Robustness of a distributed knowledge management model (original) (raw)

Incentives to Share Knowledge

2001

The knowledge required for decision making in a firm is distributed across various departments. In practice, cross-functional teams are used to integrate this distributed knowledge. Incentive schemes are of crucial importance to encourage departments to share knowledge. The authors study different incentive schemes by means of a two stage model. In the first step departments have to choose between learning and sharing knowledge, in the second stage, they bargain about a new product feature. The outcome of the bargaining process in the second stage depends on the capabilities of the agents and their uncertainty about the opponent. The result of the second stage determines the agents' payoffs which in turn influence the time allocation. In a simulation study, we investigate different incentive systems and show to which extent a firm has to reward the sharing of knowledge in order to reach its overall objectives. Furthermore, we are able to derive an analytical solution for the bargaining process under uncertainty and compute Nash equilibria for a discrete set of possible actions.

Distributed Knowledge Management

Encyclopedia of Knowledge …, 2011

In dynamic markets (characterized by the specialization of work, outsourcing processes, just-in-time and distributed productions, etc.), firms have moved from hierarchical structures to networked models. These are based on both intraorganizational networks among strategic units, divisions, groups, and so on; and interorganizational networks, such as industrial districts and knowledge networks (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990). Production is based on the coordination of a constellation of units, some of which are part of the organization ( ...

Incentives for knowledge production with many producers

2004

In this paper, I briefly review the motivations for inventive behavior and describe two common incentive systems that harness and encourage such behavior. This review of well-trodden ground is performed only so that the implications of the rise of the networked knowledge economy for the effectiveness of these incentive systems can be noted. Some theoretical results on the operation and stability of the two incentive systems for the production of knowledge are presented with a discussion of how they might apply in the ...

Strategizing for Distributed Knowledge Management

Seeking Success in E-Business, 2003

ABSTRACT Knowledge management is rarely found in a strategy context. Although some companies already have introduced the role of a chief knowledge officer, knowledge management is not treated as a strategic endeavour. Furthermore, contributions from an academic point of view are scarce in the field of the strategic issues of knowledge management. This paper contributes with some insight in pointing out the strategic question that knowledge management might provide answers for: The efficiency issue of stategic positioning. Furthermore, the paper emphasises the distinction between symmetric and asymmetric incentives in business relations, and on this basis identifies the notion of Distributed Knowledge Management as a means for creating efficiency strategies with symmetric incentives in business relations. In this way a strategic agenda for knowledge management is

Distributed knowledge across boundaries

2002

The strategic use of knowledge and its management depend upon the relevant organizational context. The model of the "learning ladder" is a compact way of describing the unfolding of multiple organizational knowledge creation, transformation and transfer processes in a single firm context. Additionally, in this context the governance of the firm internal knowledge processes is performed according to the resource -based view of strategy. In this paper two different contexts challenging such model are explored in the case of a large pharmaceutical company, AstraZeneca. First, the boundaries of the single firm are crossed by looking at those advantages, which may be attained by managing the transfer and co-production of unique knowledge between a few allied firms according to the theory of relational rents. AstraZeneca "formal network" is discussed in the light of this model. Secondly, emerging features of how knowledge is managed among a large number of interdependent organizations and individuals are explored with reference to the case of a very peculiar R&D department at AstraZeneca: Clinical Science. While in the first case the model prove to hold, in the latter context behaviours and performances seem to contradict the principles of knowledge management inspired by the resource-based and relational views. This is puzzling: conventional strategic and knowledge management frameworks break down precisely when dealing with highly distributed, knowledge intensive businesses.

Cooperation or competition: knowledge sharing processes in inter-organizational networks

2005

This paper examines an inter-organizational network, composed of direct competitors, where each organization has much to gain, or lose, from sharing knowledge with its competitors. The specific management problem being examined is the knowledge transfer issue. The dilemma is whether an organization should indeed share its knowledge, especially with its competitors, or should it choose to hold it privately. More specifically, how can organizations balance between cooperating and competing in terms of their knowledge assets? We employed a substantive case study to consider rich issues relative to the exchange of knowledge between competitors who were in cooperating engagements via participation in inter-organizational networks. It is believed that the paper presents useful empirical insights into decisions relating to knowledge transfer cooperation or competition.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, 2010

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in ‡uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the …rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", because this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a …ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the …rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one.

Managing knowledge within networked innovation

Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 2012

The purpose of this paper is to research firms' knowledge management practices within the context of networked innovation between multiple actors. The analysis is based on case research carried out with six companies. Based on earlier literature and the theoretical framework of the paper, two models of networked innovation can be distinguished according to knowledge management needs: networks focusing on the transaction of explicit knowledge and intellectual property, and networks focusing on the co-creation of new knowledge and business opportunities. The paper argues that a strategic approach to knowledge management is a key element of success within networked innovation, both in the theory and in the practices of firms. In that way, firms are able to manage knowledge within networked innovation when they understand their partners' business models and strategic intents, for example their motivation to collaborate.

Knowledge Sharing in an Organization of Heterogeneous Agents

Cooperative work, if it is by a team of engineers, or by a group of experts, requires coordination by sharing common knowledge. We focus on knowledge transaction as the methodology of sharing knowledge. Knowledge transaction processes are formulated as knowledge trading games among selfish agents. Each agent has idiosyncratic utility function defined over his private knowledge and common knowledge. Each agent trades his knowledge with others in order to improve his own utility. In this paper, we focus on heterogeneity of agents. Agent decide whether trade or not in terms of cost and value of new knowledge. The way to decide is different from each agent. We characterize an organization of heterogeneous agents by their threshold. We investigate what characteristics of an organization promote knowledge trading or discourage sharing common knowledge.