Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy, 1944 (Book Review)" by Ben Kite (original) (raw)
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This article is conceptually motivated. By drawing on cases from the U.S. and Israeli militaries, it aims at demonstrating the existence of two separate systems of legitimacy of military violence-extramilitary and intra-military-and mapping the gaps between them. It conceptualizes the legitimacy of violence and then maps seven conditions under which gaps are created between the two systems, as follows: the uniqueness of military culture, the extent to which the military does not mirror society, field command's broadening improvisation and interpretation, ambiguous political directives, the extent to which the military leverages a legitimacy dispute, troops' resistance, and the diachronic systems of legitimacy. The appearance of these gaps is more likely to present with weakening of civilian control and the break-up of military hierarchy.
Journal of Cold War Studies, 2007
Reviewed by James A. Russell, Naval Postgraduate School The United States is today presented with a series of disturbing and incongruous images as it attempts to apply force in pursuit of its objectives in various theaters around the world. Why, for example, did the United States and its 1.2 million soldiers, supported by more than 500billionindefenseexpenditures(nearlyhalfofalldefensespendingintheworld),havesuchdifªcultycontrollingthe13−mileroadconnectingBaghdad′sairporttothecitycenter?WhydothoserumoredtobeharboringOsamabinLadenandhislieutenantsinthenorthwestfrontierprovincesofPakistannotturnhimovertotheUnitedStatesandavailthemselvesofthe500 billion in defense expenditures (nearly half of all defense spending in the world), have such difªculty controlling the 13-mile road connecting Baghdad's airport to the city center? Why do those rumored to be harboring Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants in the northwest frontier provinces of Pakistan not turn him over to the United States and avail themselves of the 500billionindefenseexpenditures(nearlyhalfofalldefensespendingintheworld),havesuchdifªcultycontrollingthe13−mileroadconnectingBaghdad′sairporttothecitycenter?WhydothoserumoredtobeharboringOsamabinLadenandhislieutenantsinthenorthwestfrontierprovincesofPakistannotturnhimovertotheUnitedStatesandavailthemselvesofthe25-million reward? Why was the stunningly successful phase of "conventional" military operations in Iraq in March and early April 2003 not followed by a similarly successful counterinsurgency campaign? These and other incongruities are the subject of frequent commentary, consuming voluminous quantities of airtime and congressional debate, not to mention more than $100 billion in taxpayers' money in 2006 alone to fund continuing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the truth is that much of the commentary in the mass media is ill-informed and provides viewers with entertainment as opposed to cogent analysis. Searching for sound content on the national security issues of the day has become an increasingly difªcult proposition for educators, policy professionals, and interested scholars. Stephen Biddle's new book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, not only provides sound content but does so in addressing a topical issue of paramount importance. Readers seeking content in the form of a theoretical framework, interesting case studies backed by statistical analysis, and wellformulated implications for policy will not be disappointed by Biddle's rigor. As explained by the subtitle, Biddle, now a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, takes on the issue of why some states succeed and others fail in battle. He places the issue of conventional combat in a theoretical framework that can be supported through modeling and statistical analysis for specialists interested in those techniques. Although Biddle's work provides the operations research modeler with an interesting methodology, his book can also be read and easily appreciated by a wider audience of national security professionals. Biddle's argument will not necessarily be well-received in the Pentagon, which is
Understanding War's Theory: what military theory is, where it fits and who influences it
Australian Army Occasional Paper - Conflict Theory and Strategy, 2018
Many military professionals and academics outline the importance of military theory and the need to study it. Some, like Colin Gray, even highlight how understanding it allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war. Given these wise words, would it not seem important to know ‘what’ military theory is? Is it not significant to know who has shaped it? How do we, as professionals, tell if something is military theory, or just opinion and conjecture? Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It helps identify what writings further our understanding of war and warfare, and guides professional military education and research for future doctrine and training. This work answers the questions of what military theory is, where it sits within the wider context of the study of conflict, and which theorists are key in defining its body of knowledge. The work first defines what military theory is. Military theory is a field of study that seeks to understand the phenomena of war and its links to wider conflict; and provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination of the knowledge of war and warfare. In other words, military theory is the epistemology of war. This definition highlights that research into military theory is grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry and, much like applied history, must use broad scientific methods – using hypothesis and empirical data based in history; not just a single incident, war or technological advancement – to develop its concepts. Understanding this also provides a guide to test whether a new or modern idea is effective ‘military theory’, or merely ‘military notion’. The definition also indicates that the focus of military theory is the development of first principles knowledge about war and warfare. It is this knowledge that allows planners, commanders and senior decision makers to adapt their know-how of war fighting to changing situations, environments and political objectives. It is also this knowledge that can be enhanced through wider study. The analysis of what military theory is, also demonstrates where military theory fits within wider academic disciplines. Although other humanities disciplines like history can support military theory, its focus on applied theory gives it strong links to other applied social sciences like political science, international relations and economics. These other disciplines overlap with military theory, and provide an avenue to potentially advance military theory’s understanding of power, influence and war’s wider links to conflict. Such links assist in broadening the military theory body of knowledge – a body of knowledge that is not codified, but is instead shaped by foundational theorists. Who these foundation theorists are, or who is most influential, is also answered by this work. By analysing the curriculums of staff colleges around the world, this work has identified the top 20 theorists currently accepted as most influential. The analysis also suggests a normalising of military theory across the globe, including a possible convergence between the conceptual Eastern and Western ways of war. Overall, this work provides a definition for military theory and highlights the key theorists that shape our views on it now and into the future. This is supported with guidance that allows us to test future theories. Understanding what military theory is and who shapes it lays the foundation to allow the profession to debate where future advancements in military theory should focus to best support planners, commanders and senior decision makers.
The Anatomy of Change: Why Armies Succeed or Fail at Transformation
The purpose of the Institute of Land Warfare is to extend the educational work of AUSA by sponsoring scholarly publications, to include books, monographs and essays on key defense issues, as well as workshops and symposia. A work selected for publication as a Land Warfare Paper represents research by the author which, in the opinion of the editorial board, will contribute to a better understanding of a particular defense or national security issue. Publication as an Institute of Land Warfare Paper does not indicate that the Association of the United States Army agrees with everything in the paper, but does suggest that the Association believes the paper will stimulate the thinking of AUSA members and others concerned about important defense issues.
Toward a holistic view of warfare. Revista Militar, Fev/Mar 2009.
The lethality, precision, and global reach of the American way of war has changed the modern character of warfare, allowing the US to fight wars with fewer casualties and destruction, creating the general perception that conflicts are acceptable, safe, and clean. However, future emergence of a multipolar world, and the rise of US’s peer competitors with contradictory national interests, will increase the risks of conflict. Given the limited effectiveness of conventional warfare against the overwhelming conventional power of American military forces, future peer competitors will seek to dislocate its strengths. Furthermore, future trends such as the proliferation and affordability of commercial technologies, the increasing civilianization of war, and the importance of global media, will provide the leverage that asymmetric competitors can use to challenge the US outside the traditional military domain. Such changes will require professional military practitioners to have a better understanding of the nature of future warfare.