Information, Knowledge and Truth: A Polyvalent View (original) (raw)

About the nature of "knowledge"

Gilbert Ryle paid close attention to the difference between "knowing that" and "knowing how" in his book "The Concept of Mind." In this study, I focus primarily on the definition of “knowing that”, with the remark that the two concepts of knowledge, in my view, form a strongly dual epistemic relationship. The curiosity of the chosen philosophical problem is given by the talk of lively philosophical-logical debates that emerged after Edmund L. Gettier's short article published in 1963. . (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?) The "information theory" foundations of knowledge in my view - which have significant ontological implications - are as follows: - Information is not just a socio-cultural phenomenon, but primarily a physical quantity. - The static part of information can be characterized as the Shannon information quantity. - The dynamic of information is generated by the stability and complexity of the space-time structures. - Information is therefore an ’emergent’ quantity. - Information-performance (strength) as a physical quantity can be represented by in the human-social region also as a ‘multivector’ that has components of ‘real-knowledge’ and ‘emotional-impact’. - The knowledge is the ’time-invariant part’ of information-strength. - The ‘separation criteria’ between the ‘real-knowledge’ and the ‘emotional-impact’ can be the stability/instability of the information source, and the evaporation time of the emotional content.

The Concept of Knowledge: What is It For?

Disputatio

What is the concept of knowledge for? What does it do for us? This question cannot be severed from considerations about what we do by using it. In this paper, I propose to view the point of our concept of knowledge in terms of a device for acknowledging epistemic authority in a social and normative space in which we share valuable information. It is our way of collectively expressing the acknowledgment we owe to others because of their being creditable when engaged in the task of knowing. By using the concept of knowledge we are not just marking the epistemic positions we occupy, we are also acknowledging epistemic authority and indicating the advisability of taking oneself or others as “ready” for the transmission of authority.