CSDP and the open method of coordination: Developing the EU's comprehensive approach to security (original) (raw)
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The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-ordination?
nbiz.nl
The term 'comprehensive approach' is notorious for being a catch-all phrase for what can turn out to be quite different things. Nowadays, most national governments and international organisations dealing with security challenges have at least a reference to 'comprehensiveness' in their crisis management operations in their policy documents. There are many overlapping definitions: the German 'vernetzte Sicherheit', the Canadian and Dutch '3Dapproach' 2 , the British 'whole of government', the UN's 'multi-dimensionality' are all conceptions that refer loosely to responses to security threats which are not strictly of a military nature. In general, comprehensive security refers to an understanding that peace and development are fundamentally intertwined. The United Kingdom defines a comprehensive approach as 'commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation' (Ministry of Defence, 2006: 5). Most of the definitions include the following elements: 'the approach is horizontal, including both civilian and military parties and, where possible, allies and international organisations and local nationals; and vertical, taking account of the different stages in the situation from the initial war fighting phase to reconstruction' (House of Commons, 2010: 11). Key to comprehensive approaches to security is the shared understanding of the why (human security), but also of the how (with integrated policies). In the case of the EU, central to the development and internalisation of comprehensiveness in security policies has been the aim, declared by European Council 'to ensure a culture of coordination' (European Council, 2003a). When the Council sought to create a culture of coordination it was implicitly referring to a change in the organisational culture of the EU's institutions (the how). This means a change away from stove-piping, i.e. separate ways of operating of EU personnel working in the field of crisis management, towards an integrated way of thinking and working. In social psychology and organization studies the most common definition of culture is 'the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environments' (Schein, 1996: 236). According to the European Council, the underlying assumption, or norm, that needs to be ingrained into the EU is that of coordinating action for crisis management among EU institutions. This article addresses to what extent the EU's 2 3D stands for Defence, Development and Diplomacy.
2014
Since the Lisbon Treaty, all organizational conditions have been created for the systematic use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military and civil structures, especially the operational headquarters and associated common structures like transport command, have been established. Until now there has been limited activity in crisis resolution, outside of Bosnia and Macedonia, and therefore little has been done in replacement of NATO. It is therefore difficult to assess the development of the common policy on conflict prevention and crisis management and it has been shown that in all cases NATO should come into play as planned from the outset.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The EU is undertaking important developments in the area of European security without asserting new fundamental goals. This paper proposes a conceptualisation of new logics of integration in the ESDP, by focusing on the transformation of conflict-resolution mechanisms in the adoption and implementation of policy provisions in the area. I argue that since 1998, pressing external events have led to an integrative policy change in the area of European security, manifest in an increasing use of expert incrementalist methods within the intergovernmental framework of the EU. The urgency of collective decisions adopted in substantive negotiations at a high political level combines with the incrementalist "filling-in" in the operational phase. While bargaining is highly determinant in the adoption of key compromises, the operational phase has become infused with administrative management and expert consultation, corresponding with the proliferation of newly created specialized agencies and think tanks, thus creating dynamics for the introduction of novel program specifications. Integrative outcomes are manifest in the progress in military operational capacity, the actual accomplishment of EU-based "Petersberg" operations, the focus on a more pragmatic understanding of the relationship with NATO and the proposals for coordination and flexibility envisaged in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty.
EU Permanent Structured Cooperation for a common defense
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