Biosecurity, bioterrorism and the governance of science: The increasing convergence of science and security policy (original) (raw)
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At a time when the diffusion of knowledge into society and the utilisation of science by industry is as high as ever, some types of research may undergo restrictions on the basis of ethical principles and security imperatives. The role of this doctoral study is to clarify the legal obligations originating from export control laws and affecting research activities and, explore the level of awareness of proliferation risks within the scientific community. National law provisions and especially international law would normally reflect and codify long-lasting ethical principles and patterns that guarantee the smooth functioning of societies. The study by no means intends to stigmatise specific areas of research and direct a purely ethical discussion on what should be considered as moral or not when conducting research. Instead, its main purpose is to identify the implications of export controls of dual-use items and technologies for legitimate research and equip researchers and research organisations with a strategy to cope with the challenges being inherent to the combat against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
Geoforum, 2017
The increasing focus on new biological risks and threats together with unsatisfactory progress in international negotiations about biological disarmament have opened up new questions about the further development of the biological weapons regime. The present paper focuses on the politics of biological (post-)disarmament from the perspective of critical security studies and scrutinizes the changing role of scientific experts in relation to the shifting understanding of the threat of bioweapons. Specifically, it argues that the move toward a networked approach to biosecurity governance relying on an increasing role of experts and nonstate actors may be read in the context of a broader insecuritization of biological risks and threats and the evolution of new techniques of government. Drawing on sociological approaches in security studies, the paper unfolds the connections between the construction of biosecurity and the politics of expertise and explores the changing role of scientific experts in biological disarmament. The paper also finds that the attempts to manage bio-insecurity create demand for new types of expertise and empower actors with a specific form of knowledge who can navigate in the changed structural environment, and enable new forms of governing security.
Access to scientific knowledge is a slippery slope in which the concept of dual-use research comes into play. The scientific community's outcry for accessibility to publications has shined light on the rising issues surrounding censorship from various institutions and the underlying implications of dual-use research in regards to national security vs. academic freedom. I aim to suggest that a particular traditional 'top-down' approach in the traditional hierarchy of institutional research and publication is adverse in effect on the ethics of research censorship and offer policy revisions to remedy the structure.
Safety and Security in the Biotechnological Age
GCSP Geneva Papers, 2010
Advancements in the field of biological research are moving faster now than ever before. At the same time, these biological innovations have a ‘dual use’ potential of which researchers may not be aware. While on the one hand they may provide solutions to many of the world’s problems, on the other hand they may potentially be abused, mishandled or used for hostile purposes. As a result of these possible ‘dark’ uses of biotechnology, it is imperative that a dynamic international regime be put in place to meet, in a comprehensive manner, the multi-layered aspects of the new security challenges that biological advances now pose. The current international regime, led by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), has succeeded in setting normative standards governing non use by states of biological weapons in warfare. However, these shall soon be insufficient to cope with the rapid and momentous changes expected in the field of biotechnology in this century. The new regime must bring together the fields of industry, science and various non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to build together an effective web of response to the dark potentialities of biotechnology advances. Such a web implies a network of different solutions and organisations to tackle the problem. Indeed, there is no one single ‘magic’ solution to combating the multi-faceted nature of biological research advances, and the coordinated international response must reflect this.
Emerging Biotechnologies and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
Texas A&M Law Review, 2015
In light of the quandaries presented by domestic law, has the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 (“BWC”) also been so outpaced by the technologies that it is no longer effective and meaningful in international law? Part II will examine the continuum of official actions that have attempted to keep pace with the growing biotechnologies that may present threats to global biosecurity through interpreting the BWC. Part III looks at how these definitions may not be sufficient. Finally, Part IV looks at other mechanisms that may provide a better way of controlling biological weapons than redefining the technologies through the current processes.
Biosecurity as a Boundary Object: Science, Society, and the State (Security Dialogue)
Security Dialogue, 2016
Biosecurity is a concern in many parts of the world but is differently conceived and addressed depending on context. This article draws on two cases concerned with life sciences research involving dangerous pathogens, one in the United States and one in Israel, to examine this variability. In both cases, concern revolves around issues of biosafety and bioterrorism, which are targeted by similar policies and solutions. The cases, nevertheless, differ. In the United States, biosecurity is contextualized in the dynamics between science and society, and apprehension about research with dangerous pathogens focuses on the social risks and benefits of such research. In Israel, biosecurity is contextualized in the dynamics between science and the state and hinges on whether and how far the state should restrict scientific freedom. In view of this difference, the authors advocate the development of a nuanced concept of biosecurity capable of describing and explaining local permutations. They...
K. Lee. Lerner. "Biological weapons, a genie already out of the bottle and awaiting a master: Evaluating arguments in favor of resuming research and development on biological weapons." (Preprint) Originally appeared as "Bioweapons Research" in Schlager, N. ed. Science in Dispute, Thomson | Gale, 2002
A contentious issue that forces us to confront humankind's deepest fears, the debate over whether the United States should resume research and development programs on biological weapons often disregards the fact that although the United States biological weapons programs formally ended in 1969-by then President Richard M. Nixon's executive order-research on potential biological weapons has never stopped-only the formal research dedicated to the weaponization 1 of agents. As abhorrent as the argument may be on a personal level, there are valid strategic reasons for the United States to abandon its current BWC policy and treaty obligations in order to openly resume formal research and development programs on the actual weaponization of biological agents. Renewed research and development on biological weapons does not demand that the United States begin to accumulate or stockpile such weapons and this article makes no such argument. Regardless, the evolution of political realities in the last half of the twentieth century clearly points toward the probability that, within the first half of the twenty-first century, biological weapons will surpass nuclear and chemical weapons in terms of potential threat to the citizens of the United States. An effective defense to biologic agents-and the development of strategic weapons that will deter attack on the United States-can only be obtained through limited but deliberate biological weapons research. (download to read more)