Unclogging WTO Decision-Making with the Provisions on Amendments in Article X of the WTO Agreement (original) (raw)
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The WTO Decision-Making Process: Problems and Possible Solutions
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
The WTO has become one of the key international organisations responsible for regulating international economic relations among states. At first glance, the WTO Agreement makes very democratic provisions with respect to decision-making. All formal WTO decisionmaking organs are open to all members. Independent of population size, economic might or contribution to international trade, each member of the WTO wields a single unweighted vote-i.e. one-member-one-vote. Thus at the formal level, all appears to bode well with the WTO decision-making process. This seeming well-being however belies the true nature of the problems and challenges the decision-making process is encumbered with. The article undertakes a descriptive and analytical exegesis of the provisions on decision-making in Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement. The article is segmented into three main sections. The first section presents a descriptive account of the WTO as an international organisation and the textual provisions on decision-making contained under Articles IX and X of the WTO Agreement. The focus here is to explore the formal provisions on 'legislative' decisionmaking by the two most important decision-making organs of the WTO-i.e. the Ministerial Conference and the General Council. The second section presents a critical analysis of the WTO decision-making process with particular emphasis on the problems, challenges and opportunities that the consensus and single undertaking principles and the Green Room process hold for the WTO. The concluding section explores possible options for reforming the WTO decision-making process. The importance of the principles of sovereign equality of states and the special and differential treatment of developing countries are used in both the second and third sections as key considerations in the discourse on the challenges and possible reform of the WTO decision-making process. General Overview of the WTO The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement) ushered in a new multilateral trade organisation that replaced the GATT 1947, after the latter had been in operation for almost 50 years. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that culminated in the formation of the WTO started off in 1986 as a multilateral trade Round aimed at reforming the GATT 1947. 1 The establishment of a new trade organisation was not on the agenda at the inception of the Uruguay Round. 2 The idea of a new trade organisation was mooted by the EC and Canada in 1990 and in 1991 by the EC, Canada and Mexico. 3 The proposal for a new trade organisation initially faced opposition from the US and developing countries but by 1993, opposition to its establishment had waned and developing countries and the US had agreed to the establishment of the WTO. 4 Negotiations on the WTO were completed in December 1993 and in April 1994, the signatory states ratified the WTO
Democracy in the World Trade Organization
International Organizations Law Review, 2017
The wto has become one of the key international organisations responsible for regulating international economic relations among states. At first glance, the wto Agreement makes very democratic provisions with respect to decision-making. All formal wto decision-making organs are open to all members. Independent of population size, economic might or contribution to international trade, each member of the wto wields a single unweighted vote—i.e., ‘one member, one vote’. Thus, at the formal level, all appears to bode well with the wto decision-making process. This seeming well-being, however, belies the true nature of the problems and challenges the decision-making process is encumbered with. This article undertakes analytical exegesis of the provisions on decision-making in Articles ix and x of the wto Agreement. The article also explores possible options for reforming the wto decision-making process and its implications for developing countries.
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The recent emergence of Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) – that is, negotiating initiatives among a subset of the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership – has reignited the debate over lawmaking in the WTO. As things stand, the WTO operates on the basis of a widespread expectation that consensus needs to be achieved for any decision to be taken. Agreements that produce rights and obligations only among a subset of the membership (‘plurilaterals’, or Annex 4 agreements) are also subject to the consensus rule and thus remain exceptional. Are JSIs the first move towards redressing the current equilibrium in favour of agreements among a subset ofWTO members and, if so, can they be integrated within the current regime absent amendments? Even though consensus decision-making does not necessarily lead to failed negotiations, it is undoubtedly a significant contributory factor when parties hold diverse and unaligned priorities. Contracts signed in the WTO involve increasingly heterogen...
Decision-Making by Consensus in the WTO
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
Open discussions prevent developing countries from objecting publicly 2.3.2.3 The overloaded agenda and too many meetings held simultaneously have put resource deficient developing countries at a great disadvantage.
WTO Decision Making Process and Its Challenges by Developing Countries
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The Decision-making process in the WTO, in itself, in the form of rules and procedures (formal or informal), is a key determinant of the substance of power politics. At first glance, the WTO agreement makes very democratic provisions with respect to decision making. This seeming well, however, does not show the true nature of the problems and challenge the decision making process is encumbered with. More active participants, representing more diverse interests and objectives, have complicated WTO decision-making. The process of trade negotiations at the WTO is said to not consider the developing countries needs, nor does it find a middle ground between the developed and the developing countries for obvious reasons of economic and political power differences. The politically and economically power full self-selected states are the one who makes decisions within their ‘green room’ meeting and forwards it to the general assembly for consensus, whereby none of the developing countries will be able to reject for obvious reasons. And this process of decision making is challenged for the developing countries in the decision-making process of the WTO.
The WTO Constitution: Tertiary Rules for Intertwined Elephants
Bepress Legal Series, 2005
Constitutions have many dimensions. These dimensions include at least the following: • an economic constitution in the sense of a set of rules for exchange of value and authority, • an interfunctional constitution that allows for the integration of various social values, • a political constitution that reflects the cultural and democratic integrity of a group of people, • a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules for the making of other rules, and for determining supremacy and the scope of judicial application of rules, • a human rights constitution that limits the sphere of governmental authority, and • a redistributive constitution founded on social solidarity. The WTO constitution has already grown along some of these dimensions. As we assess the constitutional development of the WTO, we must first analyze these dimensions separately. Second, we must examine how these dimensions relate to one another. Third, we must examine how these dimensions of the WTO "constitution" relate to the general international legal system's constitution. Finally, we must examine how these dimensions of the WTO "constitution" relate to the domestic constitutions of the WTO's member states.
Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) Vol. 2, No. 1 (January-June 2021), 50-62, 2021
The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) dispute settlement mechanism, known as the "pearl in the crown," is stalled due to United States (U.S.) obstruction, which prevents appellate body members from being ordained. This situation continues, and the WTO's dispute settlement function is paralyzed since 2019. The WTO has faced a crisis in recent years, and the trade legislation has stagnated. The dispute settlement body was also blocked due to U.S. interference, which led to the failure of the appellate body's members to be selected. The data has been gathered for this descriptive study using secondary research method, including different newspaper articles and the internet, which were outlined and noted. This paper presents and evaluates several existing proposals on how to get out of the impasse. This paper points out whether the existing WTO members can choose to join or not participate in establishing a new appellate body. On this basis, it makes its own relatively unique proposal, namely, to establish a substantial dispute settlement mechanism outside the WTO, parallel to the existing dispute settlement mechanism, and it demonstrates the legal feasibility of the proposal. Immediately, the states should begin negotiations on the significant agreements required for this new appellate body. It will effectively solve the deadlock in the dispute settlement mechanism caused by the United States, blocking the appointment of members of the appellate body.