Post-Crisis Changes in Global Bank Business Models (original) (raw)

The Impact of the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks on Their Business Model

2020

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to provide empirical evidence on how the recent international regulation designed for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) drove changes in these institutions’ activity. Our econometric approach quantifies the impact of the designation of G-SIBs on their activity, controlling for both structural differences and industry trends. We find that G-SIBs have reduced the expansion of their balance sheet, which further improved their leverage ratio. A downward pressure is noticed on their return on equity, but no adverse consequences are observed on lending. We find no effect on G-SIBs’ funding cost advantage, which suggests that “too-big-to-fail” distortions still persist.

The Business Models of Large Interconnected Banks and the Lessons of the Financial Crisis

National Institute Economic Review, 2012

This paper looks at the urgent and ongoing need to change the business models of global systemically important banks — particularly those that dominate the OTC derivatives markets which carry massive counterparty risk via collateralisation practices. It explores the three main lessons of the financial crisis: too big to fail, excess leverage and conflicts of interest. While regulatory reforms have been plentiful, none have adequately addressed the main source of the problems which lie in the very nature of the business models of large interconnected banks.

Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era: The Global Response, and Responses Around the Globe for 135 Countries

Financial system policymakers around the world continue to respond vigorously to the problems in financial markets, financial institutions, and financial system regulation and supervision brought into high relief by the global financial crisis. However, the overall understanding of what those responses are remains rather vague and limited. Our study contributes to improving the state of knowledge by focusing on one particularly relevant issue, the regulation and supervision of systemically important banks (SIBs). The heart of our contribution is the presentation of information heretofore obscure, or new, or both. Our approach is to develop two complementary perspectives. The first perspective is what we have characterized as "the global view." That discussion begins by noting that the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are the architects of the most significant agenda in the world to reform the global financial system, including in particular as that system operates through systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). We explain what the G20 and the FSB are, how they came to occupy the driver's seat so to speak, and the evolution of their major financial system reform initiatives since the darkest days of the global financial crisis. Our discussion highlights SIFIs initiatives, emphasizing in particular those pertaining to global systemically important financial institutions/banks (G-SIFIs and G-SIBs). Our second perspective is a country-specific one. It starts by making the important observation that while most of the largest banks around the world have not been designated as "globally" systemically important, they are nevertheless systemically important when considered in a national or "domestic" context. Under those circumstances it is therefore fortunate that, due to recent World Bank efforts, a large set of information exists about the regulation and supervision of SIBs. Our study summarizes and highlights the new data collected by the World Bank on the post-crisis regulation and supervision of SIBs by 135 countries around the world. Broadly, that analysis shows that countries are more similar than different in the measures they have adopted for regulating and supervising SIBs. We conclude our study by suggesting that, although that fact should aid countries in coordinating policies internationally, there is a very long way to go in that respect.

The Impact of the Identification of GSIBs on their Business Model

2017

Most research papers dealing with systemic footprint in the banking system either investigate the definition and the measure of systemic risk, or try to identify systemic banks and to calibrate the systemic risk buffers. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to provide empirical evidence on how the recent international regulation designed for global systemically important banks (GSIBs) drove changes on these institutions’ activity. Our data consists of cross-section observations for 97 large international banks from 22 countries from 2005 to 2016 (12 years). Our econometric approach quantifies the impact of the FSB designation on GSIBs’ activity, controlling for both structural differences between GSIBs and non-GSIBs and structural evolutions of the banking system over time (industry trends). We find that GSIBs have curbed downward the expansion of their total balance sheet after the FSB designation, which resulted in an additional improvement of their leverage...

Bank Business Models: Popularity and Performance

Banking & Insurance eJournal, 2017

We allocate banks to distinct business models by experimenting with various combinations of balance sheet characteristics as inputs in cluster analysis. Using a panel of 178 banks for the period 2005-15, we identify a retail-funded and a wholesale-funded commercial banking model that are robust to the choice of inputs. In comparison, a model emphasising trading activities and a universal banking model are less robustly identified. Both commercial banking models exhibit lower cost-to-income ratios and more stable return-on-equity than the trading model. In a reversal of a pre-crisis trend, the crisis aftermath witnessed mainly switches away from wholesale-funded and into retail-funded banking. Over the entire sample period, banks that switched into the retail-funded model saw their return-on-equity improve by 2.5 percentage points on average relative to non-switchers. By contrast, the relative performance of banks switching into the wholesale-funded model deteriorated by 5 percentage...