From Truth Pluralism to Ontological Pluralism and Back (original) (raw)
Related papers
In J. Wyatt, J. Kim, M. P. Lynch, N. Kellen (eds.): The Nature of Truth, 2nd ed. MIT Press., 2020
Moderate pluralism is the dominant view in the truth pluralism debate. This paper aims to show that austere pluralism—a form of strong truth pluralism—should be taken seriously as a contender in the pluralist landscape. We do three kinds of work to level the playing field. First, we argue that moderate pluralism conveniently takes advantage of the dual nature of their view, switching back and forth between their distinctively monist and distinctively pluralist commitments depending on the issue or task at hand (Sect. 2). Crucially—and perhaps somewhat ironically—the plurality of truth-grounding properties plays an ineliminable role in explaining the metaphysical unity of truth, a key feature of moderate pluralism—and a monist one at that (Sect. 3). Second, we introduce and articulate austere pluralism, a novel form of strong pluralism (Sect. 4) and show that it is entirely adequate for capturing the core idea of pluralism (Sect. 6.1) and can deal with the problem of mixed compounds and the problem of mixed inferences, two challenges usually regarded as stumble blocks for austere pluralism (Sect. 5). Third, we argue that austere pluralism fares better than moderate pluralism with respect to ontological parsimony, an important theoretical virtue (Sect. 6.2).
A Problem for Ontological Pluralism and a Half-Meinongian Solution
Philosophia, 2016
According to K. McDaniel's and J. Turner's Ontological Pluralism, there are many ways of being that are more fundamental than being in general. In this paper, I shall analyze some constraints on this doctrine. Among other, ontological pluralists are committed to the idea that there are no things that have no way of being at all and that it is not legitimate to quantify over ways of being. Later on, I shall introduce a problem for ontological pluralism: if there is a privileged way of being an ontological pluralist (characterized by the claim that there are only some definite ways of being), then, given those constraints, ontological pluralists cannot logically express that privileged way. Finally, I shall justify the acceptance of a Half-Meinongian solution to this problem, that is roughly grounded on the acceptance of entities that have no way of being at all.
Ontological pluralism and ontological category
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2023
Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Historically, ways of being are aligned with the ontological categories. This paper is about to investigate why there is such a connection, and how it should be understood. Ontological pluralism suffers from an objection, according to which ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism, i.e., there is only one way to be. Admitting to ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from this objection if ways of being ground ontological categories.
In J. Wyatt, N. J. L. L. Pedersen & N. Kellen: Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. Palgrave Macmillan. , 2018
Truth pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being true. The most prominent form of truth pluralism ties the plurality of truth to domains. Thus, propositions about riverbanks might be true because they correspond with reality whereas propositions about the law might be true because they cohere with the body of law. Recently, truth pluralism has attracted considerable attention in the literature. Authors with pluralist sympathies have taken on the positive task of spelling out the different aspects of pluralism in greater detail. As a result, different versions of the view have emerged. Strong pluralists give up on the idea of truth-as-such. They deny that there is a single truth property applicable across all truth-apt domains of discourse. Truth is many, not one. Moderate pluralists, on the other hand, hold on to the idea of truth-as-such. The property is generic or applies across all truth-apt discourse. However, propositions belonging to different domains may possess this generic truth property in virtue of having distinct properties such as correspondence or coherence. Truth is both one and many. This paper has two aims. The first aim is to present and develop a version of strong truth pluralism. This task has been somewhat neglected in the literature, one major reason being that strong pluralism is widely regarded as a non-starter due to a battery of seemingly devastating objections leveled against it. Among these objections the problem of mixed compounds is regarded as being particularly pressing—and difficult—for the strong pluralist to deal with. The second aim of the paper is to give a strongly pluralist response to the problem of mixed compounds.
Pluralism x 3: truth, logic, metaphysics.
Erkenntnis, 2014
This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present and develop a positive account according to which the different forms of pluralism are intimately related. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will investigate the connection between alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. I will argue that a certain version of alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism. Second, I will connect alethic pluralism and logical pluralism to metaphysical pluralism. I will suggest that the former two are at least partly founded on the latter.
Fundamental ontological structure: an argument against pluralism
In recent years, a hierarchical view of reality has become extremely influential. In order to understand the world as a whole, on this view, we need to understand the nature of the fundamental constituents of the world. We also need to understand the relations that build the world up from these fundamental constituents. Building pluralism is the view that there are at least two equally fundamental relations that together build the world. It has been widely, though tacitly, assumed in a variety of important metaphysical debates. However, my primary aim in this paper is to argue that this has been a mistake. I will show that serious problems concerning the relationship between building and fundamentality afflict pluralism and are likely fatal to it. I claim that, for better or worse, our best hope is building singularism, the view that there is a single most fundamental building relation. I conclude by examining the advantage that singularist accounts enjoy over their pluralist rivals.
In M. Glanzberg (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Truth. Oxford University Press, 2018
As suggested by the specific formulation of the question at hand, the three reasons to be given engage only with the debate between monists and pluralists. We leave nihilism out of the picture for present purposes. 2 Lynch (2004: 385) introduces the label the "Scope Problem" for this obsservation, the one that has become prevalent in the literature on truth pluralism. Sher (1998: 134-135) uses the label "problem of the common denominator" to refer to the same problem. • Reflexitivity: for any state of information Ii, Ii extends Ii. • Transitivity: for any states of information Ii, Ij, and Ik , if Ij extends Iii and Ik extends Ij, then Ik extends Ii. • Antisymmetry: for any states of information Ii and Ij, if Ii extends Ij and Ij extends Ii, then Ii = Ij.
On the relation between truth and logic: pluralist perspectives
Proceedings of the 17th Congress on Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science and Technology
This paper investigates the connection between truth and logic from a pluralist perspective. The most prominent form of truth pluralism is domain-based: there are several ways of being true because different properties are truth-relevant for different domains. Does domain-based truth pluralism have any impact on logic? This issue is investigated from the perspective of two versions of domain-based truth pluralism: moderate pluralism and strong pluralism. According to moderate domain-based truth pluralism there is a single truth property-generic truth-that applies across all (truthapt) domains. However, within specific domains instances of generic truth are grounded by different properties-say, correspondence, coherence, or superassertibility. Strong domain-based pluralists hold that, within specific domains, a proposition's being true reduces to its corresponding, cohering, or being superassertible-and they reject the existence of a generic truth property that applies across all domains. This bulk of this paper offers critical and constructive discussion of an argument aimed to show that moderate domain-based truth pluralism implies domain-based logical pluralism. The last section provides a very brief outline of what a strong domain-based truth pluralist might say about the connection between truth and logic.
[Metaphilosophy] Ontological Disagreements, Reliability and Standoffs: The Pluralist Option
Metaphilosophy, 2021
The reliability challenge to ontology can be summarized as the complaint that no satisfying explanation is available of how one can have true ontological beliefs, given that the relevant belief-forming methods are noncausal (e.g., not perception-or memory-based). This paper first presents a version of the reliability challenge against realist approaches to ontology, put forward by Jared Warren. It then explores a response to the challenge on behalf of the realist that appeals to the use of abduction. This response does not satisfactorily deal with the reliability challenge, though, and even leads to a further epistemic impasse. At this point, a version of ontological pluralism is presented, according to which all the competing theories in a certain ontological dispute can be true-in a sense of "true" to be articulated. The last step is to show how this version of pluralism deals with the reliability challenge, and especially with the complaint that we lack an explanation for our true ontological beliefs.
The Normative and the Natural, 2016
If, as we argue, normative claims don’t describe the world, then in what sense can they be true? Many philosophers have offered what we call substantive theories of truth. For example, on a correspondence theory of truth, to say, “It is true that roses are red” is to assert some relationship of correspondence between “roses are red” and the world: the sentence is true just in case it corresponds to the way the world really is. We argue that these substantive theories have fatal weaknesses. Instead, we endorse a range of ‘low cost’ theories of truth—anaphoric, minimalist, disquotational, and a few others. Low cost theories of truth do not give a substantive theory of truth as above. We argue that low-cost theories are preferable to substantive theories, in that they do not introduce some troublesome relation between a sentence and the world. For example, a low cost theory of truth might hold that “‘roses are red’ is true” asserts the same thing as “roses are red”; the ‘is true’ adds nothing to the content of the sentence. Thus, such theories are deflationary rather than substantive. Rather, such theories focus on the practical significance of truth talk: what is the significance of calling a sentence ‘true’? What does it add? In Chap. 4 (and subsequent chapters), we argue that we can embrace a low-cost theory of truth while still giving an account of normative claims (a) on which some normative claims are objectively true, and (b) and which does not commit us to normative objects or properties in the world that would run afoul of the naturalist commitments we made in Chap. 1. Nor does our account of normative discourse commit us to a doctrine of ‘non-overlapping magisteria,’ whereby one discipline is simply insulated from questions from other disciplines.