Heidegger's Productive Logic (original) (raw)
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A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ONTIC-ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTION OF BEING IN HEIDEGGER
Ifiok: Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2024
Heidegger, interpreting notion of Being from a phenomenological standpoint declares that it is that which discloses itself exactly as it is. Being is not merely Being for its own sake, it is always the Being of some entity. And there is a being whose task it is to so define Being. That is Dasein-the entity to whom the question of meaning of Being is posed, contemplated and rendered. Being is definable by Dasein because it (Dasein) is both ontically and ontologically constituted. But what does ontic and ontological composition of Dasein mean? How does the nature prepare Dasein for definition or interpretation of Being? What does the interpretation portend for Reality or the world? This essay applies critical and analytical methods of philosophical inquiry to respond to these questions.
The Equivocity of Being: Heidegger, Multiplicity, and Fundamental Ontology
Human Studies, vol. 44, n. 3, 2021, pp. 351–371.
The Heidegger–Deleuze relationship has attracted significant attention of late. This paper contributes to this line of research by examining Deleuze’s claim, recently reiterated and developed by Philip Tonner, that Heidegger offers a univocal conception of Being where there is one sense of Being that is said throughout all entities. Although these authors maintain that this claim holds across Heidegger’s oeuvre, I purposefully adopt a conservative hermeneutical strategy that focuses on two writings from the 1927–1928 period—Being and Time and the following year’s lecture course translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic—and emphasize the lesson of the ontological difference that Being is always the Being of an entity, to argue that with regards to these texts, at least, an alternative equivocal interpretation is possible in which Being is always said differently. The conclusion draws out the implications of this for the relationship between Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and Deleuze’s differential ontology.
Cosmos and history: the journal of natural and social philosophy, 2019
This essay is both a review and a critical engagement with Heidegger’s Heraclitus: The Inception of Occidental Thinking and Logic: Heraclitus’s Doctrine of the Logos (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018). The ancient Greek term logos and the modern philosophical concept of logic are found throughout Heidegger’s work. This work situates him at a middle period of his thinking on these terms, through lectures given in 1943 and 1944. The text marks the first English translation of these lectures, based on Volume 55 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe , published by Vittorio Klostermann in 1979. This review asserts that while Heidegger aims for a return to “originary” Heraclitean thinking, his principle concern is in advancing his own ontological concepts. The text, itself a translation of translations, is therefore a work of meta-interpretation that functions at multiple discursive and historical levels.
HEIDEGGER AND THE MEANING OF BEING
This paper is about different ways of understanding the notion of ontology, and about correspondingly different senses of 'being'. Heidegger is renowned for probing the question of the meaning of being, but also for writing in a fashion that is immensely obscure and confusing, largely on account of the fact that the word 'being' is used so often and in so many different ways. My hope in this paper is to clarify some of his central uses of the notion, and to offer a reading of his work that displays the way his expression of his philosophical views was forced to change in order to approach the conception of ontology he was trying to communicate.
Heidegger, Ontotheology and The Foundations of Formal Logic
The aim of this paper is to show how Heidegger’s concept of ontotheological thinking can be applied to one of the foundational projects of the analytic tradition. For Heidegger, every mode of relating to the world, and indeed every conception of the world itself, is implicated in a set of metaphysical presuppositions. Heidegger calls such presuppositions ontotheological when they constrain us to think about totality in an inadequate manner. I want to look here at some of the basic structural features of an ontotheological metaphysics, focusing on the role of analogy in its formulation. Having shown how analogy and ontotheology are reciprocally determined in the philosophy of Aristotle, I will show that important structural parallels can be found between Aristotle’s account of definition and key aspects of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, which lead to a parallel analogical conception of being in the Principia, and with it, the same impossibility of raising the question of the meaning of being that Heidegger attributes to metaphysics. I will conclude by arguing that any attempt to understand the world in terms of subjects and predicates is implicitly ontotheological, regardless of whether or not it explicitly eschews any metaphysical doctrine.
Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomenality (2014)
Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomenality, 2014
This PhD thesis is an extended critical investigation of Martin Heidegger’s influential account of the problem of phenomenality, i.e., of how things show up as meaningful phenomena in our experience. As such, it is also a study of his effort to develop and probe the question of phenomenology, i.e., what it means to see, understand, and articulate such phenomena. The aim of the thesis is both historical and systematic. On the one hand, it offers a unified interpretation of how Heidegger’s struggle with the problem of phenomenality unfolds during the main stages of his philosophical development, from the early Freiburg lecture courses 1919-1923, over the Marburg years and the publication of Being and Time in 1927, up to his later thinking stretching from the mid 1930s to the early 1970s. It is argued that the problem of phenomenality constitutes one of the core problems that Heidegger is concerned with from beginning to end, and that focusing on this problem allows us to shed new light on the philosophical logic and motives behind the main changes that his thinking undergoes along the way. On the other hand, the thesis examines both the philosophical power and the problems and ambiguities of Heidegger’s consecutive attempts to account for the structure and dynamics of phenomenality. In particular, it critically interrogates Heidegger's basic idea that our experience of meaningful phenomena is determined by our prior understanding of the historical contexts of meaning in which we always already live. A central argument of the thesis is that Heidegger’s conception of the historical structure of phenomenality raises the decisive question of how to distinguish between historical prejudice and primordial understanding, and that Heidegger’s inability to answer this question in Being and Time generates a deep ambiguity between his program of historical-destructive thinking and his employment of a Husserlian intuition-based phenomenological method in his concrete investigation. Moreover, it is argued that Heidegger’s later thinking of the clearing/event of being is centrally motivated by the effort to answer precisely this question by showing how a historical world can arise and give itself as a binding destiny. Ultimately, however, the thesis suggests – elaborating on the criticisms previously presented by, e.g., Ernst Tugendhat and Emmanuel Levinas – that Heidegger’s radical historicization of phenomenality makes him unable to account either for the truth of our understanding or for the ethical-existential significance of other persons.