Why Personhood Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions (original) (raw)
American Journal of Criminal Law
Contemporary corporate criminal law is modelled on individual criminal law. Substantive bases of liability, evidence, procedure and rationale have been constructed initially for individuals. Over the years, doctrine has been transposed to corporations.' The model contains two features. One is an identification of persons as the subjects of criminal law. The other feature is an assumption that the elements of criminal law applicable to individuals also apply to all persons. There is a notable exception. Recently proposed federal sentencing guidelines for organizations explicitly recognize the difference between individuals and corporations. 2 But predominant practice remains individualistic: corporations are treated as persons in the way that individuals are treated. Constitutional protections of corporations, often analyzed in terms of individual persons, illustrate the practice. 3 So do
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