Freedom and legisprudence - A more substantial view: A reply to professor perju (original) (raw)
2009, Boston University Law Review
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 1795 I. REFLEXIVITY AND EQUALITY ............................................................ 1797 A. Reflexivity as the First Normative Dimension of Freedom ........ 1797 B. From Origin to Principium: Equality as the Second Normative Dimension of Freedom ............................................ 1797 II. FREEDOM CONTEXTUALIZED: FREEDOM AS PRINCIPIUM IN CONTEXT ........................................................................................... 1799 III. LAW’S CONTEXT: FREEDOM AS DISTANCE ....................................... 1801
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