'No Solution to the Immediate Crisis': The Uncertain Political Economy of Energy Conservation in 1970s Britain (original) (raw)
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in 1979. It was a period marked by major transitions within Britain’s oil policy as well as broader changes within the international oil market. It argues that the story of Britain, and Britain’s two domestically-based oil companies, BP and Shell, offers a valuable case study in the development of competing ideas about the reorganization of the international oil industry in the wake of the rise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries and the companies ’ losing control over the production of oil. The emergence of OPEC, and the political and resource nationalism which provided it with its inspiration, proved to be a challenge for the companies. In their view, this had to be countered commercially through the maintenance of the role of the major oil companies as well as the further internationalization of the oil market; a process which they believed would help de-politicize oil production and distribution. Although the Governments which ruled Britain in this era were init...
2013
Introduction-Britain and a Changing International Oil Industry On the evening of 21 October, 1973 an emergency meeting was held at Chequers, the country retreat of Britain's Prime Minister Edward Heath. The two most anticipated guests were the chairman of British Petroleum (BP), Sir Eric Drake, and the chairman of the British unit of Shell, Frank McFadzean. Heath had called the two men to Chequers in the midst of a chaotic scene for the world oil market. Two weeks earlier, a joint Egyptian/Syrian attack on Israel had ignited what would come to be known as the Yom Kippur or October War. 1 Events had developed dramatically following the opening of hostilities, with the nations of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) using the crisis situation to pressure the international oil companies to increase the posted price of oil. 2 When these companies sought to delay such an increase, the Persian Gulf OPEC states raised the price of oil unilaterally by 70 percent to $5.11 a barrel on 16 October. 3 Just one day later, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) unleashed the "oil weapon" by announcing a dramatic 5 percent, and later 10 percent, monthly cutback on oil production until Israel withdrew to its pre-1967 borders. 4 Several countries, including the United States and the Netherlands, were 1 This was the fourth Arab/Israeli war since 1948. 2 The posted price of oil was, at this time, set by the oil companies and was the price used to calculate the taxes and royalties paid by the companies to the oil-producing states.