Disclosure of belief-dependent preferences in the trust game (original) (raw)

2010, Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions - BQGT '10

Psychological Games Traditional Game Theory: u i = u i (actions) Problem 1: the motivation of decision makers who are a¤ected by and care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Extension 1: Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduce belief-dependent motivations: u i = u i (actions; beliefs i) beliefs i : initial (pre-play) beliefs of player i about strategies and beliefs about beliefs of others. Problem 2: conditional (second-order) beliefs are not considered. Yet they are crucial for applications, and theoretical interpretations of experimental …ndings. Extension 2: Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce conditional beliefs: u i (actions; cond:beliefs i ; cond:beliefs i) Summary: In games with belief-dependent motivations there are two channels through which beliefs and information a¤ect behavior. Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 2 / 29 Psychological Games Traditional Game Theory: u i = u i (actions) Problem 1: the motivation of decision makers who are a¤ected by and care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Extension 1: Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduce belief-dependent motivations: u i = u i (actions; beliefs i) beliefs i : initial (pre-play) beliefs of player i about strategies and beliefs about beliefs of others. Problem 2: conditional (second-order) beliefs are not considered. Yet they are crucial for applications, and theoretical interpretations of experimental …ndings. Extension 2: Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce conditional beliefs: u i (actions; cond:beliefs i ; cond:beliefs i) Summary: In games with belief-dependent motivations there are two channels through which beliefs and information a¤ect behavior. Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 2 / 29 Psychological Games Traditional Game Theory: u i = u i (actions) Problem 1: the motivation of decision makers who are a¤ected by and care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Extension 1: Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduce belief-dependent motivations: u i = u i (actions; beliefs i) beliefs i : initial (pre-play) beliefs of player i about strategies and beliefs about beliefs of others. Problem 2: conditional (second-order) beliefs are not considered. Yet they are crucial for applications, and theoretical interpretations of experimental …ndings. Extension 2: Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce conditional beliefs: u i (actions; cond:beliefs i ; cond:beliefs i) Summary: In games with belief-dependent motivations there are two channels through which beliefs and information a¤ect behavior. Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 2 / 29 Psychological Games Traditional Game Theory: u i = u i (actions) Problem 1: the motivation of decision makers who are a¤ected by and care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Extension 1: Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduce belief-dependent motivations: u i = u i (actions; beliefs i) beliefs i : initial (pre-play) beliefs of player i about strategies and beliefs about beliefs of others. Problem 2: conditional (second-order) beliefs are not considered. Yet they are crucial for applications, and theoretical interpretations of experimental …ndings. Extension 2: Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce conditional beliefs: u i (actions; cond:beliefs i ; cond:beliefs i) Summary: In games with belief-dependent motivations there are two channels through which beliefs and information a¤ect behavior. Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 2 / 29 Psychological Games Traditional Game Theory: u i = u i (actions) Problem 1: the motivation of decision makers who are a¤ected by and care for emotions, reciprocity, or social conformity may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Extension 1: Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduce belief-dependent motivations: u i = u i (actions; beliefs i) beliefs i : initial (pre-play) beliefs of player i about strategies and beliefs about beliefs of others. Problem 2: conditional (second-order) beliefs are not considered. Yet they are crucial for applications, and theoretical interpretations of experimental …ndings. Extension 2: Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) introduce conditional beliefs: u i (actions; cond:beliefs i ; cond:beliefs i) Summary: In games with belief-dependent motivations there are two channels through which beliefs and information a¤ect behavior. Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 2 / 29 / 29 Road map 1 Main Features of Psychological Games (focusing on Guilt and Reciprocity in a Trust Game) 2 Research Questions 3 Belief-dependent preferences in a Trust Game: psychological equilibrium analysis 4 Belief-dependent preferences in a Trust Game: experimental elicitation 5 Conclusions Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game March 29, 2011-University of Namur 3 / 29 (focusing on Guilt and Reciprocity in a Trust Game) 2 Research Questions 3 Belief-dependent preferences in a Trust Game: psychological equilibrium analysis 4 Belief-dependent preferences in a Trust Game: experimental elicitation 5 Conclusions Attanasi, Battigalli, Nagel () Disclosure of Belief-Dependent Preferences in the Trust Game