Insanity and the Deep Self: The Case of JoJo (original) (raw)
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Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2010
Susan Wolf objects to the Real Self View (RSV) of moral responsibility that it is insufficient, that even if one’s actions are expressions of one’s deepest or “real” self, one might still not be morally responsible for one’s actions. As a counterexample to the RSV, Wolf offers the case of JoJo, the son of a dictator, who endorses his father’s (evil) values, but who is insane and is thus not responsible for his actions. Wolf’s data for this conclusion derives from what she takes to be our “pretheoretic intuitions” about JoJo. As it turns out, though, experimental data on actual pretheoretic intuitions does not seem to support Wolf’s claim. In this paper, we present such data and argue that, at least with respect to this particular objection, the RSV can survive Wolf’s attack intact.
Expressing Who We Are: Moral Responsibility and our Awareness of Our Reasons.
Recently, so-called quality of will theories of moral responsibility, according to which agents are morally responsible for actions that express the quality of their wills, have been gaining in popularity. One motivation for such views is that they apparently allow us to hold agents responsible for actions which rival theories seem to excuse, on the grounds that agents lack control over these actions. I argue that this is an illusion: agents express the quality of their wills only in actions the reasons for which they are aware at the time of acting. Quality of will theories are (very nearly) extensionally equivalent to their volitionist rivals.
Views of the self and their ethical implications
1990
VIEWS OF THE SELF AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS SEPTEMBER 1990 THOMAS M. RAVENS, B. A. , DARTMOUTH COLLEGE M.E., THAYER SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Directed by: Professor Gareth Matthews This thesis examines some views of the self and investigates the ethical implications of these views. The working hypothesis is that our ethical principles are conditioned by what we hold to be the nature of the self. My investigation of the self concerns the question of whether there is a metaphysical self which functions as the subject of human experience, that is, which thinks, feels and acts. I conclude that there is no such self. Next, I investigate how our thinking about persons and our moral principles are affected by the denial of the self. I conclude that some principles of moral responsibility such as promise keeping are unaffected for they only presuppose psychological continuity. However, principles of distributive justice may be affected in scope and
Holding others and ourselves to moral norms requires that we understand agents as possessing a capacity for recognizing and acting on those norms. Taking our status as moral agents seriously therefore requires us to make sense of such a capacity. Wallace argues that a genuine ability to act in accordance with norms requires that at least some of our motives be up to us, meaning that as moral agents we must be capable of creating new items in the motivational sequences leading up to action. These active states, volitions, are sharply distinguished from the passive desires against which we exercise our agency. I argue that Wallace’s account is too extreme: the sharp dividing line between passivity and activity in our mental life should be softened. A dispositional view fares better at making sense of our activity as agents, while nevertheless satisfying the normative concerns motivating Wallace’s account.