism do not solve this challenge. In opposition to common view, I argue that phyrrhonism is practicable, coherent and consistent. Although there is no possible solution to skepticism, there is at least a general way to answer it without contradiction, infinite regress or becoming a skeptic."

The Virtue of a Fallibilist: Aretê , Sophiê, and the Limits of Knowledge in Xenophanes

Ageless Aretē: Essays from the 6th Interdisciplinary Conference on the Hellenic Heritage of Sicily and Southern Ital, 2022

In this paper, I shall develop an account of virtue in Xenophanes as “fallibilistic piety”. Piety in that the proper relation between mortals and immortals is central. Fallibilistic in light of his insistence that no human being can know with certainty matters pertaining to the divine. In so doing, I hope to reconcile his rejection of traditional conceptions of the gods, his endorsing of what may be a radically new idea of a single god, and his skepticism about any claim to knowledge about the gods by a human being. One result of my analysis will be to suggest that Xenophanes anticipates the sophia tis with which Socrates labels his all-too-human wisdom in the Apology.

Xenophanes the High Rationalist

Epoché, 2014

Scholarship on Xenophanes's F1 has had two foci, one on the rules of the symposium and the other on the religious program posed at its close. Thus far, the two areas of focus have been treated as either separate issues or as the religious program proposed in the service of the sympotic objectives. Instead, I will argue that the sympotic norms Xenophanes espouses are in the service of the broader program of rational theology.

From Proto-Sceptic to Sceptic in Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 2022

This is an account of Sceptical investigation as it is presented by Sextus Empiricus. I focus attention on the motivation behind the Sceptic’s investigation, the goal of that investigation, and on the development Sextus describes from proto-Sceptical to Sceptical investigator. I suggest that recent accounts of the Sceptic’s investigative practice do not make sufficient sense of the fact that the Sceptic finds a relief from disturbance by way of suspending judgement, nor of the apparent continuity between proto-Sceptical and Sceptical investigation. I offer an alternative account which turns on the suggestion that the Sceptic accepts that justification is the norm of belief.

Sextus Empiricus and the scientific scepticism

otherwise it might lead to an 'infinite regression' resulting to fall into a vicious circle. The escape from infinite regression might be based on a hypothesis. Encountering disagreement, whenever several points of view and strong arguments seems to be of equal validity (ισοσθένεια), the thinker being unable to judge and decide properly and accurately, has to give up, for attaining peace of mind (αταραξία). Sextus insists that arriving to a definite conclusion is not merely a matter of high education, intellectual integrity, wisdom or experience, since it is mostly a matter of the proper nature of the problem. In the field of morality, Sextus and the other ancient sceptics deny the existence of the absolute good, but most of them admit the potentiality for a continuous amelioration of the life, based on the proper evaluation of the ongoing experiences and research. However to the sceptics nothing is in itself either good or evil, since he who considers anything as good or evil is always troubled and suffers being not at rest. Sextus' doctrines have exerted a strong influence on the course of Western philosophy, from the seventeenth century and onwards, inspiring Michel de Montaine, Rene Descartes, David Hume, Hegel and many philosophers of our Era in their theoretical orientation. The sceptical influx is of substantial importance for the current philosophy of the science, the neurophilosophy, the scientific research, the modern schools of psychology, offering also an essential theoretical background for the evidence based medicine.