Penal Aspects of the UN Drug Conventions (original) (raw)
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The suppression of illicit drugs through international law /
The limited application of international drug 18 prohibition in law and practice: state sovereignty and indirect control 1.3.4 Towards direct international control: drug 23 offences as international crimes 1.3.5 The individual in the system 25 1.4 The structure, content, and methods of this study 26 CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF THE 29 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF DRUGS 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Historical events precipitating international drug control 29 2.3 International drug control 1909-1945 2.3.1 The Shanghai International Opium Commission 2.3.2 The 1912 Hague Convention 31 2.3.3 The League of Nations assumes supervision of 33 international drug control 2.3.4 The 1925 Geneva Convention 33 2.3.5 The 1931 Geneva Convention 35 2.3.6 The Advisory Committee's campaign against the 36 illicit traffic 2.3.7 The actions of police organisations against the illicit 38 traffic 2.3.8 The 1936 Geneva Convention 39 2.3.8.1 Introduction 39
The UN Drug Control Conventions: The Limits of Latitude
Legislative Reform of Drug Policies, 2012
ABSTRACT Faced with a complex range of drug related problems, a growing number of nations are exploring the development of nationally appropriate policies that shift away from the prohibition-oriented approach that has long dominated the field but is losing more and more legitimacy. In so doing, such countries must pay close attention to the UN based global drug control framework of which practically all nations are a part.This briefing paper outlines the international legal drug control obligations, the room for manoeuvre the regime leaves open to national policy makers and the clear limits of latitude that cannot be crossed without violating the treaties. It also covers the vast grey area lying between the latitude and limitations, including the legal ambiguities that are subject to judicial interpretation and political contestation.The paper applies the traffic light analogy to drug law reform in order to divide ongoing policy changes and emerging proposals into three categories regarding their legal tenability: red - stop or challenge the conventions; orange - proceed with caution; and green - please proceed.The present system of worldwide drug control is based upon three international conventions. These are the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.While the substance of the drug control conventions is complex, their function is simple. They provide the legal structure for an international system of drug control by defining control measures to be maintained within each state party to these conventions and by prescribing rules to be obeyed by these Parties in their relations with each other. These rules can be categorized by two principal methods of achieving drug control. These are commodity control (the definition and regulation of the licit production, supply and consumption of drugs) and penal control (the suppression through criminal law of illicit production, supply and consumption.)The conventions therefore operate with the intention of creating an appropriate balance between penal sanctions, the degree of real and/or potential harm associated with specific drugs and their therapeutic usefulness.The overarching concern for the ‘health and welfare of mankind’ expressed within the conventions’ preambles, required a dual goal: reducing the availability of drugs to prevent abuse and addiction that ‘constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind’, while at the same time ensuring adequate availability because their medical use is ‘indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering’.The global control system, established with that twin purpose, effectively ended the large-scale diversion of narcotic drugs like cocaine and heroin from pharmaceutical sources to illicit channels. However, it was unable to prevent the resulting rapid expansion of illicit production that began supplying the non-medical market instead.The tensions resulting from the inherent duality exacerbated as the system evolved based on the implicit principle that reducing availability for illicit purposes could only be achieved through the penal enforcement of predominantly prohibition oriented supply-side measures.The tightening of drug laws, escalation of law enforcement efforts and an actual ‘war on drugs’ against the illicit market, over time distorted the balance at the expense of the other side of the coin.Key Points: Decriminalization of possession, purchase and cultivation for personal use operates reasonably comfortably inside the confines of the UN drug control conventions; Harm reduction services, including drug consumption rooms, can operate lawfully under the drug control treaty system; There is greater scope to provide health care or social support instead of punishment for people caught up in minor offences related to personal use or socio-economic necessity; All controlled drugs can be used for medical purposes, including heroin prescription and ‘medical marijuana’; what constitutes medical use is left to the discretion of the parties; The INCB often increases tensions around interpretations instead of resolving them, though the Board should be guided ‘by a spirit of co-operation rather than by a narrow view of the letter of the law’; There are limits of latitude; a legal regulated market for non-medical use of cannabis or any other scheduled drug is not permissible within the treaty framework; Legal tensions exist with other international legal obligations such as those stemming from human rights or indigenous rights; Growing doubts and inherent inconsistencies and ambiguities provide legitimate ground for demanding more space for experimentation with alternative control models than the current systems allows.
2020
See also SENATE EXEC. RPT. 101-15, REPORT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (1989) (reporting favorably with the understandings). The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on Nov. 22, 1989; the U.S. instrument of ratification was deposited with the U.N. on Feb. 20, 1990. 2. Convention, supra note 1, preamble, 4. The term "illicit traffic" is defined in art. 1(m) to mean "the offences set forth in article 3, paragraphs 1 and 2," that is, the specific offenses required by the Convention to be made illegal under the domestic law of party states. 3. Ninety-five percent of the illicit narcotics consumed in the U.S. originates overseas. Foreign sources account for all of the cocaine and heroin and most of the U.S.-consumed marijuana. It is estimated that U.S. consumers use 65% of the world's supply of illegal narcotics. 4.
International Journal of Drug Policy, 2010
This commentary addresses some of the challenges posed by the broader normative, legal and policy framework of the United Nations for the international drug control system. The ‘purposes and principles’ of the United Nations are presented and set against the threat based rhetoric of the drug control system and the negative consequences of that system. Some of the challenges posed by human rights law and norms to the international drug control system are also described, and the need for an impact assessment of the current system alongside alternative policy options is highlighted as a necessary consequence of these analyses.
The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human Rights Based Approach (With Prof Manfred Nowak)
In 1945, the United Nations was established to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.' Today, the language of war has been adopted for policy objectives. The 'war on drugs' is now more widespread and higher in financial and human cost than ever, and has impacted negatively across borders and across human rights protections. In much the same way as the 'War on Terror,' the war on drugs has left in its wake human rights abuses, worsening national and international security and barriers to sustainable development. Although UN bodies have never officially endorsed the term, for many human rights, public health, HIV and drug policy reform advocates - and for many of those on the front lines of the war on drugs, including indigenous people, farmers, people who use drugs and service providers - the United Nations drug control system is seen as a significant part of the drug problem, rather than part of the solution. We argue that the aims of international drug policy must be revisited in line with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the binding normative framework of human rights. We argue further that the UN drug conventions are insufficient, alone, as a legal framework for the complex issue of drug policy and that human rights law must be recognised by the relevant organs of the UN as a part of that framework. The implications of this 'expanded' legal framework for the current pillars of international drug policy are then considered as are the human rights obligations of the drug control entities, and their possible future roles in the promotion and protection of human rights. Barrett, Damon and Nowak, Manfred, The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human Rights-Based Approach (August 25, 2009). THE DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR KALLIOPI K. KOUFA, pp. 449-477, Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos, eds., Brill/Martinus Nijhoff, 2009
Challenging the UN drug control conventions: problems and possibilities
International Journal of Drug Policy, 2003
Increasing numbers of sovereign states are beginning to review their stance on the prohibition based UN drug control conventions. Recent years have seen nations implement, or seriously discuss, tolerant drug policies that exploit the latitude existing within the legal framework of the global drug control regime. With efforts to implement pragmatic approaches to drug use at the national level, however, comes the growing recognition that the flexibility of the conventions is not unlimited. It seems that the time is not too distant when further movement within states away from the prohibitive paradigm will only be possible through some sort of change in or defection from the regime. This article suggests that efforts to implement treaty revision are fraught with difficulties. It will be shown how the UN procedures permitting revision of the conventions allow nations supporting the current prohibition based system, particularly the United States of America, to easily block change. The article argues that such systemic obstacles may lead parties wishing to appreciably expand policy space at a national level to consider a form of treaty withdrawal. It is suggested that such action by a group of like-minded revision oriented states may be sufficient to trigger a weakening of the regime. The article contends, however, that total withdrawal would be a problematic option, not least because it would have serious consequences for the entire international treaty system.
Inter se Modification of the UN Drug Control Conventions
International Community Law Review, 2018
Inter se modification of the UN drug control conventions An exploration of its applicability to legitimise the legal regulation of cannabis markets Draft-International Community Law Review