The State is Not Like a Beehive: The Self-Containment of Plato's Statesman. In: Problemos, 2014 (86): 127-138. (original) (raw)
Related papers
Statecraft and Self-Government: On the Task of the Statesman in Plato's Statesman
Ergo, 2022
In this paper I argue that, according to Plato's Statesman, true statesmen directly control, administer, or govern none of the affairs of the city. Rather, administration and governance belong entirely to the citizens. Instead of governing the city, the task of the statesman is to facilitate the citizens' successful self-governance or self-rule. And true statesmen do this through legislation, by means of which they inculcate in the citizens true opinions about the just, the good, the fine, and the opposites of these.
Beginning with tracing the core elements of the ancient reception of Plato's Statesman in which politics and dialectic were given separate emphases (I), this paper argues that, contrary to this tradition, the dialogue deals with dialectical problems with pressing political issues, such that the subject of the dialogue is constantly political and that Plato's overall aim here is to reflect on the relation of political science to the highest form of knowledge (II). In order to demonstrate this claim, this paper asks why the paradigms in the Sophist and Statesman are treated differently and makes the case for the significance of interweaving (sumplekein) in both politics and dialectic, treating statesmanship itself as a paradigm for dialectic (III). Rehabilitating a form of the shepherding model for politics and taking seriously the oft-derided 'featherless biped' definition of man as an account of the need for artifice in forming political community as such, the last two parts of the paper (IV-V) show that the interplay of the early divisions and paradigms, far from being a tiresome exercise in weary logic, aim at dispensing a crucial political lesson by opposing a theocen-tric conception of statesmanship and the anthropocentric view of mankind.
Political Agreement in Plato’s Republic and Statesman
In this paper, I identify three problems around political agreement, as Plato conceives it in the Republic. (1) One foundational principle of the kallipolis is that philosophers should rule. But, as Plato himself notes, there is a great deal of conventional prejudice against philosophers, and thus the majority can be expected to be hostile to the proposal that philosophers should rule. Plato advances the view that such conventional prejudice can be reversed. (2) Even if conventional prejudice can be reversed, however, there is a second and more serious problem. As a matter of psychological necessity, non-philosophers lack epistemic grounds to hold that philosophical rule is the best sort of rule, and thus non-philosophers appear to have no compelling reason to agree that philosophers should rule. I propose a way of addressing the second problem by reading the belief “philosophers should rule” extensionally. Myths and stories can persuade non-philosophers to hold the extensional belief, even if they do not share grounds for this belief with philosophers. (3) However, if we hold that political agreement consists of extensional beliefs as above, this sort of agreement seems to provide too slim a foundation for such good-making features of a polis as civic sophrosunê (moderation), unity, and stability. This form of political agreement appears too weak to sustain such considerable political values. I hold that Plato revisits the problem of political agreement in the Statesman. In that work, it is the weak form of political agreement (at best) that obtains between political elites and non-elites. In the Statesman, Plato also introduces a stronger form of political agreement that consists in agreement on normative beliefs, as well as on the grounds for those beliefs. But this stronger form of political agreement only holds among political-ethical elites. The result is that only political-ethical elites in the Statesman form a civically-unified, moderate, and stable political community. Non-elites are “enfolded” but not properly included in this community.
"Kingship and Legislation in Plato's Statesman"
Polis. The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought, 2021
One of the main philosophical outcomes of Plato's Statesman is to define statesmanship as a prescriptive (epitactic) form of knowledge, exercising control over subordinate tekhnai. Against a widespread scholarly view according to which the Statesman offers a radically critical view of laws, this paper argues that the art of legislation (nomothetikē) has pride of place among these subordinate arts which also include rhetoric, strategy, the art of the judge and education.
Theory and Practice in Plato's Statesman
I provide a new interpretation of a relatively neglected passage in Plato's Statesman (258b-261a) dealing with the distinction between theory and practice and the "theoretical" character of political science (identified with "statesmanship" in the dialogue). Through a close reading of the text, I argue that the Platonic distinction between theory and practice emerges from Plato's reflection on the distinction between soul and body, and in particular from his reflection on the ways in which knowledge may be embodied or disembodied. This understanding leads to a conception of the relationship between theory and practice that emphasizes the fragility of their connection and the necessity for mediation between them, as well as the ultimate interdependence of theoretical and practical knowledge in political life.
The stranger's knowledge: Political knowledge in Plato's" Statesman".
2006
I first contextualize the question of political knowledge in relation to the questions of the nature of philosophy and sophistry with which it is intimately bound in the Sophist. There, philosophy is shown to be different from political knowledge; it is at best a striving for such knowledge. I then carefully dissect the way in which the nature of this knowledge is brought to light in the Statesman.
Reinvestigating the Political Position of the Citizen in Plato's Republic
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia, 2019
In this paper, I argue that in the Republic Plato justifies the political authority of the guardians in light of the principle of partnership-a principle which fits coherently with other Platonic principles which undergird his political theory, including optimum functionality, social justice and power. Therefore, I argue that, by their respective professions, there is a cooperative interaction between the guardians and the producers as partners within the political structure of the ideal polis towards attaining the eudaemonistic goals of both the individual and the polis. I contrast this with the orthodox interpretation that Plato justifies political authority using the idea of the Good-an interpretation which holds that since the citizens cannot grasp the Good, they assume an insignificant political position, including the allegations that they are cogs, slaves, morally obtuse, and politically inept.